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INTRODUCTION
The failure mode and effects analyses (FMEA) were performed during preliminary R
and detail design in order to identify all MOD-2 failure modes and to ensure
that the resultant effects are: (1) acceptable from a safety standpoint and
(2) fail safe or, if not fail safe, represent least cost solutions (i.e.,
result in the lowest cost of electricity).
The FMEA's were completed by the cognizant designers and reviewed by system
engineers and a reliability specialist. In general, fail safe design is
employed wherever cost effective and a safe life design is employed for
single thread structural items such as the rotor. The failure severity code
used in the analysis is described in Table 1.
Completion of the FMEA's by the designers <as an in-line part of the design
process resulted in numerous design changes to either prevent serious failure
modes or reduce their impact. The FMEA's contained herein reflect the detail
design configuration.. All major changes incorporated subsequent to the DDR R
will be evaluated relative to personnel safety and cost of electricity. R
Whenever applicable, failure frequency data has been included in the analyses.
This data was used to quantify the probability of occurrences and hence the,
impact on the cost of electricity. ' , "
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Over 860 failure modes were analyzed and numerous corrective actions were R
implemented to preclude costly failures. .Special attention was directed at
all potentially catastrophic failure modes; the results of this effort are
summarized in Table 2.
Wherever practical, redundancy- is used to preclude catastrophic failures.
Safe life design is employed for items whose failure could cause serious
damage, but could not be made redundant (e.g., blade fatigue cracks). The
ability to control each rotor pitch control surface independent of the
other precludes several potentially serious failure modes such as control
linkage binding or bearing failures (the MOD-2 design provide for an orderly
shutdown with just one control tip operative). The most probable, potentially
catastrophic failure mode is the rapid progression of a fatigue crack in the
blade. The MOD-2 design has incorporated a crack detection system which will R
cause an orderly WTS shutdown prior to suffering significant rotor damage.
The detailed FMEA sheets are contained "in Appendix A, and relevant electrical/
hydraulic schematics are included in Appendix B. Appendix C contains the
results of a staff analysis of WTS emergency shutdowns. Appendix D contains
an FMEA of the cable runs and both slip rings.
Summary of Revisions (Initial Analysis at PDR; this revision at DDR)
The purposes for this revision are: (1) to update the FMEA based on changes
to the MOD-2 configuration that have occurred since the preliminary-design
review (PDR), (2) to add a new section that contains an analysis of the
possible effect of electrical failures that have a potential for causing
numerous secondary failures (e.g., a wire shorts and causes other wires in
the same bundle to short to ground or to other wires) and (3) to add a
new section that contains an analysis of the possible effects of contact-
to-contact shorts of adjacent slip rings in the two slip ring assemblies.
The latter two sections could not be completed at the PDR since cable runs
and slip ring assignments had not yet been established.
The major configuration changes covered by this revision are:
1. Addition of ice detection and crack detection systems.
2. Changes in the gearbox lubrication system to take advantage
of the pump redundancy.
3. Deletion of the delta pressure sensors in the yaw hydraulics
system.
4. Changes in the yaw drag brake caliper to make the drag propor-
tional to hydraulic pressure rather than depending upon a
mechanical spring.
The following pages have been added:
11 i - i-ew page
Pages 273 through 295 Appendix D (new section)
The following pages have been revised:
i, n , v ( was page iv)
1, 2/29, 46, 69.1, 72, 82, 98, 129, 148, 169, 262, 263, 266a,
267 & 268
m
TABLE 1, SAFETY AND FAILURE SEVERITY CATEGORY GUIDE
HAZARD
CATEGORY
Minimal
Marginal
Critical
Catastrophic
FUNCTION
c
None
(1)
,. anNone
Critical
(2)
Loss of o
Function
(3)
Loss of c
System
(4)
IMPACT
REPAIR COST
nd a
Under $1000
d an
Under $1,000
r o
Up to $10,000
r
 Over °
$10,000
TIME TO REPAIR
nd a
Under 2 Days
d an
Under 2 Days
r o
Up to 10 Days
r
 Over °
10 Days
PERSONNEL
INJURY
nd
None
d
First Aid
r
Hospital
jr
Fatal or
Permanent
Disable
Impact values include the dollar and human cost of an unplanned event
(a realized hazard).
Hospitalization is a severity category; includes wound stitches, extensive
burn treatment, broken bone setting and equivalents.
Permanent Disablement includes loss of limb, sight or other majority
body function.
*With the exception of flying objects emanating from the WTS, personnel
injury can only occur during period of preventative and corrective
maintenance.
(1) Minor items that can be repaired with convenient.
(2) No loss of generating capability, but repair must be accomplished
within 2 weeks to avoid shutdown.
(3) Causes WTS shutdown.
(4) Destruction of major element such as rotor or gear box.
TABLE 1, SAFETY AND FAILURE CATEGORY GUIDE
IV
Table 2, Summary of Ma/or Failures and Effects - MOD-2-107
Failure Effect Corrective action
Structural failures
Rotor
• Ice forms and is thrown off
• Blade fatigue cracks
• Spar buckling
• Fatigue crack at control
tip spindle end thread or at
tip-blade interface
• Inboard joint-rotor to hub bolt
or flange weld failure
• Broken teeter trunnion or flange
cracks
• Buckling inboard sections or hub
compression skins
Drive
• Broken low speed shaft
• Broken quill shaft bulkhead
joint
• Teeter shaft or flange cracks
Tower
• Failure of structure or foundation
Control system failures
• Signal to one tip incorrectly drives
control surface to zero pitch
• Control linkage to one tip jams
• Control system signal to both
pitch actuators incorrectly drives
control surfaces to zero pitch
• Power output sensor fails, calling
for power increase when system
is already at full power output
Electrical power failures
• Synchronizer provides signal to
close bus tie contactor too soon or
too late (WTS not proper phase
relationship or voltage to mate
with bus)
• Loss of commercial power while
WTS is at rated power
Could injure public - remote possibility
Loss of part of rotor and possible
secondary damage if allowed to progress
Loss of load
Possible extensive rotor damage
Extensive damage
Emergency shutdown triggered by
differential of tip position signals
Emergency shutdown triggered by
generator output power sensor
Damaging overspeed possible if load
drops off prior to initiating shutdown
High current transient causing high torque
load on the generator that could cause
mechanical damage to generator or
drive train
Rotor speed increases
Ice detection system added
Crack detection system shuts down
WTS prior to incurring serious damage
Safe life design
Fatigue tests
Inspection schedule
Mid-blade assembly buckling test
Emergency shutdown effected prior
to reaching damaging overspeed
Safe life design
Strain gage correlation
Safe life design
Safe life design
None required, analysis verifies that
one tip operative can safely stop rotor
None required — shutdown occurs prior
to damaging overspeed
System changed to command shutdown
prior to load dropping off Also, backup
power sensor signal sent to controller ,
Synchronizer is fully redundant and
fail safe
None required — shutdown occurs prior
to damaging overspeed
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MOD-2 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS
ANALYSIS - DETAILED WORKSHEETS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Control Number Item
4.0 Rotor Subassembly
4.1 Rotor Blade
" 4.1.1 Shell Structure 1
4.1.2 Spars - - 2
4.1.3 Inbrd. Joint 3
4.1.4 Pivot Spindle 4
4.2 Hub 5
4.3 Pitch Change Mechanism
4.3.1 Hydraulics
4.3.1.1 Actuators 8
4.3.1.2 Reservoir 9
4.3.1.3 Accumulators - 10
4.3.1.4 - Valves
4.3.1.4.1 » Start-Stop Valves 11
4.3.1.4.2 System Relief Valve 12
4.3.1.4.3 Teeter Brake Valve 13
4.3.1.4.5 Servo Valve 14
4.3.1.4.5 Shuttle Valve 15
4.3.1.5 Fittings & Hoses 16
4.3.1.6 Filters 17
4.3.1.7 & 8 Motor - Pump Assembly 18
4.3.1.9 Sensing Devices (See controls)
4.3.1.10 Electrical Cables'
4.3.1.10.1 Control Cable to Tip No. 1 Actuator 19
4.3.1.10.2 Control Cable to Tip No. 2 Actuator 20
4.3.1.10.3 Tip No. 1 Bonding Strap 21
4.3.1.10.4 Tip No. 2 Bonding Strap > 22
4.3.1.10 Cables and Connectors (See controls)
4.3.1.11 Emergency Feather Device (See controls)
4.3.2 Feather Lock Mechanism 23
4.3.3 Fasteners, Rod Ends 24
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5.0 Drive Train Subassembly
5.1 Low Speed Shaft and Bearings
5.1.1 Shaft (Part of low speed shaft & bearings) 25
5.1.2 Radial Bearing 26
5.1.3 Teeter Bearing " 27
5.1.4 Radial Thrust Bearing 28
5.1.5 Teeter Stop 29
5.1.6 Electrical Distribution Equipment
5.1.6.1 Slip Rings 30
5.1.6.2 Slip Ring Junction Box 31
5.1.6.3 Electrical Cables
5.1.6.3.1 Power Cable to Hydraulic System 32
5.1.6.3.2 Control Cable to Hydraulic System 33
5.1.6.3.3 " Rotor Actuator Control Cable 34
5.1.6.3.4 Flex Cable Across Teeter Bearing 35
5.1.6.3.5, Teeter Bearing Bonding Strap , 36
5.1.6.4 Rotor Junction Box 37
5.2 Quill Shaft and Couplings
5.2.1 Quill Shaft 38
5.2.2 - • Quill Shaft Coupling 39
5.3.1 Gearbox Mounting Installation 40
5.3.2 Gears and Shafts 41
5.3.3 Gear Box Bearings 42
5.4 High Speed Shafts and Couplings
'5.4.1 Highspeed Shaft 43
5.4.1 High Speed Shaft Couplings 44
5.5 Rotor Brake 45
5.6 .Lubrication System
5.6.1 Gearbox Lubrication 46
5.6.2 Rotor Bearing Lubrication 47
5.6.3 Generator Lubrication' " 48
5.7 Generator 49
6.0 Nacelle Subassembly
6.1 . Nacelle Structure
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6.1.1 Primary Truss Structure 50
6.1.2 Secondary Support Structure 51
6.1.3 Yaw Bearing Support Structure 52
6.1.4 Forward Bearing Support 53
6.1.5 Aft Bearing Support 54
6.1.6 Enclosure 55
6.3 Yaw Drive System
6.3.1 Brake Disc - 56
6.3.2 Bearing, Gear, Pinions 57
6.3.3 Gear Box 58
6.3.4 Hydraulic Motor 59
6.3.5 Hydraulic Pump and Motor 60
6.3.6 Hydraulic System Components
6.3.6.1 Reservoir 61
6.3.6.2 Heat Exchanger 62
6.3.6.3 - Accumulators ' 63
6.3.6.4 Relief Valve 64
6.3.6.5 Solenoid Valves 65
6.3.6.6 Motor Control Valve 66
6.3.6.7 Fittings, Tubes, Hoses - Yaw System 67
6.3.6.8 Fittings, Tubes, Hoses - Yaw Brake 68
6.3.6.9 Fittings, Tubes, Hoses - Rotor Brake 69
6.3.6.10, 11 High Pressure and Low Pressure Filters - 69.1
6.3.6.12 Check Valves 69.2
6.3.6.13 Needle Valve 69.3
6.3.7 Weather Shield 70
6 3.8 Miscellaneous Fasteners 71-
6.3.9 Brake Calipers 72,
6.3.10 Yaw Sensors (See Controls)
6.5 Environmental Control System
6.5.1 Cooling Equipment 73
6.5.2 Heating Equipment 74
6.6.1.1 High Voltage Power Cable to GAU 74.1
6.6 Electrical Cables
6.6.1 High Voltage Power Cables 75
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6.6.2 Accessory Power Cables
6.6.2.1 Main 480 Volt Feeders 76
6.6.2.2 AC Power Cable to the Control System 77
6.6.2.3 DC (Uninterruptable) Power to the C.S. 78
6.6.2.4 Power Cable to Yaw Drive System 79
6.6.2.5 Power Cable to Pitch Control System 80
6.6.2.6 Power Cable to Gear Box Oil Heaters 81
6.6.2.7 Power Cable to Lubrication System 82
6.6.2.8 Power Cable to Environmental Control System 83
6.6.2.9 Power Cable to Electrical Facilities Eqpt. 84
6.6.2.10 Uninterruptable Power Feeders 85
6.6.3 Control and Instrumentation Cables
6.6.3.1 Generator Control Cable 86
6.6.3.2 Control Cable to the Generator Ace. Unit 87
6.6.3.3 Control Cable to Rotor 88
6.6.3.4 Control Cable 89
6.6.3.5 Control Cable to Tower 90
6.6.3.6 Control Cable to Gear Box 91
6.6.3.7 Control Cable to Lub. System 92
6.6.3.8 Control Cable to Yaw Drive System 92.1
6.6.4 Slip Ring Brush Assembly (Drive Train) 93
6.8 Generator Assessorv Unit
6.8.1 Generator Circuit Breaker 94
6.8.2 Generator Excitation Controls
6.8.2.1 Voltage Regulator 95
6.8.2.2 Power Factor Controller 96
6.8.2.3 Field Current Relay 97
6.8.3. Generator Protective Relays
6.8.3.1 Over Voltage Relay 98
6.8.3.2 Under Frequency Relay 99
6.8.3.3 Over Current Relay 100
6.8.3.4 Reverse Power Relay 101
6.8.3.5 Ground Current Relay 102
6.8.3.6 Differential Protection Relay 103
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6.8.3.7 Generator Winding Overtemperature Relay " 103.1
6.8.3.8 Generator Bearing Overtemperature Relay 103.2
6.8.3.9 Loss of Excitation Relay 103.3
6.8.3.10 Power Factor Relay • 103.4
6.8.3.11 Generator Bearing Undertemperatur'e Relay 103.5
6.8.4 Generator Instrumentation Transformers - -
6.8.4.1 Potential Transformers •. 104
6.8.4.2 Current Transformers 105
6.8.5 Generator Instrumentation Transducers —
6.8.5.1 Voltage Transducer , 106
6.8.5.2 ' Current Transducer 107
6.8.5.3 Real Power Transducer 108
6.8.5.4 Reactive Power Transducer 109
6.8.5.5 Generator Temperature Transducer 109.1
6.8.6 Accessory Power Transformer 110
6.8.7 Accessory Power Circuit Breaker Panels - -
6.8.7.1 480 Volt Circuit Breaker Panel ' 111
6.8.7.2 115/230 Volt Circuit Breaker Panel 112
6.8.8 GAU Internal Wiring" '
6.8.8.1 4.16 KV Buses 114
6.8.8.2 480 Volt Circuits 115
6.8.8.3 115/230 Volt Circuits 116
6.8.8.4 . D.C. Circuits " 117
6.8.8.5 Control Circuits . 118
6.9 Electrical Facilities . - -
6.9.1 Lighting Equipment 119
6.9.2 Convenience Outlets , 120
6.9.3 Aircraft Warning Lights 121
7.0 Tower Subassembly - -
7.1 Tower - -
7.1.1 Tower Structure 122
7.1.2 Nacelle Access Device 123
7.1.3 Ladder 124
7.1.4 Tower Foundation • 125
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7.2 Electrical Cables 125
7.2.1 High Voltage Cables - -
7.2.1.1 Tower HV Cable 126
7.2.1.2 Tower to BTBU HV Cable 127
7.2.1.3 BTBU to Transformer HV Cable 128
7.2.1.4 Aerial HV Cable 129
7.2.2 Accessory Power Cables - -
7.2.2.1 Accessory Power Feeder to the Tower Jet. Box 130
7.2.2.2 Accessory Power Feeder to the Nacelle 131
7.2.2.3 Accessory Power Cable to the Tower Cont. Unit 132
7.2.2.4 Ace. Power Cable to the Lift System 133
7.2.2.5 Ace. Pwr. Feeder to Twr. Elec. Facility 134
7.2.2.6 Ace. Pwr. Cable to Pwr. Output Transformer 135
7.2.2.7 Uninterruptable Pwr. Fdr. to Twr. Junction Box 136
7.2.2.8 UPS Cable to Tower Control Unit - 137
7.2.2.9 UPS Feeder to Nacelle 138
7.2.3 " Control Cables - -
7.2.3.1 Control Cable to Nacelle • 139
7.2.3.2 Control Cable to BTB Unit 140
7.3 Cable Transition Mechanism 141
7.4 Lightning Protection System , - -
7.4.1 Electrical Path Across Yaw Bearing 142
7.4.2 Generator Lightning Arresters 143
7.4.3 Transformer Lightning Arrestors 144
7.4.4 Earth Grid 145
7.4.5 Connection to Earth Grid 146
7.6 Electrical Equipment - -
7.6.1 Bus Tie Breaker Unit - -
7.6.1.1 BTBU Enclosure 147
7.6.1.2 Bus Tie Contactor (BTC) 148
7.6.1.3 Bus Tie Controls - -
7.6.1.3.1 Synchronizer 149
7.6.1.3.2 Differential Protection Relay 150
7.6.1.4 Bus Tie Instrumentation - -
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7.6.1.4.1 Generator Voltmeter 151
7.6.1.4.2 Utility Voltmeter 152
7.6.1.4.3 Generator Ammeter 153
7.6.1.4.4 Line Ammeter 154
7.6.1.4.5 Generator KW Meter ' 155
7.6.1.4.6 Generator PF Meter 156
7.6.1.4.7 Generator KWH Meter 157
7.6.1.4.8 Line KWH Meter
 i 158
7.6.1.4.9 Potential Transformer 159
7.6.1.4.10 Current Transformer 160
7.6.1.4.11 Generator Total Running Hours 161
7.6.1.4.12 BTC Operating Cycles 162
7.6.1.5 . Accessory Power Transformers
7.6.1.5.1 4.16 KV to 480 Volt Transformer 167
7.6.1.5.2 480 Volt to 115/230 Volt Transformer 168
7.6.1.6 Uninterruptable Power Supply
7.6.1.6.1 Battery 169
7.6.1.6.2 Battery Charger 170
7.6.1.6.3 Battery Heater 171
7.6.1.7 BTBU Internal Wiring
7.6.1.7.1 High Voltage Input Bus 172
7.6.1.7.2 High Voltage Output Bus 173
7.6.1.7.3 480 Volt Acces. Power Circuit ,-,.
Breaker Panel
7.6.1.7.4 115/230 Volt Acces. Power Circuit
 1?5
Breaker Panel
7.6.1.7.5 Umnterruptable Power Circuit 176
7.6.1.7.6 Control Circuit 177
7.6.2 Power Output Transformer 178
7.6.3 Fused Manual Disconnect Switch 179
7.7 Control Subsystem - 179.1
7.7.1 Power Failure Restart Circuit 180
7.7.2 CPU, PROM and Data Bus 181
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7.7.3 Interrupt Logic 182
7.7.4 Deleted 183
7.7.5 Serial I/O Circuits 184
7.7.6 Fail Safe System 185
7.7.7 RPM Signal 186
7.7.8 No. 1 Vibration Signal 187
7.7.9 No. 2 Vibration Signal 188
7.7.10 Bearing Overtemperature #1 189
7.7.11 Bearing Overtemperature #2 190
7.7.12 Deleted 191
7.7.13 Teeter Brake Unlock System 192
7.7.14 Emergency Accumulator ,q3
Command Signal
7.7.15 Pitch Hyd. Pump On Command Signal 194
7.7.16 Pitch Hyd. Pump Off Signal 195
7.7.17 No. 1 Pitch Servo Command Signal 196
7.7.18 No. 2 Pitch Servo Command Signal 197
7.7.19 No. 1 Blade Pitch Position Signal 198
7.7.20 No. 2 Blade Pitch Position Signal 199
7.7.21 Blade Locked #1 Signal 200
7.7.22 Pitch Hyd. Filter Clogged Signal 201
7.7.23 Blade Lock #2 Signal 202
7.7.24 Pitch Hyd. Oil Temp. High Signal 203
7.7.25 Pitch Hyd. Oil Pressure Low Signal 204
7.7.26 Pitch Accumulators Precharge Low 205
7.7.27 Pitch Hyd Oil Level Low Signal 206
7.7.28 Gear Box Oil Temperature High Signal 207
7.7.29 Gear Box Oil Pressure Low Signal 208
7.7.30 Gear Box Oil Level Low Signal 209
7.7.31 Gear Box Oil Temp. Low 210
7.7.32 Gear Box Oil Flow Low Signal 211
7.7.33 Deleted 212
7.7.34 Gear Box Oil Pump On Command Signal 213
7.7.35 Gear Box Oil Pump Off Command 214
7.7.36 Rotor Brake Command Signal 215
7.7.37 Deleted 216
7.7.38 Rotor Brake Unlocked Signal 217
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7.7.39 Generator Field Enable Signal 218
7.7.40 Generator Output Signal 219
7.7.41 Utility Power Status Signal " 220
7.7.42 Bus Tie Contactor Open Signal 221
7.7.43 Sync. Enable Signal 222
7.7.44 Bus Tie Disconnect Command Signal 223
7.7.45 Remote RS 232 Signal 224
7.7.46 Local RS 232 Signal 225
7.7.47 Ground Intrusion Signal 226
7.7.48 Deleted _ . 227
7.7.49 NCU Temp. Low Signal > 228
7.7.50 ' Yaw Accumulator Precharge Low Signal 229
7.7.51 Yaw Oil Level Low Signal , 230
7.7.52 Yaw Oil Pressure Low Signal 231
7.7.53 Deleted 232
7.7.54 Deleted 233
7.7.55 Yaw Oil Temp. High Signal 234
7.7.56 Yaw Oil Pump On Signal 235
7.7.57 Yaw Oil Pump Off Signal 236
7.7.58 Yaw Left Command Signal 237
7.7.59 Yaw Right Command Signal 238
7.7.60 Deleted 239
7.7.61 Fail Safe Yaw Hyd. Pump Off Command 240
7.7.62 NCU Temperature Low Signal 241
7.7.63 No. 1 Wind Speed Signal 242
7.7.64 No. 2 Wind Speed Signal 243
7.7.65 No. 1 Direction Signal 244
7.7.66 No. 2 Direction Signal 245
7.7.67 Fail Safe Generator Bearing Overtemp. 246
7.7.68 Fail Safe Enable Signal 247
7.7.69 Fail Safe Emergency Ace. Pressure
 9.fi
Low Signal "°
7.7.70 Fail Safe Pitch Accum. Signal 249
7.7.71 Fail Safe Pitch Hyd. Pump Off Command 250
7.7.72 - Fail Safe Bearing Temp. #1 & #2 Signal 251
7.7.73 Fail Safe Vibration #1 & #2 Signal 252
7.7.74 Fail Safe Gearbox Oil Pressure Signal 253
Page 1.9
7.7.75
7.7.76
7.7.77
7.7.78
7.7.79
Fall Safe Gearbox Temp. High Signal 254
Deleted , 255
Fail Safe Rotor Brake Command Signal 256
Fail Safe Overspeed 257
Test Van Ready Signal 258
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MOO-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR
COMPONENT
SHELL STRUCTURE
PAGE 1
FMEANO 4.1.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CARRY SHEAR AND BENDING LOADS TO BLADE ATTACHMENT AT HUB
IN TENSION SKIN WELD. CAUSES LOSS OF PORTION OF APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
BLADE IF CRACK IS UNDECTECTED. ALL
MAY CAUSE CHANGE IN BLADE STIFFNESS AND IN TURN INCREASE
VIBRATION. -
2. ICE ACCUMULATIONS COULD SEPARATE FROM ROTOR AND STRIKE PEOPLE
OR ANIMALS IF DETECTION SYSTEM FAILS
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Cannnl hp armrat.e y ralrulatpd
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i CRACK DETECTION SYSTEM.
2. ICE DETECTORS ON BLADES.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 IT IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID THIS FAILURE MODE BY USE OF A CRACK DETECTION SYSTEM.
(INCORPORATED INTO SYSTEM)
SAFE LIFE DESIGN OF THIS COMPONENT IS INTENDED TO AVOID THIS FAILURE MODE.
* IF NOT DETECTED
2. ICE DETECTORS ON BOTH BLADES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. DETECTION CIRCUIT IS FAIL SAFE
(I.E , OPEN OR SHORTED HIRE/CONNECTION RESULTS IN WTS SHUTDOWN).
[NAME j.
 NQBLE |DATE 8/15/7J
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/78
3/8/79
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
ROTOP - SPARS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CARRY SHEAR LOADS TO BLADE ATTACHMENT AT HUB.
PAGE ^
FMEANO 4.1.2
t
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i FATIGUE CRACK ACROSS SPAR.
PAl^Fc; nVFRSTRFSSTNG OF SHFI 1 STRIir.TIIRF'
2 BUCKLING OF SEARS BY HIGH RFSTDIIAL WELDING STRESSES
CAUSFS nVFRSTRFSSING OF SPAR TO SHFI 1 UFI HS
3
1
4
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
A l l
Al 1 '
F
FAILURE FREQUENCY " FAIL URE SEVERITY
FAILURE COMPONENT MEANTIME .
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE .BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
MODE NO FREQ %
 X l106 PER HOUR -- (YEARS) 1 II
1 _Cfl mot hp arnir; tply rfllnilfltpl
„ 11 ii ii H
-
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
lit - IV
x x*
X X*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 Crack Detection System
2 Not directly observable
3 Change in blade stiffness may be detected by an accelerometer as increased vibration
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
THESE FAILURE- MODES WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY AFFECT WTS OPERATION. BUT COUl D I FAH in
CATASTROPHICJFAILURE OF THE BLADE SHELl STRIimiRF TN A FATRl Y SHORT TTMF
IT IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID MODE I BY USE OF A CRACK nFTFfTTnu SYSTFM
SAFE LIFE DES"lGN OF THIS COMPONENT IS INTENDED TO AVOID THESE FAII
\l
(INCORPORATED).
URF MODFS:
* IF NOT DETECTED
NAME J. NOBLE DATE 8/15/78
OPERATING MODES " R6V. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE 3/8/79
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H - TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1- FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR ASSY.
COMPONENT
INBD JOINT
PAGE 3
FMEANO 4.1.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ATTACHES ROTOR R| AHF in HIIR
FAILURI
1 E TO CORROSION, FATIGUE, OR INTERNAL
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
DEFECT - LOSS OF BLADE CAUSES SEVERE ASYMMETRIC LOADING F. G. H
ON TEETER BEARING. DRIVE TRAIN. NACELLE & TOWER.
2. FLANGE WELD FAILURE DUE TO INCLUSION. FATIGUE CORROSION OR OVER-
LOAD - LOSS OF BLADE CAUSES SEVERE ASYMMETRIC LOADING
TEETER BEARING. DRIVE TRAIN. NACELLE & TOWER. F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL:
in
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Cannot be accurately calr Hated
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL INSPECTION (BOLTS MISSING - CRACKS IN WELD)
CHANGE IN NATURAL FREQUENCY (OR STIFFNESS) OF ROTOR ASSY.
INCREASE IN VIBRATION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. INSPECTION OF FLANGE WELD & CONSERVATIVE LOCAI HFSTRN
2. USE OF MANY. SMALL DIAMETER HIGH QUALITY BOLTS GIVES REDUNDANT LOAD PATH
3. APPLICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF GOOD CORROSION PROTECTION SYSTFM (TNSTnF ft nilTSTDF)
SHOULD PREVENT ANY FAILURE CAUSED BY CORROSION (ALSO FAY SURFACE SFAI ANT)
4. LOW FATIGUE ALLOWABLES SHOULD PRECLUDE FAILURE DUE TO MOMENTARY OVERLO'AD.
5. SAFE LIFE DESIGN OF THESE COMPONENTS IS INTENDED TO AVOID FATIGUE FAILURES.
JOINT FATIGUE TEST TO ESTABLISH FATIGUE ALLOWABLES
* IF NOT DETECTED
NAME AT Falco DATE 8/16/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D - TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G-OPERATE
H-TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure'Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
ROTOR - PIVOT SPINDLE
PAGE 4
FMEANO 4.1 .4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE CONTROL AXIS AND STRUCTURAL RESTRAINT FOR CONTROL TIP.
•
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i FATTGUF TRACK AT INBP END THREAD T™ unni n Ffii i PIPP raiKiMC
IMBALANCE & SHUTDOWN.
2 FATIGUE CRACK AT TIP-BLADE INTERFACE.
IMBALANCE & SHUTDOWN.
3 OVERSPEED CAUSF9 RFNDTNG flF SPTNni F.
CAUSE IMBALANCE X SHUTDOWN
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE BETWEEN FAILURE
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 1%0 6 PER HOUR (YEARS)
1 Cannot, hf a>rurately ca
2 .1 ii
3 .. N
-
TIP WOllin FAN OFF TAIKT
DISPLACED HINGELINE WOULD
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL ,
-NG ALL
ALL
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
1 II
1 culated
„
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III - IV
X
x •
Y"
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i OBSERVABLE
2 OBSERVABLE
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
^
SAFE LIFF DESIGN OF THIS COMPONENT IS INTEND™ ™ flunrn ruccr CATI nor wnnrc
REDUNDANCY COULD BE ACHIEVED BY AN ADDITIONAI n AMP OR STMTI AD ntrwrrr ADniiMn CDTMHI r
AND PUT INBOARD OF THE OUTBOARD BEARING.
>
-
NAME J. NOBLE DATE 8/1 5/78
OPERATING MODES RCV. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
HUB
COMPONENT
HUB
PAGE 5
FMEANO 4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ATTACHES ROTOR BLADE TO TEETER BEARING
FA
^
UR\TGHTSN&INGFESCTRIKE - LOCALIZED PAINT DAMAGE. FAY SEAL APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
PROTECTED BY CONSIDERABLE METAL-METAL CONTACT ALL
2 HAIL - OVERALL PAINT DAMAGE - MOST SEVERE ON LEADING EDGE
ALL
SNIPER - LOCALIZED PAINT DAMAGE
ALL
INTERNAL MOISTURE BUILDUP - ACCELERATES CORROSION
LARGE AMOUNT COULD FREEZE AND CAUSE UNBALANCE ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Frequency is site ( ependent
-fF
requonry j pppnHpnt
requiincy is site ( ependent
Frequnncy is site dependent
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1, 2 and 3: VISUAL FOR PAINT DAMAGE & RESULTING CORROSION
INTERNAL MOISTURE DETECTION SYSTEM
II WILL Bh
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
4 MOISTURE BUILDUP IS MINIMIZED BY PROVIDING VENTS AT OUTBD. END AND
ALLOWING CENTRIFUGAL FORCE TO FORCE THE WATER OUT. CORROSION
CONTROL SYSTEM WILL MINIMIZE CORROSION.
1,2,3 NORMAL MAINTENANCE PAINTING SHOULD PREVENT ANY MAJOR DAMAGE DUE TO
LOCALIZED PAINT REMOVAL.
1,2 WTS INSPECTION FOLLOWING EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS.
NAME AL FALCO DATE 8/6/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
HUB
COMPONENT
HUB
PAGE 6 ~
FMEANO 4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ATTACHES ROTOR BLADE TO TEETER BEARING
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i INBD. OF STA. 60: -HUB FAILURE FRQM'FATIGUE CRACK PROPAGATION APPLICABLEOPERATING-MODES
RESULTING IN SEVERE DEFORMATION?; ANH POSSTRI F TNTFRFFRFNrF UITTH F", G. lH
2 NACELLE OR TflWER OIJTBD OF STA fiBr HUB FAIL11RF FROM FATTRIIF C.WC.K
PRQPAGATinN rAUSTNR LOSS OF BLAQ£_ RFSIM TTMB JN
F.G.H
ASYMMETRIC LnAnTNR ON TFFTFR RFARTNR, NA miF, T H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
til
CATASTROPHIC
IV
rANNHT RF fmiRATM Y rA[ r. JLATED
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 ? VISI1AI
CHANGE IN FREQUENCY OF ROTOR ASSY.
INCREASE IN VIBRATION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1,2SAFE LIFE DESIGN IS INTENDED TO AVOID FATIGUE FAILURES
[NAME AL FALCO DATE 8/ 6/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER-
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
HUB
COMPONENT
HUB
PAGE 7
FMEANO 4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ATTACHES ROTOR BLADE TO TEETER BEARING
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
BUCKLING OF COMPRESSION SKINS DUE TO OVERLOAD (SEVERE SNOW, ICE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
A, F, G
&/OR HURRICANE LOADS) RESULTING IN COLLAPSEOF BLADE AND NTS SHUT-
DOWN INITIATED BY VIBRATION DETECTION SYSTEM AFTER STARTUP.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
CANNO BE ACCURATE _Y CALCULATED
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VIBRATION PICK-UP MOUNTED ON LOW SPEED SHAFT FRONT BEARING.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSERVATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING RANGE TO MINIMIZE RISK OF
THIS FAILURE MODE .
NAME AL FALCO DATE 8/16/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
ACTUATORS
PAGE g
FMEANO 4.3.1.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
POSITION THE VARIABLE PITCH PORTION OF THE, WIND TURBINE ROTOR BLADE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
 INTERNflL
.
 REDUCES RATE QF MOTION, ACTUATOR
CREEPS UNDER LOAD, HEATS FLUID.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F, G, H
2 EXTERNAL LEAK.DISSIPATES SYSTEM FLUID
F, G, H
3 JAMMED - UNABLE TO CONTROL BLADE PITCH ON ONE BLADE ONLY
F, G, H
ROD-END SEPARATION - UNABLE TO CONTROL BLADE PITCH, ONE BLADE
ONLY F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
RAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
.95 70 1.7
.04
:or
70
70"
41
TFT
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
POOR SPEED CONTROL, OVERHEAT WARNING, MANUAL TEST
2 VISUAL, LOW FLUID QUANTITY ALARM
BACK SIGNALS FROM 2 BLADES DISAGREE, UNABLE TO hL-AIHLk UK UNhLAIHL-H ONE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
SYSTEM WILL- SHUT DOWN.
1. SUGGEST MANUAL TEST TO ALLOW MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO DETECT INTERNALLY
LEAKY ACTUATOR. BY DISABLING FEEDBACK. ABSOLUTE RATE OF CHANGE DIFFERENCES
CAN BE DETECTED AND ACTUATOR CAN BE REPLACED PRIOR TO FAILURE.
3.4 SIMGLF Bl AHF FFATHFRFD WILL STOP THE ROTOR. FREE TIP WILL ALIGN ITSELF
STREAMLINE TO THE WIND.
* IF UNDETECTED DURING INSPECTIONS.
NAME D. W. KING DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A-SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
RESERVOIR
PAGE 9
FMEANO 4.3.1.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONTAINS A SUPPLY OF HYDRAULIC FLUID FOR THE PITCH CONTROL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
FAILUF TUMBLES - APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F.G.H, & I
2 ROTARY SEAL FAILS - AIR SLOWLY ENTERS HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. &/OR OIL
LEAKS FROM BREATHER F, 6,H, & I
LIQUID LEVEL GAUGE FAILS - PRODUCES EMPTY INDICATION PRODUCES
FALSE INDICATION F.G.H, & I
4 EXTERNAL JOINTS LEAKS - EVENTUALLY PRODUCES LOW LEVEL ALARM
SPREADS OIL IN AREA OF LOW SPEED SHAFT F,G,H,&I
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 10 110
2,4 100 20 5.7
100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
LOW LEVEL ALARM & VISUAL DETECTION OF OIL IN BREATHER WTS SHUT DOWNS.
2,4 LOS SYSTEM PRESSURE &/OR OIL IN BREATHER WTS SHUTS DOWN
WTS SHUTS DOWN.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[> LIQUID LEVEL INDICATOR PRODUCES INTERMITTENT LOW LEVEL ALARM. AIR ENTERS PUMP
INLET, OIL ESCAPES FROM BREATHER.
IF INDICATOR INCORRECTLY SHOWS A SATISFACTORY OIL LEVEL WHEN THE OIL LEVEL IS
UNSATISFACTORY, THE OIL TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE DETECTION SYSTEM WILL SHUT THE
WTS DOWN.
DEVELOPMENTAL TESTS TO BE CONDUCTED TO VERIFY RESERVOIR PERFORMANCE.
NAME D. W KING [DATE 7/20/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
ACCUMULATORS
PAGE 10
FMEANO '4.3.1.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
1. STORE HYDRAULIC ENERGY FOR FEATHERING
2. STORE ENERGY FOR SHORT TERM PEAK DEMANDS DURING NORMAL OPERATION
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 GAS LEAKS INTO HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - SPRING RATE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
OF SYSTEM REDUCED, EVENTUAL LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR CAPABILITY. F, G, H, & I
2 GAS LEAKS EXTERNALLY - LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR CAPABILITY.
G, H, & I
3 OIL LEAKS EXTERNALLY - DISSIPATES OIL FROM.SYSTEM
A, F, G, H, & I
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
30 42 X IF UNDET :CTED
20 42 14
30 42 X IF UNDET :CTED
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
LOW ACCUMULATOR GAS PRESSURE WHEN HYDRAULICS DE-PRESSURIZED-DISABLES START-UP ABILITY
GAS PRESSURE NOT EQUAL TO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE: SYSTEM SHUTS DOWN.
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE AND VISUAL INSPECTION
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME D. W. KING DATE 7/21/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and'Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
APPLIES HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
COMPONENT
START-STOP VALVES
TO SERVO VALVES FOR NORMAL OPERATION
PAGE
 n]
FMEANO 4.3.1.4.1
•
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
. i EITHER VALVE FAILS TO OPEN - UNABLE TO START TURBINF. "
2 EITHFR VA IVF FATI S TO H OSF - TIIRRTNF SHUTS DOWN NORMAN Y.
3 RflTH V A [ V F S FAIL TO CLO^F - IN
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ%
 x 10 6 pER HQUR
! 90 41
2 10 41
^ 100 ,003
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F
H
H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
3.1
278
.5 x 10°
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
x
X
X
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 UNABI F TO START TLJRRTNF-AI 1 DTHFR SYSTEMS HK.
2 PERIODIC CHECK FOR VALVE OPERATION.
3 UNABLE TO IMPLEMENT NORMAL. SHUTDOWN, BUT NO PROBLEM.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
&>- TWO VALVES PROVIDED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.
_
-
|NAME D. W. KING
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
8 - TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C - WARM-UP
DATE 7/21/78
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G - OPERATE
E STANDBY H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE
PAGE 12
FMEAN04.3.1.4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
RFI TFVFS PRESSURE IN FVENT PUMP COMPENSATOR FAILS
FAILUF
- UNABLE TO MAINTAIN SYSTEM PRESSURE. HEATS' FLUID
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
E.F.G.H
2 LEAKS EXTERNALLY - DISSIPATES SYSTEM FLUID.-MAKES A MESS
E.F.G.H
3 FAILS TO OPFN - SYSTEM MAY BF OVFR PRFSSUREI7ED IF PUMP MMPFNSATni
ALSO FAILS. E.F.G.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAJLURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS) '
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
40 17 66.6 X IF UNDETECTED
40 17 66.6
20 17 33.3 X ft> X IF UNDETECTED
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
J LQ1L PRESSURE ALARM,- OR QVERHEAT Al ARM
2 LOW FLUID QUANTITY ALARM
DETECTION METHOD EXCEPT BENCH TEST - CONSTITUTES DOUBLE FAILURE.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
PROBABILITY OF DOUBLE FAILURE IS. NEGLIGIBLE
NAME D. VI. KING IPATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
G-OPERATE
H-TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
TEETER BRAKE VALVE
PAGE
 13
FMEANO 4.3.1.4.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONTROLS HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TO REI FASF TFFTFR RRAKF
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 FAILS TO OPEN-TEETER BRAKE SLIPS. BRAKE LINING & PLATE WEARS.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 FAILS TO CLOSE-TEETER BRAKE RELEASES TOO EARLY ON START-UP
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
90 21 6.2
10 21 55.6
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 BRAKE SQUEAKS DURING NORMAL OPERATION. VISUAL INSPECTION
MANUAL INSPECTION.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SWITCH ADDED TO INDICATE
BRAKE RELEASE STATUS.
INAME D. W. KING DATE
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/7J
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
>ITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
SERVO VALVE
PAGE 14
' FMEANO 4.3.1.4.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONTROLS PITCH CHANGE ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 FAT I * TO RFSPflNH TO rOMMANnS - ONF Rl AflF TIP MOVES TO LIM
MOTION.
2 INTERNAL LEAKAGE - HEATS FLUID, REDUCES RATE OF PITCH CHA
3 JAMS - ONE BLADE TIP WILL NOT MOVE
4 EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - DEPLETES SUPPLY IF NOT DETECTED.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENTFAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ %
 x ,0 6 pER HQUR
1 9 74
2 , 4 90 74
3 1 74
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 PnSTTTON FFFDRAr.K FRDM 7
FAILU
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) 1 II
17.1
1.7 X, (4
154
Rl ADFS DTSAGRFF
r
APPLICABLE
IT OF OPERATING MODES
F.G H
NGE.
F,G H
F.G.H
F.G.H
RE SEVERITY
L CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
0 X (2)
X
i OVERHEAT WARNING
3 SAME AS 1 ABOVE. - 4. FLUID LEVEL SENSOR.
D'lSCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FOR 1, 2, 3, 4 EMERGENCY STOP IS INITIATED WHICH BY-PASSES SERVO VALVE .
-
NAME D. W. KING
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
DATE 8/9/78
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER -
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
SHUTTLE VALVE
PAGE 1 5 !
FMEANO 4.3.1.4.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
DISABLES SERVO VALVE & APPLIES BLADE FEATHERING PRESSURE UPON LOSS OF NORMAL HYDRAULIC
SYSTFM PRFSSIIRF. '.
FAILUF^MPDE^ EJJF^^
 MHEN PRESSURIZED - UNABLE TO CONTROL ONE BLADE. x APP LtCABUEOPERATING MODES
TIP, BYPASSES FLUID F.G H
2 FAILS TO SHUTTLE MEN DE-PRESSURIZED- UNABLE TO FEATHER ONE
BLADE TIP
LEAKS
F.G.H.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
"ll
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 27 41.7
10 27 41.7
90 27 4.6
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i UNABLE TO UN-FEATHER BLADE TIP ON START COMMAND
LOW PRESSURE ALARM, OVERTEMP ALARM
2 NO PRESSURE CHANGE IN FEATHERING ACCUMULATOR ON "FEATHER" COMMAND. SLOW FEATHERING
OR NO FEATHERING.
INSPECTION DURING PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE PERIODS.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1,2. SHUTDOWN CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY FEATHERING ONE BLADE.
NAME D. W. King DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN•
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGING MECHANISM
COMPONENT
FITTINGS & HOSES
PAGE Ib
FMEANO 4.3.1 .5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPLIES PRESSURIZED HYDRAULIC FLUID TO
CONTROL ACTUATORS AND FEATHER LATCHES
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i TUBING TOTAIIY FAILS - I OSS OF PRFSSIIRF: OTI WOIII H SPIN TNTO
RACEWAY AND/OR BLADE SECTIONS.
2 HYDRAUITr FIIITn IFAHS - flTI unil in-IFAK TNTO RACFWAY: PO.SSTRI F OTI
rnATTNR nN FI Fr.TRirAi
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F.G.H
F.G.H
JJLTNFS OF PRESSURE
F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODENO
FAILURE
MODE
F R E Q %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10'6 pER HQUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
20 29 20
75 29 5.3
J_ 29 80.
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 LOW OIL PRESSURE, LOW OIL QUANTITY. S.YS.TFM WOIII D GO INTO FMFRKFNfY STOP
2 VISUAL AND OIL LEVEL INDICATOR
SLOW FEATHERING RESPONSE PICKED UP BY MICRO PROCESSOR.'
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. SYSTEM WOULD 60 INTO AUTOMATIC STOP (FEATHER LATCH WOULD LOCK) IF FAILURE OCCURED AT
1250-1260 STATION, COMPARTMFNT U/FI Ff.TRTfAl ft MFrHANTrAI -mMPONFMTS MAY RF mATEP HTTH
OIL. ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS SHOULD BE RESISTANT TO OIL. FLUID TRAPS IN BLADE SHOULD
ALSO BE AVOIDED, (DRAlNb).
2. SMAI.I I FAKS mill H FNTER RACEWAY AREA- ELECTRICAL WIRING SHOULD BE--Q-I-L RESISTANT-,
3. THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT VFRY LIKELY STNPF THF SY.STFM HAS TUQ RLTFRS.
* CRITICAL IF LEVEL OR PRESSURE SENSORS INITIATE SHUTDOWN
PRIOR TO LEAK DETECTION BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.
NAME JOSE A. BURRUEL DATE 7/26/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 - FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
COMPONENT
FILTERS
PAGE 17
FMEANO 4.3.1.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
REMOVES SOLID PARTICLES FROM HYDRAULIC FLUID.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 FAILS TO RFMfWF PARTIH FS - R>
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F, G H
LEAKS EXTERNALLY - DISSIPATES SYSTEM
FLUID MAKES A MESS F, G H
3 EXCESSIVE PRESSURE DROP -
DUE TO FILTER CLOGGING F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FIL FER CLOGGED, J EE #3 X*
100 14 8.3
CANNOT BE ACCURATELY ESTIMATED x*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, PERIODIC FLUID SAMPLING & FILTER ELEMENT REPLACEMENT
LOW FLUID QUANTITY ALARM- VISUAL INSPECTION
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCHES. WTS WILL STOP IF EXCESSIVE PRESSURE DROP IS INDICATED
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
INCREASES HEAR RATE OF PUMP. MAY CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF VALVES.
>- TNTFRNfll RYPASS Vfll WF OPFMS PRnnilPTMR SflMF FFFFPT l\< NQ
MAY ALSO REDUCE PITCH CHANGE RATES WHICH WOULD BE DETECTED BY THE MICROPROCESSOR.
* IF UNDETECTED BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
jNAME D. W. KING [DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
G- OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD -2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
pIT^H ("HAN^E MECHANISM
COMPONENT
MnTflR-PlIMP /KSV
PAGE
FMEAN04.3.1.7&8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE HYDRAULIC POWER FOR OPERATION OF PITCH CHANGE MECHANISM
-
FAI
^
UREOlP[rf¥[Mu!EffirSOR NO PRESSURE - PRODUCES LOW PRESSURE ALARM
WTS SHUTDOWN
2 LOW HYDRAULIC FLOW - REDUCES PITCH CHANGE RATES, MOMENTARY
PRESSURE ALARM - WTS SHUTDOWN
3 EXCESSIVE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE - OVERHEATS HYDRAULIC FLUID.
SHUTDOWN
4 LEAKS - EXTERNAL
_
FAILURE FREQUENCY
- FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE B
MODE NO FREO.% j,
 10
 6
 PER HOUR
1 50 38
2 20 38
3 100 "17
..
FAILUF
MEANTIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) I II '"
6,1
15.2
6.7
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
4 30 38 10.0 " X
1 LOW PRESSURE ALARM . WJS SHUTDOWN
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F.G.H
LOW
F.G.H
- WTS
F.G.H
F G H
^SEVERITY ~
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III , IV
' - x -
X
X
X*
2 LOW PRESSURE ALARM -- WTS SHUTDOWN
3 OVERHEAT ALARM - WTS SHUTDOWN
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
* IF UNDETECTED - " -
-
<„
- -
-
| NAME D. W. KING
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
DATE8/9/78
Rev. 10/25/78
D- TRANSIT ION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUbSYSTCM
ROTOR - EPS
COMPONENT CONTROL CABLE
TO TIP NO 1 ACTUATOR
PAGE TIT
FME A NO 4.3.1.10
FUNCTION OF COfuFOMENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA FROM THE TEETER BEARING
FLEXIBLE CABLE ASSEMBLY TO THE TIP NO. 1 ACTUATOR
n c a e is open_circuitedj No path for a specific command
or aa£a~T6 orTrom Tip TJo. "TTacfueTtor. lip is notTcontrollable.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING M'.
F.G.H
2 Cable is parti ally short ci rcui ted : False commands may result or
aTse data may be. transmitted, n]TNo. i does not position F,G,H
Cable-i s-pa r-tiaJ-ty-g^ou nded- / — L-o&s of data -or— c ommafld-f-unc to-on to-
.Tip No. 1. Tip No. 1 does not position properly. F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
PREQ %
20
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
.04
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
14 X 10
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTF:=HIC
IV
10 .04 28 x
70 .04 4 x 10-
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i - 3 Tip No. 1 data disp1ityed_jDJiCR]LJ:ermiJia1 indicates that c'ommands are not executed.
WTS SHUTS DOWN DUF TO DIFFERENTIAL IN THE TWO PITCH
POSITION SIGNALS.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Conservative mechanical design of cable will reduce
occurrence of these failures.
Failsafe shutdown is initiated if tip control signals are not executed^
NAME G. TRUSK / H. Roth I DATE 8/17/78
jPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/3/7?
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/7
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
\
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR - EPS
COMPONENT CONTROL CABLE TO
TIP NO 2 ACTUATOR
PAGE2Q
FMEA NO
4.3.1.10.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
EEQMIDE-ft-PATH F"R 'THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA FROM TH_E_JEETER_BEARING_
FLEXIBLE CABLE ASSEMBLY TO THE TIP NO. 2 ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i _ Wire in rahlp nppn rirrnitpri; __ No path for a. specific _ ._ _ .
command or data to or from tip No. 2 actuator, tip is not control
jg partially short n'rrui t.pd; False .rnmtnands may result
or false data may be transmitted, tip No. 2 does not position
- p r o p e r l y . ; o r high reTTstance. -
rahip i<: partially grounded/.Lloss of data or command-fuocti
to tip No. ,2 does not position properly.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING M1OES
F.G.H
F,G,H
F.G.H
Tn 1,?, apri ^ MT^.may <;hnt Hnwp
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTR.PHIC
IV
20
10
.04 ,14 x 10"
.04 28 x 10J
70 .04 4 x
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
- 3 Tip No. 2 data displayed on CRT terminal indicates that commands are not
executed.
WTS shuts down due to differential of pitch position signals.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Conservative mechanical design of cable will reduce
occurrence of these failures.
Failsafe shutdown initiated'if tip control signals are not executed.
|NAME G. TRUSK /H. Roth DATE 8/17/78
jPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBYE STANDBYF TRANSITION TO OPE'RATE
-Rev. 10/5/78
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I -FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUdSYSTEM
_ROTOR E£S-
FUNCTION OF CO\PONENT
COMPONENT
TTP NO. 1 BONDING STRAP
PAGE 2]
FMEA NO 4.3.1.10.
PRQVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF LIGHTNING CURRENT FROM THE VARIABLE PITCH TIP OF THE
ROTOR TO THE FIXED PITCH PORTION OF THE BLADE
FAILURE MODCS& EFFECTS
i_ Bonding strap is open citouted.
2 Bonding strap has high resistance due to fraying.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING M'.IES
ALL
ALL
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTF.^HIC
IV
20 2.8 X 103
40 1.4 x 10°
To3"40 .2 1.4 x
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 - 3 Peraodic .inspection.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 When lightning strikes the variable pitch tip of the rotor the resultant extremely
nign current wi i i follow the path of least resistance to ground. IT an infinite
or high resistanr.p path rpplarpt: the low reiistanrp hnnd path the current will
possibly flow through the tip pitch bearing or hydraulic lines causing local
"werheatlng, pitting or welding or parts. Redundant bonding straps wiTTBe
USPd to prprludp t.hi<; failnrp mnHp. _ Straps will he Hpsigned t-Q rmnT"i?e Strap
fatigue failures.
*1 Physical damage could be fatal at a manned site, due to, fall
- Probability of site being manned in a parts, orstorm and also
having failure of both straps is negligible. O&M manual will specify that
no one is allowed in nacelle during lightning storms.
NAME G. TRUSK /
 H. Roth DATES/I 7/78
OPERATING MODES REV. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR - EPS
COMPONENT
TIP NO. 2 BONDING STRAP
PAGE 22
FMEANO 4.3.1 .10.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR.JHE FLOW OF LIGHTNING CURRENT FROM THE VARIABLE PITCH TIPJ)F_THEJOTOR
TO THE FIXED PITCH PORTION OF THE BLADE.
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
i_____Bo_ndi'ng strajjjis open circuited.
2 Bonding strap has high resistance due to fraying.
3 Bonding strap has high resistance sue to poor bond connection.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO. %
20
40
40
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
.2
.2
.2
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
2.8 x 103
1.4 x 103
1.4 x
APPLICABLE
OPERATING M'.-
ALL
ALL
ALL
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
It
CRITICAL
III
CATASTF;=HIC
IV
1*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 - 3 Periodic inspection.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 When lightning strikes the variable Mp nf thpvr"tor the resultant
extremely high current wil.l follow the path of least resistance to ground. If
-am~rnf m i be or high~resTstaTrce~pdth replaces the TTJW resistance bond path Lhe
current wlULposslbLy flow through the tip pitrh hearing nr hydraulir
causing local heating, pitting, or welding of parts.
Redundant bonding straps will- be used to preclude this failure mode, straps will
be designed to minimize strap fatigue failures.
* See page 21 for safety note.
NAME G. TRUSK/ H. Roth DATE 8/17/78
jPERATING MODES Rev. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR
COMPONENT
FEATHER LOCK MECHANISM
PAGE 23
FMEANO 4.3_J>_
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO HOLD BLADE TIP IN THE FEATHERED POSITION
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i MECHANISM FAILS TO LOCK
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
A,R,r,nrFfF,HrT
2 MECHANISM FAILS TO UNLOCK
F,G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 2.3 500
90 2.3 55.6
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 TTP pnsmnN INDICATOR SHOWS MOVEMENT AND PITCH LOCK STATUS INDICATES UNLOCKED.
2 TIP DOES NOT RESPOND TO COMMAND - START-UP NOT POSSIBLE.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. SINCE ONLY ONE TIP IS REQUIRED TO STOP UTS. A FAILURE TO LOCK W i l l NOT PRFVENT
A NTS SHirrnnuiN.
2. FAILING TO UNLOCK IS A FAIL-SAFE FEATURE. NTS WILL BE 'INSPECTED FOR FAILURE CAUSE.
NAME M. A. HOYT IDATER/15/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ROTOR
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ATTACHEMENT OF ACTUATOR TO
COMPONENT
FASTENERS, ROD ENDS
BLADE AND TIP.
PAGE 24
FMEANO 4.3.2
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 ROD FND RFARTNGS WFAR FXCFSSTVFI Y
2 ROD END BREAKS
-
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY ,
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ%
 x 10 6 PER HOUR
1 98 6.8
2 2 6.8
FAILUF
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAI
(YEARS) 1 II
17 X
833
,
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
G
G
-
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III JV
•
X
1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, INSPECTION, TIP POSITION INDICATOR.
2 INSPECTION, TIP POSITION INDICATOR.,
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 . EXCESSIVE WEAR WILL BE INDICATED BY TIP POSITION MOVEMENT AT A FIXED COMMAND. "
? SINCE TIPS ARE CONTROL 1 FPI TNnFDFNnFNTI V FflTI IIDF OF OMF TTD Dfin FWH UTM MOT
PREVENT AN EMERGENCY SHUT nnWN RY THF nTHFR TIP.
'
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP'
C WARM UP
|NAME MAURIE HOY T DATE 8/15/78
D- TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 - FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT(PART OF LOW SPEED SHAFT &
SHAFT BEARINGS)
PAGE 25
FMEANO 5.1.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO TRANSMIT TORQUE FROM ROTOR TO THE QUILL SHAFT AND REACT ROTOR MOMENT (FROM OVERHUNG
WEIGHT).
FAVBR^N YE|TEERCTSSHAFT OR SHAFT FLANGE JOINT - ROTOR COULD FALL OFF
2 BROKEN OUILL SHAFT BULKHEAD JOINT - WOULD ALLOW ROTOR TO FREEWHEEL
3 DEFORMED SHAFT STRUCTURE
FAILURE
- COULD CAUSE IMBALANCE AND BEARING
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREO %
 x 10 6 pER HOUR
1 5 1.1
2 5 1.1
3 90 1.1
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
G
G
G
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL CRH
(YEARS) 1 II 1
2000
2000
111
FICAL CATASTROPHIC
M IV
X
y
X
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, LOSS OF ROTOR CAUSES LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD, INITIATES (ELECTRICAL) EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
AS UTILITY^TRIES 10 DRIVE GENERATOR
LOSS OF GENERATOR RESULTS IN ACTIONS ABOVE (1) PLUS OVERSPEED OF ROTOR TRIGGERS
rrA-ri irni-Mp nr m AnC"" AMI"! 'M inrmi IFMT flPPI TPATTflN0 (IF POTDP FtPAkT1 LnlllLKlINu Ul ULMUtO HINU JUPOLLJULIN 1 HP r L1L.H 1 1UINJ Ul KUIUK UKMNL.
3
 VIBRATIONS » JNCRFASFD TFMPFRATIIRF .SENSED AT BEARINGS WOUI D INITIATE EMERG. SHUTDOWN.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. SAFE LIFE DESIGN
INCIPIENT FAILURE DETECTION DEVICES NOT PRACTICAL.
2. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE PREVENTS ROTOR OVERSPEED IN EXCESS OF DESIGN LIMITS.
3 NONE REQUIRED
-
(NAME ROLF LUTH
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE 8/7/8
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
RADIAL BEARING (FLUID)
PAGE 26
FMEANO 5.1.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO SUPPORT LOW SPEED SHAFT BY DECREASING RUNNING FRICTIONS AND TO REACT ROTOR MOMENT
CFROM OVERTURNING ) ROTOR WEIGHT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 BEARING FATI IIRF WHTI F TN MOTION - TAIISFS HTRH VIBRATION AND OVER-
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
TEMPERATURE. F, G, H
2 BEARING FAILURE WHILE PARKED - INCREASED BREAKAWAY MOMENT LEADING
TD FM (1) UIHFN RRfWFM I nfKF : ALL
DETERIORATED BEARING - INCREASED FRICTION AND TEMPERATURE
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
'(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 10.3 111
Car not be accurately estimated
90 10.3 12.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 TEMPFRATIIRF AND VTRRATTflNS SFNSflRS until H TNTTTflTF FMFRKFHrV SHI ITPIfUIN ''
THERE IS NO-INSTRUMENTATIONS THAT SENSES EXCESSIVE BREAKAWAY TORQUE. HOWEVER.'ONCE
IN MOTION FAILURE WOULD BE DETECTED PER FM(1) ABOVE
EXCESSIVE TFMPERATIIRF TNTTTATFS EMERGENCY SHIITnni/JN.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
2. System will be designed to allow lubrication of bearing if stationary
for extended periods.
[NAME ROLF LUTH DATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
TEETER BEARING
P A G E 2 7
FMEANO 5.1.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ACCOMODATES TEETER MOTION. TRANSMITS ROTOR TORQUE TO LOW SPEED SHAFT. SUPPORTS UEIGHT
OF ROTOR, REACTS ROTORJ DRAG LOAD
OF ELASTOMER - [> APPLICABLEOPERATING MO^ES
FAILURE OF BOND BETWEEN ELEASTOMER & METAL PARTS Q> ||> 13> _ALL
ALL
DETERIORATION OF ELASTOMER DUE TO,OIL, OZONE, OR LIGHTNING -
PRIMARILY SURFACE EFFECTS, BUT MAY SHORTEN LIFE. ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO.%
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
33 22.8 15
33 22.8 15
33 22.8 15
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 VISUAL
VISUAL
VISUAL
JSCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)|P> MAY ALLOW EXCESSIVE DISPLACEMENT OF ROTOR DUE TO DEAD WEIGHT AND DRAG LOADS
RESULTING IN INCREASED VIBRATION
J2> FAILURE PROGRESSES VERY SLOWLY AND IS VISUALLY DETECTABLE. IF FAILURE IS FIRST
DETECTED AT 35% OF LIFE. BEARING WILL PROBABLY COMPLETE 100% OF LIFE CYCLES SATIS-
FACTORILY.
|5> CORROSION OF METAL PARTS MAY ACCELERATE BOND FAILURE.
PERIODIC INSPECTIONS REQUIRED.
[NAME p. KING DATE 7/19/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TRflTN
COMPONENT
RADIAL/THRUST BEARING
PAGE
 28
FMEA NO 5.1.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
" SUPPORT LOW SPEED SHAFT BY DECREASING RUNNING FRICTIONS AND TO REACT ROTOR MOMENT
(FROM OVERHUNG ROTOR WEIGHT) AND ROTOR THRUST
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS I APPLICABLE
i BEARING FAILURE WHILE IN MOTION CAUSES HIGH VIBRATIONS fiNDopERATING MODES
AND TFMPFRATIIRF AND COULD CAUSE FAILURE OF RADIAL BEARING AND GEARBOX BY, F. G. H. I
* * FATI IIRF TQ RFACH THRUST.
RFARTNR FflTI IIRF UHTI F PARKFH - TNrRFASFF) RRFAK-AWAY MOMENT I FADING
.AIL
TO FM 1 ARfWF I/JHFN RROKFN lOOSF.
RFARTNfi - TNPRFASFn FRTPTTHN, TFMPFRATIIRF AND VTRRATTON
.ALL
CORROSION WHILE STATIONARY OVER EXTENDED PERIODS DUE TO OIL
DRAINING OFF BEARING SURFACES
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 RER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
55 10.3 20.2
9 . 4 INCLUDED IN 1 AND 3
45 10.3 24.7
'AILURE DETECTION METHODS
TEMPERATURE AND VIBRATIONS SENSORS WOULD INITIATE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN. THERE is NO IN-
STRUMENTATIONS THAT SENSES EXCESSIVE BREAKAWAY TORQUE, HOWEVER, ONCE IN MOTION FAILURE WOU
2 BE DETECTED PER FM ABOVE.
EXCESSIVE TEMPERATURE INITIATES EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
SYSTEM WILL BE DESIGNED TO ALLOW LUBRICATION OF BEARING IF STATIONARY FOR EXTENDED
PERIODS.
[NAME R. LUTH DATE8/7/78
DERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
RESTRAIN TEETERING MOTION OF
COMPONENT
TEETER STOP
THE ROTOR WHEN THE TURBINE IS SHUT DOWN
PAGE 90
5.1.5FMEA NO.
. LIMITS TEETER
ANGLE. -
FAILURE MODES 81 EFFECTS
i BRAKE FAILS TO RELEASE
TO SLIPPAGE.
- BRAKE LINING & PLATE WILL WEAR OUT DU
2 BRAKE FAILS TO APPLY OR IS WORN OUT -ROTOR BANGS ON MOTION LIM
STOPS v,
3 MOTION STOP BUMPERS FAIL - EXCESSIVE TEETER ANGLE, MAY CONTACT
TOUFR
« LEAKS
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 10 6 PER HOUR
1 20 22.8
2 4 22.8
3 1 22.8
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
4 " 75
,-4 VISUAL INSPECTION
APPLICABLE
E OPERATING MCCES
G
IT
A,B,C,D,E,F,H,I
A,B,C,D,E,F,H,I
G
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
25
125
500
6.7 X
CRITICAL CATASTR1PHIC
III IV
X
X
X
2
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. BRAKE WILL SLIP AND EVENTUALLY WEAR OUT. NO MAJOR DAMAGE RESULTS.
2
- RFQIITRFS_ PERIODIC INSPECTION & Rf PI Af.FMFNT HF WORN RRAKF 1 TNTNG.
3,4 REQUIRES PERIODIC INSPECTION.
NAME D. U. KING
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE 7/18/7*
3/8/79
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES THE' ROTATING PORTION
COMPONENT
SLIP RINGS
PAGE 30
FMEANO 5.1.6.1
nF THF PATH FOR THF Fl OW OF FLECTRICAL POWER AND SIGNALS
BETWEEN THE NACELLE AND THE DRIVE TRAIN
FA7REsTfpEWNGFEFCAILURES RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER AND/OR SIGNAL
POWER AND SIGNAL LINES
2 SUBSYSTEMS.
ARE ADDRESSED UNDER THEIR RESPECT
•
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE E
MODE NO FREQ%
 x ,0 6 pER HOUR
ALL 100 37.6 -
"(
FAILU
MEAN TIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
' (YEARS) 1 II
3
•
•
-
 n. . APPLICABLE
b. MLL OPERATING MCCES
IVE ALL
,
-
RE SEVERITY ]>
L CRITICAL CATASTR-.PHIC
III IV
-
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, t>
2
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) •
SEE INDIVIDUAL CABLES FOR FAILURE EFFECTS AND DETECTION METHODS
[>
-
'
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
NAME Q_ T }USK DATE 8/17/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER •
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE ' 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS
COMPONENT
SLIP RING JUNCTION BOX
P A G E 3 1
FMEA NO 5.1.6.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PROTECTED ELECTRICAL JUNCTION POINT FOR THE WIRES COMING OUT OF THE SLIP
RINGS AND THE CABLES DISTRIBUTING POWER AND SIGNALS.
FAILURE MODES 8i.EFFE.CTSj , . .. , . ... , ci Open circuited conductor ynthin junction box. Loss of asspc- APPLICABLEOPERATING MCCES
iated function. ALL
2 Short circuited conductors within junction box. Loss of assoc-
lated functions, erratic operation, or loss of meaningful, data. ALL
3 Conductor grounded within junction box. Loss of associated
function. ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTRCPHIC
IV
50 1.1 200
25 1.1 400
25 1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 - 3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
* See individual cables for failure effects and detection methods
for each signal and power line.
[NAME G. TRUSK / H. Roth |PATES/!7/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
f TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS
COMPONENT
POWER CABLE TO HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
PAGE 32
FMEANO 5.1.6.3.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POKER ON THE LOU SPEED SHAFT FROM THE SLIP
RING JUNCTION BOX TO THE PITCH CONTROL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.^
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
is nppn rirruited. Hydraulic pump motors may operate
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOLES
at reduced capacity. WTS may shutdown. F,G,H
2
 Conductor is short clrc'n'tpd. Hydraulic pump motors may operate
at reduced capacity. WTS may shutdown. F.G.H
3 Conductor is grounded., Hydraulic pump motors may operate at
reduced capacity.WTS may snutdown. F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTRCPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500 1*
25 .15 >3000
-1*.
25 .15 >3000 1*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
T - 3 WTS may shutdown if hydraulic accummulator pressure,cannot be maintained.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Periodic review of CRT data should reveal that pitch accummulator pressure
has been low.
1* Pump motors can run on 2 of the 3 phases; however, motor temperature will increase
and .capacity hp rpHnrpd.
NAME G. TRUSK /H. Roth |DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D - TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CABLE TO THE HYDRAULIC
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA ON THE
FROM THE SLIP RING JUNCTION BOX TO THE ROTOR PITCH CONTROL HYDRAULIC
PAGE 33
SY5FBJAN05.1.6.3.2
LOW SPEED SHAFT
SYSTEM.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i A rnntrol nr d*1"3 wlrp 1<; nnpn Circuited. Control function
cannot be accomplished. WTS will shutdown.
2
 A control or dat^ wire is sh^rt^d t.n another wire. Incorrect
commands or data present. WTS will shutdown.
3 A control of data wire is grounded Control function cannot
be accomplished. WTS will shutdown. , ., . ,
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE I
MODE NO FREQ %
 x ,„ ^ER HOUR
l" 50 .15
2 25 .15
3 25 .15
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i - 3 WTS shutsdown due to
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
F.S.H
F,G,H
F.G.H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
1ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
>1500
>2000
>3000
differential pitch signals.
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
1
]
1
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
OPERATING MODES
A -SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
NAME
 G. TRUSK / H. Rotl1 DATE 8/1 7/78
REV. 10/5/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS'
COMPONENT
ROTOR ACTUATOR CONTROL CABLE
PAGE 34
FMEANO 5.1.6.3.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA ON THE LOW SPEED SHAFT
FROM THE SLIP RING JUNCTION BOX TO THE ROTOR JUNCTION BOX.
. circuited. Control function can-
not be accomplished.wiswill shutdown.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOLES
ALL
2 A control or data wire is shorted to another wire, incorrect
commands or data present.WTS will shutdown. ALL,
3 A control or data wire is grounded.' Control function cannot
, be accomplished. WTSwill shutdown. ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY,
FAILURE
MODE. NO
FAILURE
MODE
FRED %
COMPONENT'
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL, MARGINAL
II "-
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
.. IV
50 .15 >1500
_E5_ >3000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS shutsdown due to differential' pitch position signals,
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
NAME G.-TRUSK / H- Roth)DATE
 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES REV. 10/5/71
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT)ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN-EPS
COMPONENT
FLEX CABLE ACROSS TEETER BEARING
PAGE
 35
FMEANO 5.1 .6.3.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH ACROSS THF TFFTFR RFARTMB FOR THF
 Fl nu OF COMMAND AMD OPERATIONAL DATA
FROM THE. ROTOR .IIINrTTON RfW TO THF ROTOR
 :
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
1 A control or data wire is open circuited. Control function cannot
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOLiS
be accomplished. WTS will shutdown. ALL
2 A control or data wirp is shorted .to anothpr wirp. Inrorrpr.t.
commands or data "present. WTS will shutdown.
ALL
3 A rnnt.rnl or data wire is qrnnnripri
accomp11shed. WTS willshutdown.
Control function cannot by ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1,2,3 100 11.41 10'
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, WTS shutsdown due to differential pitch position signals.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME G. TRUSK DAT
OPERATING MODES REV. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
B-TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRTVF TRAIN - EPS
COMPONENT
TEETER BEARING BONDING STRAP
PAGE
 36
FMEANO. 5.1.6.3.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOU OF LIGHTNING CURRENT AROUND THE TEETER BEARING FROM THE
ROTOR TO THE DRIVE TRAIN.
FAILU sWIs open circuited. APPLICABLEOPERATING MCCES
ALL
2 Bonding strap has high resistance due to fraying.
ALL
3 Bonding strap has high resistance due to poor bond connection.
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x TO 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTRCPHIC
- - IV .
1.1 2000 1*
5Q_ JL1 _2QQ_ 1*
45 1.1 222 1*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i - 3 Periodic Inspection
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 When lightning strikes a rotor blade the resultant extremely high current will
follow the path of least resistance to ground.If an infinite or high resistance
path replaces the low resistance bond path the current will possibly flow
through the teeter bearing resulting in erratic operation and WTS shutsdown. Re-
dundant bonding straps will be used to preclude this failure mode"! Straps will be
designed to minimize strop fatigue-failures. Straps will be inspected periodi
cally. Probability of both straps failing is. negligible.
1* Rotor will operate with the teeter mechanism inoperative.
NAME G. TRUSK / H. Roth DATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/5/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
DRIVE TRAIN - EPS ROTOR JUNCTION BOX
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PROTECTED ELECTRICAL JUNCTION POINT FOR THE RIGID CABLE
PAGE 37
FMEANO 5.1.6.4
COMING OUT THE
SI IP RING .HINCTIfiN BOX AND THE F | F X T R I F TABLE GOING AROUND THF TFETER BEARING.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Open circuited rnndurt.nr within junction box. Loss of associa
function.
2
 Short circuited conductors within junrtinn box. Loss of
associated functions, erratic operation, or loss of meaningful
data.3
 Conductor grounded within junction box Loss of ^ssoci^ted f"
tion.
4
-
APPLICABLE
ted OPERATING MO15S
ALL
ALL
nc- Al L
.
FAILURE FREQUENCY FAILURE SEVERITY
FAILURE COMPONENT^ MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 10 6 PER HOUR (YEARS) 1 II
1 50 5 44
2- 25- 5 88
3 '25 5 88
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i WTS shutsdown. See individual signal and power lines.
CRITICAL CATASTRCPHIC
III IV
X
X
X
-
2
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
-
-
See individual signal wires for impacts.
.
NAME G. TRUSK / H. Roth DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev . 10/6/7*
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
C WARM-UP F TRANSITION TO OPE RATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
QUILL SHAFT
PAGE
FMEANO
38
5.2.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO TRANSMIT ROTOR TORQUE FROM THE LOWSPEED SHAFT TO THE GEAR BOX AND
TO LIMIT TORSIONAL ROSONANCE
 ; ' "
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
SHAFT FAILURE - WOULD ALLOW ROTOR TO FREE WHEEL P.G.H-
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 3.4- 33.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD INITIATES (ELECTRICAL) EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN DUE TO SUDDEN
DROP"IN POWER OUTPUT.AS BACKUP TO THIS SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE, THE OVERSPEED SWITCH
ON THE LOW SPEED-SHAFT-INITIATES SHUTDOWN.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
STRUCTURAL AND FATIGUE ANALYSIS ACCOMPLISHED TO CONFIRM ADEQUATE SAFETY MARGIN
IN DESIGN. WTS WILL NOT EXCEED DESIGN OVERSPEED LIMITS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.
DESIGNATED CATISTROPHIC DUE TO HIGH COST OF REPLACING THE QUILL SHAFT.
NAME ROLF LUTH DATE 8/7/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 11/27/78
A SHUTDOWN
6 TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
D R I V E TRAIN
COMPONENT
QUILL SHAFT COUPLING
PAGE
 3g
FMEANO 5.2.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO TRANSMIT TORQUE FROM LOW SPEED SHAFT TO GEAR BOX AND TO ACCOMMODATE SHAFT
MISALIGNMENT
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 COUPLING STRUCTURAL FAILURE - MOULD PERMIT ROTOR TO FREEWHEEL
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
2 COUPLING INCIPIENT FAILURE OR DAMAGE DUE TO OVERLOAD.
F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III -
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 13.7 137
_3Q_ 13-7
4 .
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
BREAK IN LOAD PATH CAUSES LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD WHICH INITIATES EMERGENCY SHUT
DOWN AS UTILITY TRIES TO DRIVE GENERATOR.
ULTIMATE FAILURE DETECTED PEP
? INEFFICIENT JOINTS CAN CAUSE UNDETECTABLE TEMP. RISE - FM(1) ABOVE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
L> IF DETECTED BY INSPECTION PRIOR TO FAILURE MODE 1 OCCURRING.
ROTOR OVERSPEED IS WITHIN DESIGN LIMITS.
NAME ROLF LUTH DATE 8/7/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WAF1M-UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
GEARBOX MOUNTING INSTALLATION
PAGE 4U
FMEANO 5.3.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO ATTACH G/B TO NACELLE BASE PLANE TO MAINTAIN DRIVE TRAIN ALIGNMENT AND TO REACT
LOADS.
i"R)lf1%!MTf ffiETS WORKING LOOSE. CAUSING LOSS OF ALIGNMENTFAILUR APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
G , H
2 ATTACHMENT BOLT FAILURE CAUSING MAJOR FAILURE OF DRIVE TRAIN
, G,H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
• MEAN TIME
• BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
TOT-
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
TOO" JLJ_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 MISALIGNMENT WOULD BE DETECTED BY BEARING TEMPERATURE AND VIBRATIONS SENSORS AND
2
 'SYSTEM WOULD.SHUT DOWN. (2) ATTACHMENT BOLT FAILURE WOULD BE SENSED AS ABOVE.
'HOWEVER. LACK OF DFTFCTION mill D RF CATASTROPHIC.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[t> MARGINAL IF DETECTED DURING INSPECTION PRIOR TO EXCESSIVE VIBRATION
CAUSING SHUTDOWN.
REQUIRES DOUBLE FAILURE - NEGLIGIBLE PROBABILITY.
[NAME RQLF LUTH DATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E RATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
HRTVF TRAIN
COMPONENT
GEARS AND SHAFTS
PAGE 4]
FMEANO 5.3.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO TRANSFER ROTOR TORQUE AND INCREASE RPM (FROM 17.5 RPM TO 1800 RPM)
FAILUR
1 DUE TO CHIPPED GEAR OR SHEARED SHAFT - WOULD APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALLOW ROTOR TO FREE WHEEL. F.G.H
2 DAMAGED GEAR TEETH - COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO FM(1) ABOVE
F,G,H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
3.4 667
95 3.4 _35_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD DUE TO BROKEN LOAD PATH WILL INITIATE (TECHNICAL) EMERGENCY
SHUTDOWN AS UTILITY TRIES TO DRIVE GENERATOR. (2) DAMAGED GEAR TEETH SHOULD BE
INDICATED BY CHIP DETECTOR IN SUMP WHICH SHUTS DOWN SYSTEM. ROTOR OVERSPEED
WILL ALSO INITIATE SHUTDOWN. VIA RPM SENSOR.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Rotor overspepd will hp within Hpsign limit';
NAME ROLF LUTH DATE 8/7/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX BEARINGS
PAGE 42
FMEANO 5.3.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO ALIGN GEAR TRAIN COMPONENTS AND REDUCE GEAR/SHAFT FRICTION
FAILURE MILE RUNNING - RESULTANT MISALIGNMENT OF GEARS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F.G.H
2 BEARING DETERIORATIONS - INCREASE IN TEMPERATURE AND NOISE
LEVELS All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 11.4 100
90 11.4 11.1
FAILURE DETECT!ON METHODS
i 1, 2 OIL TEMPERATURE AND VIBRATION SENSORS CAUSE SYSTEM SHUTDOWN.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
TEMPERATURE AND VIBRATION SENSORS WILL PICK UP IMPENDING FAILURE PRIOR TO
SERIOUS STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
NAME R. LUTH [DATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
HIGH SPEED SHAFT
PAGE
 43
FMEANO 5.4.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO TRANSMIT TORQUE FROM GEARBOX TO'GENERATOR
FAILURE Irfe^ T - WOULD ALLOW ROTOR TO FREE WHEEL APPLICABLEOPERATING MCOES
F.G.H '
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
"MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 3.4 33.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 . LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD WOULD SHUT DOWN. GENERATOR AND FEATHER-BLADES.
SHUTDOWN INITIATED THROUGH OVERSPEED SENSORS.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
ROTOR OVERSPEED PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN WOULD BE WITHIN DESIGN UNITS.
NAMER. LUTH DATE8/7/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
HIGH SPEED SHAFT COUPLING
PAGE ft
FME A NO 5.4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT _ i
TO TRANSMIT TORQUE FROM GEAR BOX TO GENERATOR AND TO ACCOMODATE SHAFT MISALIGNMENT
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
L_jaU£UNfi_SIBUCIllBALfMLJJRE_=. WOULD PERMIT ROTOR TO FREE WHEEL
INCIPIENT FAILURE OR DAMAGE DUE TO OVERLOAD/OVERFLEX - -
INCREASE IN TEMPERATURE AND DECREASE IN EFFICIENCY.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO.%
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN.TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
APPLICABLE
OPERATING M'.-
F,G.H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTRl^HIC
IV
13.7 167
95 13.7 8.8
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i BREAK IN LOAD PATH CAUSES LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD WHICH INITIATES EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN
,OF GENERATOR AND'THE FEATHERING OF THE BLADES.
INEFFICIENT JOINTS CAN CAUSE UNDETECTED TEMPERATURE RISE - ULTIMATE FAILURE DETECTED PER
3 FMQ) ABOVE.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
INSPECTION OF WTS @ 2-MONTH INTERVALS SHOULD'DETECT INCIPIENT FAILURES.
|NAME
 RQLF LUTH DATIW7/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Fnilure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
ROTOR BRAKE
PAGE 45
I~MEA NO 5.5
I UNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO POSITION AND HOLD ROTOR
FAILURE MODE S & EFFECTS
L.,JIXDRAykIg/iLECTRIC FAILURE MOULD CAUSE BRAKE TO CLOSE WHICH WOULD
lUROIJM-AL-EULL-TDRQUE
2 FAILURE OF BRAKE TO OPERATE WOULD PERMIT BLADE TO STOP AT ANY
ANGLE AND WOULD PRECLUDE HOLDING ROTOR IN SELECTED POSITION.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MC^?
F, G, H
A, B,C,D,E,H,I
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
1.
2.
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
95
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
18.3
18.3
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
6.6
125
-FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTPl^HIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1. WTS SHUTDOWN UPON LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SENSED.
2. VISUAL INSPECTION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
MOD-2 DESIGN INCORPORATES CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY TURN ROTOR AND LOCK
LOW SPEED SHAFT" IN DESIRED POSITION.
 :
NAME ROLF LUTH DAT§/7/78
Rev. 10/25/1OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C-WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I - FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Ef.-ct: Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
GEARBOX LUBRICATION
PAGE 2J1T
FMEA NO 5.6.1
AND REMOVE HEAT FROM THE GEARBOX BEARINGS AND GEARS.
FAILURE - AUXILIARY PUMP IS STARTED - APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F,G,H
SEAL FAILURE - LOSS OF FLUID - LOSS OF GEARBOX IF UNDETECTED
F, G, H
3 HEATER FAILURE - WTS WILL NOT START - LOW FLUID TEMPERATURE
F. G, H
BLOCKED FILTER - PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL ACROSS FILTER TRIPS F.G.H,
BYPASS VALVE, WTS SHUTDOWN AFTER TIME DELAY.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
M Nli'iAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
JLDJL
100 10 12
100 30
Not A)plicab1e
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL INSPECTION
* 2. WTS SHUTDOWN
T~3rwTS~DOTS~N~OT
* 4. UTS SHIITDfUJM
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
THE GEARBOX LUBE SYSTEM IS REDUNDANT. IF A PUMP FAILURE DOES NOT
BESUL-T-IN THE STARTING OF THE AUXILIARY PUMP THE WTS WILL SHUT DOWN-
PUMP AND SEALS ARE REDUNDANT. THIS FAILURE RATE IS FOR'A SINGLE PUMP.
PROBABILITY OF BOTH PUMPS FAILING BEFORE THE FIRST ONE IS REPAIRED IS
NEGLIGIBLE.
ROLF LUTH DATE 10/20/7
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN-
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP*
C V.'ARM UP
D IRAK'S,710, T O S T / 3E^
E STANDBY
F TPANSITIO" TOC. = r«TE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/7!
3/8/79
7o K. 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure- Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
• ROTOR BEARING LUBRICATION
PAGE */
FMEANO 5.6.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE LUBRICATION FOR ROTOR BEARINGS
FAILURE MopES&^ECTs
LUBRICANT _ POSSIBLE FLUID ONTAMINATION APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F. G. H
CONTAMINATED FLUID - EXCESSIVE WEAR ON MOVING ,PARTS
F, R, H
OIL IS COLD - TOO THICK FOR PROPER LUBRICATION -
F. 6. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
100
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
_1P_
Cannot b
MtAN TIME '
BETWEEN FAIU.'IE
(YEARS)
e accurately ?
FAILURE SEVERITY
XL -
ft;i ma tedje'cT
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
BEARING OVERHEATS - WTS SHUTS DOWN - VISUAL INSPECTION
2 INSPECTION - VISUAL
3 NONE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLfc)
1. IF NOT DETECTED PRIOR TO WTS SHUTDOWN
FLUID WILL BE CHANGED AT SIX MONTH INTERVALS TO MINIMIZE
CONTAMINATION AND ADJUST TO SEASONAL CHANGES.
DATE lQ/20/7
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25//1
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO
£ STANDBY
F TRANSITION
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN
COMPONENT
GENERATOR LUBRICATION
PAGE 48
FMEANO 5.6.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES LUBRICATION TO THE SLEEVE BEARINGS SUPPORTING THE GENERATOR ROTOR AT EACH
E N D O F T H E GENERATOR F R A M E . = ~
FATLEQMS0SDEQSF&OIFLE:CTSLOSS OF LUBRICATION CAPABILITY APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F,G
DIRTY OIL: EXCESSIVE WEAR ON MOVING PARTS
F,G
3 OIL TOO THICK (COLD)
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 10 11.4
Negligible with Preventative Maint
1 114
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS SHUTDOWN WHEN BEARING OVER TEMPERATURE IS PRESENT.
NONE. UNLESS OVERTEMP OCCURS
WTS IS SHUTDOWN
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[l> IF UNDETECTED BY INSPECTION PRIOR TO WTS SHUTDOWN.
1. When oil level drops below oil ring, lubrication of the bearing begins to
detenprate until insufficient lubrication, ispossible.ihe bearings are
excessively worn and temperature rises until bearing overtemperature protection
il^Initiates
or trouble.
temperature
 WTSshutdown. On-site... . te review ot stored data w i l l identity tlje source
Check oil-level sight gauge at each end of generator housing for
low level or presence of oil on floor. Inspect and replace bearing if necessary.
2. Periodic maintenance should detect this condition.
3. Generator space heaters wi.ll keep the oil warm. See also FMED 6.8.3.11.
NAME H. ROTH DATElQ/20/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
f TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
DRIVE TRAIN ASSEMBLY - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR
PAGE49
FMEA NO 5.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONVERTS SHAFT TORQUE AT 1800 RPM INTO ELECTRICAL POWER
FAVRtiLlffRfdAYEfiffilDING FAIL TO OPEN. CAUSES LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER APPLICABLEOPERATING MC-ES
OUTPUT AND WTS SHUTDOWN F, G
ELECTRICAL WINDING FAIL SHORTED OR GROUNDED: CAUSES LOSS OF
ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT AND WTS SHUTDOWN
GENERATOR OVERHEATS. CAUSES GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPEN
WHICH CAUSES WTS TO SHUT DOWN. F. G
GENERATOR MECHANICAL FAILURE: CAUSES ABNORMAL POWER GENERATION
WHICH OPENS GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WHICH CAUSES SHUTDOWN. F. G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO. %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY.
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1,2,3,4 100 10.3 11.1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 POWER PROTECTIVE RELAYS SEE SECTION 6.8
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
GENERATOR HAS MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE DEVICES SENSING CURRENT. VOLTAGE AND
TEMPERATURE. EACH INITIATES WTS SHUTDOWN UPON WARNING SIGNAL.
NAME G. TRUSK DATE 8/17/7E
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/7*
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
NACELLE PRIMARY TRUSS STRUCT. '
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PRIMARY TRUSS THAT SUPPORTS ROTOR SHAFT GEARBOX
GENERATOR SECONDARY STRIirTIIRF MISC. EQUIPMENT
TRANSFERS 1 flAD TO YAU RFARTNf, SIIPPflRT STRIirTIIRF
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 CRACK IN WELD OR TRUSS MEMBERS
INITIATES COLLAPSE OF NACELLE
2 CORROSION OF WELD OR MEMBER
INITIATES COI I APSE OF NACFI I E
3 EXCESSIVE NACELLE DFFI Er.TinN
LONG TERM DAMAGE Tfl RFARJNRS AWn/OR cnijpLING
4
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FMEANO 6-1 • 1 •
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
F, G, H.
FAILURE FREQUENCY FAILURE SEVERITY .
FAILURE COMPONENT MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 10 6 pER HO(JR (YEARS) 1 II
1,2,3 100 11.4 10 X
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 HIGH LEVEL OF INITIAL INSPECTION OF WELDS AND STRUCTURE.
:RITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III ' IV
•
2 MORE FREQUENT INSPECTION INTERVAI
3 ALIGNMENT CHECK PERIODICALLY.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) ,
WELD CRACKING FAILURE CAN BE REDUCED BY MORE EXTENSIVE INITIAL INSPECTION OF WEI DS.
PERIODIC INSPECTION OF CRITICAL WELDS SHOULD DETECT CRACK BEFORE TOTAL MEMBER FAILURE.
MULTIPLE LOAD PATHS OF TRUSS STRUCTURE MAY AI IOU MORE EXTENDED INSPECTION TNTFRVAI
CORROSION MAY BE PREVENTED BY "FREQUENT PAINT TOUCHING-HP AND INSPECTION AND REPAIR ON
CRITICAL MEMBERS.
-
.
. [NAME K. HERNLEY DATE 8-16-78
OPERATING MODES " Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
C WARM-UP F TRANSIT! ON TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM "'
NACELLE . "
COMPONENT «'
SECONDARY SUPPORT STRUCT.
PAGE ci
fi 1 2
FMEANO
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPORTS ENCLOSURE AND WALKWAYS AROUND GENERATOR BAY
^^•Mesg^rBffijs •
ENCLOSURE DAMAGE -
2 CORROSION DAMAGE .
ENCLOSURE DAMAGE
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE E
MODE NO FREQ%
 x 10
 6
 PER HOUR
1.2 TOO 11.4
FAILUF
MEANTIME
IETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAI
(YEARS) 1 II
10 - X
-
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
-
ALL
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i HIGH LEVEL OF INITIAL WELD INSPECTION
2 FREQUENT INSPECTION
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF
WELD CRACKING CAN BE REDUCED
APPLICABL E)
BY MORE COSTLY INITIAL INSPECTION OR ENCLOSURE ISOLATION
BY ELASTOMERIC MOUNTS. FREQUENT VISUAL INSPECTION WOULD DETECT FAILURES OF MEMBERS ._-
MULTIPLE LOAD PATHS DECREASE PROBABILITY OF UNDETECTED FAILURE
_
-
[NAME K. HERNLEY
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATES-! 6-78
Rev. 10/25/78
D- TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1- FEATHER
78-K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE
COMPONENT
YAW BEARING SUPPORT STRUCTURE
PAGE
•FMEANO
52
6.1.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TRANSFERS LOADS FROM NACELLE TO YAW BEARING
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSTN UFI ns - mm \ F nrspi Ar APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
CORROSION OF WELD OR MEMBER - NACELLE DISPLACEMENT
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 1%0 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
I icluded in 6. 1.1 JU1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
FREQUENT INSPECTION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
WELD CRACKING CAN BE REDUCED RY HIGH I FVFI nF TNTTTfli
FREQUENT INSPECTION OF CRITICAL MELDS MAY DETECT CRAP.E RFFflRF FATI IIRF
MULTIPLE WELDS & GUSSETS TNfRFASF TTMF TO FATI IIRF
1> IF DETECTED EARLY
 : :
NAME K. HERNLEY DATE
 8/16/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C - WARM-UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE >
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE
COMPONENT
FWD BEARING SUPPORT
PAGE 53
FMEANO 6.1.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TRANSFERS RADIAL LOAD FROM LIVE-SHAFT TO NACELLE TRUSS.
FAILUI IN ROTOR DISPLACEMENT APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 WILL DAMAGE/DESTROY'BOTH SHAFT BEARINGS, LIVE SHAFT. AND
COUPLING. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
U 2 Included in ii.1.1
.FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i "HIGH LEVEL INITIAL INSPECTION
2 FREQUENT INSPECTION
INCREASING VIBRATION SENSED BY #1 VIBRATION MONITOR RESULTING IN WTS SHUTDOWN.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
THE BEARING SUPPORT TO TRUSS WELD IS MOST VULNERABLE. ADDITIONAL WELD AREA & HIGH
FACTOR OF SAFETY REDUCES POSSIBILITY OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. FREQUENT INSPECTION AND
MAINTENANCE OF PROTECTIVE PAINT ELIMINATES CORROSIVE DAMAGE. REDUNDANT SUPPORT DESIGN
REDUCES POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN COLLAPSE.
IF UNDETECTED
NAME K. HERNLEY |DATE 8/16/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITI ON TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE. '
COMPONENT
AFT BEARING SUPPORT
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FMEANO 6.1.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONE NT
TRANSFER'S RADIAL & THRUST LOADS FROM LIVE SHAFT TO NACELLE1 TRUSS
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 HELD FAILURE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
LIVE1 SHAFT LIFTS & JAMS DRIVE TRAIN F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MOPE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
, IV
Inclu led in 6.1.1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 HIGH LEVEL OF INITIAL INSPECTION
FREQUENT INSPECTION BY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
#2 VIBRATION SENSOR INITIATES WTS SHUTDOWN
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
THE BEARING SUPPORT TO TRUSS HELD IS-MOST VULNERABLE. THERE ARE MULTIPLE LOAD PATHS.
REDUNDANT STRUCTURE. AND HIGHER FACTORS OF -SAFETY TO MINIMIZE PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPH
FAILURE
MAINTENANCE OF PAINT ELIMINATES CORROSIVE DAMAGE'. I
NAME HERNLEY W16/78
OPERATING MODES
A-SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPE RATE
Rev 10/25/7;
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE
COMPONENT
ENCLOSURE
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FMEANO 6.1.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT.
FAIiURSEKTNDEQSR&STRICNGER CRACKS AT FASTENERS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
I FAKS - FVENTUAL PARTIAL SKIN LOSS All
2 CDRRnsinN OF FASTENERS
LEAKS - EVENTUAL PARTIAL SKIN LOSS All
CORROSION OF SKIN OR STRINGERS RESULTING IN LEAKS
All
DAMAGE DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE AND/OR HAIL
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
F'AILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
Ml
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1-4 Included in 6.1. 1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3 FREQUENT INSPECTION
GROUNDING OF STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE LIGHTNING PATH.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
MAINTENANCE OF PAINT AND CORRODED
FASTENER REPLACEMENT WILL REDUCE CORROSIVE DAMAGE. CORRU3ATED SKINS REDUCE NUMBER OF
FASTENERS PERHAPS PERMITTING MORE COSTLY CORROSION RESISTANT FASTENERS.
[NAME
 K HERNLEY DATE
 8/16/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYStEM
COMPONENT
BRAKE DISC
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FMEANO 6". 3.1
FUNCTI ON OF COMPONE NT
SUPPORTS YAW "BEARING AND PROVIDES CLAMPING SURFACE FOR BRAKE CALIPERS
FAILUR
- COULD CAUSE BRAKE FAILURE AND/OR YAW BEARING APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
FAILURE ALL
BRAKE SURFACE WARPING. PITTING, OR GALLING - CAUSING ERRATIC BRA ING
ALL
3 DTRT- OR LUBRICANT ON DISC - ERRATIC OR CHATTERING BRAKES
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x*106 PER HOUR
M'EAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
33 4.6 75.8 - • f
33 4.6 75.8
33' L6 - 75.8
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 'VISUAL INSPECTION OF DISC
ERRATIC BRAKING
SLOW OR ERRATIC YAW MOTION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
LOW ALLOWABLES WILL MINIMIZE POTENTIAL FAILURES7
UNDETECTED TO POINT OF YAW BEARING FAILURE
INAME J. W. ACKER IDATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. TO/Z5/75
A - SHUTDOWN
B' TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78-K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and .Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BEARING, GEARN,BINIONS
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FMEANO 6.3.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE BEARING- SUPPORTS .THE" NACELLE. AND PERMITS IT TO YAW. THE GEAR (PART OF THE BEARING)
AND PINION TRANSMIT YAW DRIVE TORQUE FROM THE DRIVE GEAR BOX TO THE
, • r-
f.-
tr
FA
'iUfBEARIENSG& STRUCTURAL FAILURE - -COULD CAUSE WTS JO BECOME INOPERAB
"
2 GALLING. BRINELLING. FRETTING - COULD
FRRATTf.., SI nw, OR THMPI
3 REAR FATI IIRF mm n rAiis
•»., - 0
4 PINION FAILURE - WOULD
* f
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
MODE NO FREQ %
1,2,3,4 10Q
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
1.1
"
FTFL-Y STOPPED
F ihss np YAW
CAUSE LOSS OF
CAUSE- YAW' MOTION TO BE
-
RniATTON.
YAW DRIVE
y_
"*">
YAW "BEAR ING.
F
. - APPLICABLE
Lt . OPERATING MODES '
F.'.G, H
••
Fs G, H
F. G. H
*' 1*v
'
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
100 .
/ MINIMAL
<-
,
MARGINAL. C
II
.
•
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS ,-
i "VISUAL INSPECTION.
2 OBSERVATION OF ERRATIC
3
 cvrccQ no
YAW MOTION, OR LACK OF MOTION
IIMMQIIAI NDTCC
:RITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III . IV
X
f ^
•»_
ra
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
EXERCISE OF YAW SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE BRINELLING
•
BEARING GEAR AND PINION SHOULD BE DESIGNED WITH A "WEAK LINK" TO MINIMIZE
DAMAGE TO EXPENSIVE COMPONENTS
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
NAME J_
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT! ON TO OPERATE
W. ACKER DATE
 8/7/78
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE Rev. 11/27/78
H- TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
-3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX
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FMEANO 6.3.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT 1 - "
THE GEAR BOX PROVIDES TWO 'STAGES OF GEAR REDUCTION PERMITTING A HIGHER SPEED
HYDRAULIC MOTOR 'TO DRIVE THE LOWER SPEED DRIVE PINION "
, (AND LOW SPEED GEAR)
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 OIL SEAL FAILURE - LOSS OF LUBRICANT AND SUBSEQUENT GEAR BOX FAIliURfopERATiNG
APPLICABLE
MODES
F.G.H
2 fiFAR RnX SFT7FS OR .1AMS - WTS UITI I NOT YAW: IN EXTREME WINDS
mm n raiKF STPiirriipfli FATI IIPF F.G.H
3 GEAR BOX FAILS TO TRANSMIT TORQUE - WTS WILL NOT YAW OR COMMAND
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
-85 14.8
10 14.8 154
14.8 308
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
BI-MONTHLY INSPECTION
?. WTS FATI IIRF TD YAW ON mMMANH
3. ERRATIC YAW-MOTION
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES ev. 107^5/7
A-SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E S-TANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP ERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162 001
MOD-2 Failure IVfode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM "
YAW ORIVE SYSTEM
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE HYDRAULIC MOTOR SUPPLIES
TO CAUSE THE WTS TO YAW. -
°. "
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
i Fl Uin 1 FAKS EXTFRNAI 1 Y
TO OPERATE-
2
 MOTOR FAIL^ TO OPERATE
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ %
 x ,06pERHOUR
' -| 85 13.7
1 15 13.7
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 LEAKS - VISUAL, RESERVOIF
2 FAILURE TO YAW - WTS WILL
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (
|J> CRITICAL IF UNDETECTED Li
_
,
"
••
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
COMPONENT „.. . r PAGE CO
^ *«Wj " * >J ^
HYDRAULIC MOTOR • . FMEANO 6:3.4
* *• v *
THE PRIME fOWER TO THE YAW DRIVE GEAR TRAIN, ON COMMAND,
/
3
' 1
 x -
APPLICABLE
- SYSTEM MAY LOSE PRESS. (FLUID! & FAIL OPERATING MODES
F, G, H
- SYSTEM WILL NOT YAW ON' COMMAND
. F, G, H
J
* r
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
(YEARS) I II III IV
9-8 • X £*
55.6
 x -
I LEVEL DEPLETION, LOW HYD. PRESSURE, LOW TORQUES.
. NOT ASSUME COMMANDED POSITION
F APPLICABLE)
:ADING TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
"
-
"• --} v
_
NAMEj. W. ACKER DATE 8/8/78
Rev. 10/25/7J
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
HYDRAULIC PUMP & MOTOR
PAGE 50
FMEANO 6.3.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPLIES HYDRAULIC FLUID AT CONTROLLED 2000 PSI PRESSURE, ON DEMAND. TO OPERATE'YAW
HYDRAULIC MOTOR, YAW BRAKE CALIPERS, AND ROTOR BRAKE CALIPERS.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i PUMP LEAKS EXTERNALLY - SYSTEM MAY BE DEPLETED. THEN FAIL TO
OPERATE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F.GrH
2 PUMP FAILS TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE - SYSTEM MAY NOT FUNCTION PROPER
IV (Mn RRAKF RFIFASF, SI fM YAM) f.fi,H.
3 PUMP FJUK: . RFSIIITTMR mss OF PRFSSIIRF unin n PPDHTRTT
RELEASE OR YAW MOTION F.G.H
MOTOR FAILS - SAME AS #3
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x ' lO 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
33 3.4 101
10 3.4 34
3,4 57 3.4 58/5
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-4 WTS Shutsdown (low pressure sensor)
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME J. W. Acker 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
SYSTFM
COMPONENT
RESERVOIR
PAGE
 61
FMEANO 6.3.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONTAINS A SUPPLY OF HYDRAULIC FLUID FOR THE YAW HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i FXTFRNAI I FAK - FVFNTIIAI I Y PRODUCES A LOU LEVEL ALARM. SPREADS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
OIL IN NACELLE. SHUTS TOWN SYSTFM F. G. H
2 nninn | F\>FI BARF FJUI <; . PRnniirps FAI SF HTRH OR i nu RFAHTNGS
F. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE'
(YEARS)
FA'ILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
90 6.8 18.5 X - O
10 6.8 68
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 VISUAL INSPECTION OF RESERVOIR. SPILLED OIL IN NACELLE
LOW SYSTEM PRESSURE OR LEVEL OR SYSTEM INOPERATIVE
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
ft> IF DETECTED BY INSPECTION PRIOR TO CRITICAL FAILURE
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAVLDRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
HEAT FXHHANGFR
PAGE 62
FMEANO fi 3 fi ?
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT -
COOLS HYDRAULIC FLUID TO LIMIT MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE
,
'TWsWl^ DEPLETES RESERVOIR, WTS SHUTS DOWN. WON'T YAW
WON'T RELEASE ROTOR BRAKE
2 THERMOSTAT FAILS. SYSTEM OVERHEATS. WTS SHUTS DOWN.
3 FAN F A T I S , SYSTFM (1VFRHFATS. WTS SHUTS DOWN.
-
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ%
 x 10 6 pER HQUR
1 20 2.3
2 40 2.3
3 40 2.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i OVERTEMPERATURE SIGNAL
2 LEAKING OIL IN NACELLE
-
APPLICABLE
, OPERATING MODES
F.-G, H
-
F, G, H
F, G, H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
250~ " . X -
125
" '125
-
- VISUAL/LOW PRESS. STGNAI
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
- X"]> ' '
X
X
—
3 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE - OVERTEMP SIGNAL
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) •
> CRITICAL IF NOT DETECTED PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN.
•> -
- '
-
•
, * -
••
^
(NAME
 iL w ArKFR
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP , -
DATE
 fi/ft/78
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G - OPERATE
E STANDBY - H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRTVF SYSTEM
COMPONENT
ACCUMULATORS - C2)
PAGE
 63
FMEANO 6.3.6.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
STORE ENERGY TO MAINAIN REI EASED ROTOR BRAKE TF SYSTEM FATI S.
REDUCE PUMP RTPPIF r DAMPEN HYORAIII Tf SYSTEM PULSATIONS
FAILU'
1
EF.F,
OF ACCUMULATOR CAPABILITY, RESULTING IN LOSS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
OF ABOVE FUNCTIONS F. G. H
2 OIL LEAKS-LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ABOVE FUNCTIONS
POSSIBLE SYSTEM FATI URE F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 27.4 8.3
50 27.4 8.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
MONITOR GAS PRESSURES IN ACCUMULATORS
VISUAL INSPECTION FOR OIL LEAKS
MONITOR SYSTEM PRESSURE. RESERVOIR I FVFI
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION tIF APPLICABLE)
1 If Undetected
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A-SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION-TOWARMUP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
f FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAWJ3RIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
RELIEF VALVES (3)
PAGE 54-
FMEANO 6.3.6.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO PREVENT OVERPRESSURE OF THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF A PUMP PRESSURE
COMPENSATOR FAILURE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 LEAKS FXTFRNALLY - MAY DEPLETE RESERVOIR AND CAUSE SYSTEM FAILURfl
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 I FAKS TNHTRNAI I Y - SYSTEM PRFSSURF Wnill D RF I OU, MAY NOT OPERATE
VAU np HP/JIT flrTiiATDR<; ' "_ F. G. H
3 FAILS TO OPEN AT PRESET PRESSURE, COULD CAUSE HYDRAULIC COMPON-
ENT OVERPRESSURE IF PUMP COMPENSATOR FAILS F. G. H
F. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
70 51.3 3.2 - X
20 51.3 11.1 X-
10 51.3 22.2 X '-[>
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 VISUAL INSPECTION. NTS shutdown
2 PERIODIC TESTING FOR PRESSURE SETTING - LOW PRESSURE, VJTS SHUTDOWN
SIGNAL SHUTS DOWN WTS.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
{!> r.RTTTrfll TF PRFSSIIRF I flSS SIIFFTfTFNT TO TNTTTATF SHUTDOWN.
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
c WARM-UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPE RATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
SOLENOID VALVES (2)
PAGE 55
FMEANO 6.3.6.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TO RELEASE ROTOR BRAKE AND/OR YAW BRAKE,- ON COMMAND
FAILU OPERATE - ROTOR BRAKE, OR YAW BRAKE WILL NOT RE- APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
LEASE- WTS CANNOT START F, 6, H
2 VALVE FAILS TO DEACTIVATE - ROTOR BRAKE OR YAW BRAKE WILL NOT
APPLY UNTIL PRESSURE IS RELEASED BY FLUID BLEEDING BACK THROUGH A. B. C. D. E. I
3 SYSTEM. OR YAW CONTROL VALVE IS SHUTTLED.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
95 27.4 4.4
5 27.4 87.8
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
PFRIODIC CHECK FOR VALVE OPERATION
BRAKE(S) FAIL TO RELEASE OR APPLY (WHEN SYSTEM IS OTHERWISE OK),
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME j. y. /\CKER IDATE8/8/78
OPERATING MODES
A-SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
MOTOR CONTROL VALVE
PAGE bb
FMEANO 6.3.6.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CONTROLS YAW MOTION BY CONTROLLING FLOW .AND DIRECTION-OF FLOW OF HYDRAULIC FLUID TO'YAH
DRIVE MOTOR.
FAILUi
- COULD CAUSE UNCONTROLLED, ERRATIC YAW MOTION APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
FAILS TO OPEN - WTS WILL NOT YAW ON COMMAND
F, G, H
3 FAILS TO CLOSE - WTS WILL NOT STOP. YAW BRAKE WILL NOT APPLY ON
COMMAND F, G, E, H, I
4 LEAKS EXTERNALLY - COULD DEPLETE SYSTEM FLUID, CAUSE OPERATIONAL
FAILURE IF UNDETECTED F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
' IV
30 18.3 20.8
10 18.3 62.6 \
20 18.3 31.3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
4 40 18.3 15.6 X
1.2 ERRATIC MOTION IN YAW. DOES NOT FOLLOW COMMAND - MICROPROCESSOR SHUTS WTS DOWN.
4. VISUAL INSPECTION: LOSS OF PRESSURE SENSED; LOSS OF LEVEL SENSED.
3 WTS WILL SHUT DOWN IF YAW MOTOR MOVES NACELLE TO-WRONG POSITION.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev, 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G- OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FITTINGS, TUBES, HOSES - YAW SYSTE^
PAGE 67
FMEANO 6.3,6'. 7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPLIES PRESSURIZED HYDRAULIC FLUID TO YAW HYDRAULIC MOTORS
iURREUP°TTjRSE8' -FLOSS OF SYSTEM PRESSURE & FLUID - SYSTEMS WOULD FAIL APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
TO OPERATE. F,- G , 'H
? I FAK'AEF
F. G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE '
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 37.6 30.3
90 37.6 3.4 t> x
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL INSPECTION OF SYSTEM
LOW PRESSURE OR RESERVOIR LEVEL INDICATION RESULTING IN SHUTDOWN.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[j> DEPFNDS ON SEVFRTTY DF I FAK. I DSS (IF PRFSSIIRp TNTTTATFS SHUTDOWN- MINOR LEAKS
MAY BE DETECTED RY VISIIAI INSPECTION.
 :
[NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F-TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FITTINGS, TUBES, HOSES, .YAW BRAKE
PAGE 68
FMEANO 6.3.6.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPLIES PRESSURIZED HYDRAULIC FLUID TO YAW BRAKE CALIPERS.-
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 RIIPTIIRF - LOSS OF SYSTEM PRESSURE & FLUID
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
SYSTFMS FATI in nPFRATF F. G. H
LEAK - LOSS OF SYSTEM PRESSURE & FLUID SYSTEMS WOULD FAIL TO
OPERATE. F, G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
. CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 3.4 333
90 -3.4 37
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL INSPECTION
LOW PRESSURE OR RESERVOIR LEVEL RESULTING IN SHUTDOWN
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
DEPENDS ON SEVERITY OF LEAK. LOSS OF PRESSURE INITIATES SHUTDOWN. MINOR LEAKS MAY
BE DETECTED BY VISUAL INSPECTION.
INAME- J. W. ACKER IDATE 8 X78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TR ANSITI ON TO OP E RATE
G - OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode'and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FITTINGS, TUBES, HOSES.ROTOR BRAKE FMEANO 6.3.6':9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
SUPPLIES PRESSURIZED HYDRAULIC FLUID TO ROTOR BRAKE CALIPER.
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
i RIIPTIIRF - I OSS OF SYSTFM PRESSURE ft FLUID. SYSTFM FATI S TD
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
OPERATE
". G. H
LEAKS - LOSS OF SYSTEM PRESSURE & FLUID, SYSTEM FAILS TO OPERATE
F. 6. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
10 3.4 333
90 3.4 37
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL INSPECTION
LOW PRESSURE & RESERVOIR LEVEL RESULTING IN SHUTDOWN
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[t> DEPENDS ON SEVERITY OF LEAK. LOSS OF PRESSURE INITIATES SHUTDOWN.
| NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT r 1
HIGH PRESSURE AND LOW PRESSURE/-
PAGE 6971 ;
FMEANO 6.3.6.10 n
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE FILTERS REMOVE CONTAMINANTS FROM THE YAW DRIVE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC FLUID.
FAILUREM
- COULD DEPLETE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FLUID. CAUSING APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
SYSTEM FAILURE. F. G. H
2 PI iifiGFn FTI TFR - COULD RESULT IN- CONTAMINATION AS FILTERS
ARE BY-PASSED. "
. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
JfflL JLQCL X >
Not < pplicable
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
VISUAL - LOOK FOR EXTERNAL LEAKS
RESERVOIR OIL LEVEL INDICATOR WOULD-INDICATE GROSS LEAK.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[> IF NOT DETECTED BY INSPECTION PRIOR TO SYSTEM SHUTDOWN.
2. FILTERS WILL BE CHANGED AT REGULAR MAINTENANCE INTERVALS.
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 10/23/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
-G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/78
3/8/79
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failur6 Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
CHECK VALVES (4)
PAG
FMEANO 6.3.6.12
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
CHECK VALVES ARE USED TO PREVENT FLUID FROM FLOWING IN A REVERSE DIRECTION IN
FLUID LINES.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
VALVE LEAKS ALSO. THEN ROTOR BRAKE WOULD CLAMP ON. F. G, H
FAILURE TO CHECK IN YAW BRAKE LINE - NO EFFECT.
. G. H
3 FAILURE TO CHECK IN PUMP OUTLET LINE - FLUID MAY BLEED BACK INTO
PUMP ON SYSTEM SHUT-DOWN. F, G, H
FAILURE TO CHECK IN PUMP CASE DRIVE LINE - PUMP CASE COULD BE
PRESSURIZED IF SYSTEM RETURN PRESSURE WAS EXCESSIVE. F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 33
100
TDD"
33
3
T
33
TOTT 33
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-4 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, OR REMOVE AND TEST COMPONENT.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NONE OF THESE FAILURES ARE CATASTROPHIC. MOST WOULD TAKE A DOUBLE FAILURE
TO DO ANYTHING. THESE VALVES ARE IN THE SYSTEM AS A "BACK UP" ONLY.
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE 10/23/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E RATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
NEEDLE VALVE
PAGE 69.3
FMEANO 6.3.6.1
:UNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE NEEDLE VALVE IS USED TO ISOLATE THE SYSTEM PRESSURE GAGE SO IT MAY BE SERVICED
OR CALIBRATED.
- COULD DEPLETE SYSTEM HYDRAULIC Fl IITH ANH RFSIIIT
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
IN WTS SHUTDOWN. F. G. H
2 FAILURE TO CLOSE OFF COMPLETELY - WOULD PRECLUDE DEAD-WEIGHT
TESTING THE GAGE BECAUSE OF INTERNAL LEAK.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
75
RAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
MINIMAL
33
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 4.4 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
, EXTERNAL LEAK'- VISUAL INSPECTION, OF RESERVOIR LEVEL INDICATOR
FAILURE TO CLOSE - WOULD BE OBVIOUS TO MAN CHECKING OR SERVICING GAGE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If undetected by visual inspection prior to WTS shutdown.
_
J. W. ACKER DATEI Q/23/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP '
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
WEATHER SHIELD
PAGE 70
FMEANO 6.3.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT ' •'
SHIELDS YAW DRIVE SYSTEM BEARING, BRAKE "CALIPERS, AND DISC FROM THE LEATHER
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i FAILURE OF THE WEATHER SHIELD WOULD HAVE ONLY LONG TERM
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON YAW COMPONENTS ALL
2 FATIIIRF nilF TO FXTRFMF WINKS, I TGHTNING STRIKE. AND/OR HAIL.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Negligible
Site dependent
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-2 VISUAL INSPECTION AT REGULAR INTERVALS & AFTER SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
.1. M. ACKFR IDATE R/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW
COMPONENT
MISCELLANEOUS FASTENERS
PAGE 7]
FMEANO 6T3.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
FASTENERS HOLD BEARING AND HYDRAULIC COMPONENTS IN PLACE
FAILURE MODES 8TEFFECTS
1 FATI IIRF OF ANY ONF FASTFNFR HAS EFFECT ON OPERATION OF UTS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
BECAUSE OF REDUNDANCY. ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Negligible
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS .
1 VISUAL INSPECTION ON REGULAR SCHEDULE.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME J. W. ACKER [DATE 8/8/78
"Rev. 10/25/78OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSJTION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G~ OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BRAKE CALIPERS
PAGE 72
FMEA NO 6 3.9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
!_. CALIPERS ARE SPRING LOADED TO CLAMP ON DISC TO PROHIBIT YAW MOTION.
2. WHEN HYDRAULIC PRESSURE IS APPLIED, 6 nf 7 BRAKES. RELEASE. PERMITTING YAW
MOTION (7th BRAKE MAINTAINS DRAG ON DISC FO^ DAMPING PURPOSES).
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 MFfHANirfll OR SPRTNR FATI IIRF - RRAKF WOUI D RFI FASF'. RFnilf.TNfi
YAW HOLDING OR DRAG TORQUE. >
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
-ALL
HYDRAULIC FAILURE - BRAKE WOULD NOT RELEASE. PROHIBITING OR
INHIBITING YAW MOTION . " „ - E, G, L
3 BRAKE PAD FAILURE - YAW BRAKE TORQUE MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE FOR
HURRICANE WINDS A, E, I
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
Negligible - 6 units for lolding yaw position
See 6 3.6.8
100 Negligible - 6 Units for lolding yaw- position
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i VISUAL INSPECTION - ALL MODES OF FAILURE
2 ERRATIC MOTION OR EXCESSIVE NOISE/LACK OF YAW MOTION ON COMMAND. WTS SHUTS DOWN
, (LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OR 1EVEL SIGNAL).
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUCING HOLDING TORQUE MAY ALLOW WTS TO WEATHERVANE. LOSS OF DRAG TORQUE
MAY CAUSE YAW MOTION TO BE ERRATIC.
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE OFFSPRING OR_OTHE£ MCHANICAL.JTEM_ON_JHL^IflGLE
DRAG BRAKE IS APPROXIMATELY ONCF EVERY 1OEARS J\NDJ01ILQ_BE_DfJECJED_AL_2__
MONTH INSPECTION PERIOD. PAD WEAR WILL BE CHECKED EVERY 2 MONTHS.
NAME J W. ACKER IDATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/78
Rev
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ENVIRONMENTAL.CONTROL SYSTEM
COMPONENT
COOLING EQUIPMENT
PAGE"'73
FMEANO 6.5.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
FANS EXHAUST HOT AIR FROM NACELLE, DRAW AMBIENT AIR INTO NACELLE TO MAINTAIN
THAN NAfFI I F SUPERHEAT ON WARM DAYS.
FAILURE M
1 FAILS - NACELLE OVERHEATS - WTS shuts 'down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
if overheat "affects components, F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x tQ,6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
JLQQL JLQO_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 NAfFI I F TFMPFPATIIRF TNnTPATF nVFRTFMPFRATIIRF
NACELLE OPERATING COMPONENTS INDICATE OVERTEMPERATURE
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1>IF COMPONENTS OVERHEAT SUFFICIENTLY TO CAUSE WTS SHUTDOWN.
THE USE OF A NACELLE OVERTEMPERATURE SIGNAL DIRECTLY SHUTTING THE
WTS DOWN IS CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED
NAME
 J. W. ACKER |DATE 8/7/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO ^BATHER
I-FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/78
lev. 11/27/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
COMPONENT
HEATING EQUIPMENT
PAGE 74
FMEANO 6.5.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TBD - THERE IS, AT THIS WRITING, NO KNOWN REQUIREMENT TO HEAT THE NACELLE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
DISCOSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME J. W. ACKER DATE - 8/8/7*
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
- B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
Rev. 10/25/7?
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPE RATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162 001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS .
COMPONENT HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLE
TO THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT
PAGE M.I
FMEANO 6.6.1.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF HIGH VOLTAGE GENERATOR OUTPUT CURRENT FROM THE
GENERATOR TO THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Open circuit: One or more high voltage power phases go to zero; APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
GCB* and BTC* open, NTS shuts down.
2 Short circuit: Possible phase-to-phase or phase-to-neut fault;
GCB and BTC open. MTS shuts down.
3 Grounded conductor.: Massive fault on one conductor; GCB and BTC
open. WTS shuts down.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.6 142
176 284
25 1.6 284
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i- 3. Power output from UTS indicates zero; BTC and GCB position indicate "open"
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. Differential current protection relay will cause the GCB to open, or as a
backup, the differential current,protection will cause the BTC to open within
milliseconds.
2. Generator or bus tie unit differential current protection or generator
over-current protection circuits-will cause the GCB and BTC to open within
milliseconds.
3. Same as #2 plus the ground current relay will cause the GCB to open within
milliseconds.
*GCB - Generator circuit breaker
*BTC - Bus tie contactor [NAME H. Rotn DATE 9/27/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITI ON TO FEATHER
I FfcATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLES
PAGE 75
FMEANO 6. 6.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOU OF HIGH VOLTAGE GENERATOR OUTPUT CURRENT FROM THE
GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT TO THE CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM.
FAILUREpMODES^ EFFECTS gQ flnd APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
BTC* open, WTS shuts down
Short circuit: possible phase-to-phase fault; GCB and ETC open,
WTS shuts down '
3 Grounded conductor- Massive fault on one conductor, GCB and
BTC open. WTS shuts down.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.6 142
25 1.6 284
25 1.6 284
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i - 3. Power output from WTS indicates zero; BTC and GCB position indicate "open."
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. Differential current protection reTav will cause the GCB to open, or as a backup
the differential protection circuit will cause the BTC to open within
mill iseconds.
 :
2. Generator or bus tie contractor unit (BTCU) differential current protection
or generator over-current protection circuits will cause the GCB and BTC to
open within milliseconds.
3. Same as #2 plus the ground current relay will cause the GCB to open within
milliseconds.
*GCB - Generator circuit breaker
RTr - Rus tip rnnt.ractor
[NAME G. Trusk/ H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/7
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B-TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/26/7:
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
I F - FPS
COMPONENT
MAIN 480 VOLT FEEDERS
PAGE 75 _
FMEANC 6.6.2.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE- FLOU OF 480 VOLT ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE CABLE TRANSITION
MECHANISM TO THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY'UNIT.' * ' <
excitation power availab1e to generator APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
loss of some single phase 480 V loads. All
2 Short circuit: Same effect as open circuit', after appropriate
protective device clearing. All
3 Grounded conductor: Same effect as open circuit after-
appropriate protective device clearing. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
"IV
50 .15 >1500
25 .15 >3000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3. WTS will shutdown via Failsafe system.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
An uninteruptable power supply provides 40VDC power to protection
devices and critical loads".
NAME Trusk DATES/I 7/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I - FEATHER
- R e v . 9/26/7*
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT I PAGE 77
AC POWER CABLE TO THE CONTROL SYS.FMEANO 6.6.2.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR OPERATION OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
CABLE RUNS FROM THE CB PANEL IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT TO THE NACELLE CONTROL
UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS . ^  , _ . . .. .
 IT_1 CaDle is open circuited. Computer becomes inoperative. WTS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
shuts down. All
2 Cable is shorted to ground. Computer becomes inoperative. WTS
shuts down. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 .15 >1000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1& 2. Power output from WTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 ft ? IAJTS shut down will bg initiated via thg fgilsafp
FAME G. Trusk/ H- |DATE8/;
kev. y/
/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I - FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NAP.FI IF '- FPS
COMPONENT I tKKUr (HOLE.; rUWLh
CABLE TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM
PAGE
 78
FMEANO 6.6.2.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT ,
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNfNTERRUPTABLE. DC FOR OPERATION JJF THE CONTROL SYSTEM
.CABLE RUNS FROM THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.TO THE NACELLE CONTROL UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Cable is open circuit: ' NTS shuts down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 Cable is short -to ground: 'WTS shuts down
All •
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x'106 PER HOUR
MEANTIME -
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II „
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 .,15 >1000 X .
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i& 2. Power output from WTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IP-APPLICABLE) "" ' ,' ' ^_-=" '"
1 & 2. UTS shut down will be initiated via the failsafe shutdown system.
INAME.G. TRUSfy H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSIT! ON TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 9/26/78
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE ,
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE" - EPS
COMPONENT
- POWER CABLE TO THE YAW DRIVE SYS
PAGE 79
FMEANO 6. 6. 2.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR OPERATION OF THE YAW DRIVE SYSTEM.
CABLE RUNS FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL IN THE.GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT TO THE YAW
DRIVE SYSTEM. '' . • '
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Cable is open circuited. WTS shuts down APPLICABLE -OPERATING MODES
F, 6, H
2 Cable is shorted to ground, protective circuitry clears. WTS
chnt«: Hnwn • F,,G, H
3 .
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE MO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
COMPONENT
FAILURE.RATE
x 106PERHOUFt
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 .15 >1000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i & 2. Power output from WTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Yaw drive hydraulic pump motor does not run or develop sufficient power to"' '
maintain yaw accumulator pressure. Excessive difference between nacelle position
indicator and wind sensors initiates shutdown. ^_ .
[NAME
 G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH DATE 7/7
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT ROWER CABLE TO THE
PITCH CONTROL SYSTEM ,
PAGE 80
FME'. NO 6.6.2.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR OPERATION OF THE PITCH CONTROL
SYSTEM. CABLE RUNS FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT
TO THE LOW SPEED SHAFT SLIP RING ASSEMBLY.
FAILURE MQDESSiEFFECTS . . .i Cable is open circuited (one or more conductors). WTS shuts APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
down F, G, H
2 Cable is short circuited to ground (one or more phase .conductor!
WTS shuts down
 :
F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV.
75 .15 >1000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 Power output from" WTS indicates zero
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
—Pitch drive hydraulic pump motor does not run or develops sufficient power to maintair
pitch accumulator pressure Loss of pressure causes controls to shut WTS __
down. Verify power cable continuity, rppair a<; rpqinrprl.
[NAME
 G- jRUSK / H. ROTH !DATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C-WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 9/26/78
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/7?
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
COMPONENT PUWLK LABLb IU
GEARBOX OIL HEATERS
SUBSYSTEM
Nflrn , F _
PAGE
 8]
FMEANO 6.6.2.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR OPERATION OF THE LUBE OIL HEATERS
IN THE GEARBOX. CABLE RUNS FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY
UNIT TO THE GEAR BOX'ASSEMBLY.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 r.ah1p.nppn circuited (one or more conductors). If gearbox oil
temp is low. WT^ m11 nrit pntpr "npprate" mode
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
D, E, F, G, H
2
 Cable is shor^ r-irnptPH tn ground (one or more phase conductors)
Protective circuitry clears If gearbox oil temp is low WTS will D, E, F,- G, H
oot enter "operate" mode.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENTFAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
' l
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 .15 >1000 1*
25 .15 >3000 1*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 Power output from WTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE A'CTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If gearbox oil temperature is low,verify continuity of gearbox heaters and power
cable. Repair as required.
* If WTS has been operating, and/or air temp, is high enough to keep oil vescosity
-low failure will be "minimal."
[NAME G. TRUSK / H. ROTH [PATES/17/78"
Rev. 9/26/78OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B- TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE ' U' "'
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode 'and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
,CABLE TO THE
LUBRICATION SYSTEM
PAGE g2
FMEANO 6 6.2 7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A-PATH FOR.THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR OPERATION'OF THE LUBRI.CATION SYSTE!
CABLE RUNS FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT TO THE LU5E
SYSTEM. . , - • • •
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS '
^ Cable is open circuited (one or more conductors). Lute system
has redundant wiring and pumps.
2 Cable is short circuited to ground (one or more conductors),
nrruitry rlpari I uhp system has redundar>t_ pump.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
All
FAILURE.FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
F-AILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
' IV
75 .15 >1000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
j Failure of one pump results in operation of backup.pump. Periodic maintenance
detects this change.
DISCUS = 'ON AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If both pumps fail loss of .oil pressure results in WTS shutdown.
NAME G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP -
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F "TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev.
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE - Rev. 11/27/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER -
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis'
COMPONENT'POWER CABLE TU IHt
ENVIRONMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
PAGE 8 3 " ' •
FMEANO 6.6.2.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POUEfl FOR OPERATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL SYSTEM.
 CABLE RUN$ FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY
UNIT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Cable is open circuited (one or more conductors). ECS is APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
inoperative. Nacelle temperatures mav exceed'allow limit All
2 Cable is shorted to ground (one or more conductors). Protectivii
r1p3r. Nacelle temnerat.ur<rmav exceed allowable limits. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE.
x 10 6 PER HO'UR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
, If
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
"I & 2 100 .15 >760 X*
FAILURE DETECTI ON'METHODS •"
1 c
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Will be inspected at 2 month intervals.
UTS will-shut down if temperature falls or rises to unacceptable
(control system'Will becqme inoperative resulting in shntHnhm)
NAMEG. TRUSK/ H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
 t
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
Kev. V/Zb/TB
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT-ROWER CABLE TO THE
ELECTRICAL FACILITIES EQUIPMENT
PAGE
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FMEANO 6.6.2.9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FOR THE OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL
FACILITIES LOCATED IN-OR*ON THE'NACELLE:, CABLE RUNS. FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER-PANEL
IN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT TO LIGHTS, CONVENIENCE OUTLETS AND AIRCRAFT WARNING LT:
FAILURE MODES.* EFFECTS " • ' . . / ' " j "... \ nxr 4. J
• 1 Cable ' is open circuited (one or more conductors). Affected APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
function is inoperative (lights or portable equrpment). All
2 Cable is short circuited to ground (one or more-conductors).
Protective devices clear. „ ..._.,„ •
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x f O 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1 & 2 100 .15 ' >760
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i Function (lights or portable equipment) is inoperative.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Replace fuse/reset appropriate circuit .breaker, repair as required
NAME G. TRUSK / H. ROTH DATiS/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G- OPERATE
H-TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/2577
Rev. 10/25/7
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
'NACELLE'r EPS
COMPONENT •••
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER FEEDERS
P A G E 5 5
FMEAW 6.6.2.10
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT - , "
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER (DC) FROM THE CABLE TRANSITION
•MECHANISM TO THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT. • - 1 ' .
FAILUREL  MODES & EFFECTS .__ .1 Cable is open-circuited. Emergency JdTS shutdown. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES.
F, 6, H •
2 Cable is short circuited to 'ground.^ Protective devices clear,
emergenqy.-WTS shut down. F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ '%
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
f
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 .15
25 .15
<>1000
>3000~
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i& 2. Power output from UTS Indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH IOATI
Rev.
D E 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP ,
C-WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON'TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
9/27//8
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78-K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR CONTROL CABLE
PAGE
 86 -
FMEANO 6.6.3.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES' A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF GENERATOR EXCITATION CURRENT AND GENERATOR WINDING
TEMPERATURE SIGNALS BETWEEN THE GENERATOR AND THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .
1 A conductor in cable is open circuited. Temperature data lost APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
and/or generator excitation lost. UTS will shut down. . G. H
2 One or more conductors in cable are short circuited. Same effect
a-; 11. WTS shuts down. F. G. H
3 A conductor in cable is shorted to ground same effect as #1
NTS shuts down. F. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15
_>15QQ_
25 .15
25 ,15
_>300p_
>300D
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
For temperature - no remote display. For excitation - GCB and BTC tripped, power
from WTS indicates zero.
3 & 2 GCB and BTC tripped, power from WTS indicates zero.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
|NAME G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/27/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
i F - EPS
COMPONENT. CONTROL CABLE TO THE
GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT
PAGE
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FMEANO 6.6.3.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN THE NACELLE
CONTROL UNIT AND THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT. .
FAILURE.MODES.& EFFECTS^"Tconductor in cable is open-circuit. WTS shuts down. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F,G, H
2 Two or more conductors in cable are shorted together. WTS
shuts down. F,G,
3 A conductor with a control function is short-circuited to grounc
UTS shuts down F, G, H
A conductor carrying operational data is short-circuited to
nrnunrl. UIT1^ down F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 > 1500
- 2 25 .15 > 3000
3,4 25 .15 > 3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-4 power output from HTS indicates zero, BTE is tripped,
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-4. Either the generator field enable signal will not enable the field current
relay, inhibiting excitation of the generator or a zero power signal
generator output will prevent closing the BTC or cause it to trip.
NAME G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/27/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure JVlode and Effects-Analysis-
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL'CABLE TO THE ROTOR
PAGE 88
FMEANO 6.6.3.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF CONTROL SIGNALS AND OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN THE NACELl
CONTROL UNIT AND THE LOW SPEED SHAFT-SiIP RING ASSEMBLY.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ." .,. • . ^ j ' l jr j. j7 A conductor in-the cable is open-circuited. Loss of associated " APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
command function or data. -*
F. G. H
Two or more conductors are shorted together. Loss of associatec
command function on erroneous data. * F. G, H
3 A conductor in the cable is short-circuited to ground. Loss
of associated command function or erroneous data: * F. G. H
"FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT •
FAILURE RATE
X 10 6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL.
IJI
CATASTROPHIC
IV -
50 ..15 500
25 >2ooa
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS.
1 - 3 None until WTS shuts down or fails to deliver power.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEA-sheets 7.7.13.through 7.7.26
Failsafe system mit-iates shutdown if necessory.
*_ WTS may be shutdown or control function may be locked out-or improper commands
are issued which ultimately would lead to WTS shutdown.
NAME_ G. TRUSK /H. Roth
 DATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B -TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
Rev. 9/28/7S
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CABLE
PAGE 03
FMEANO 6.6.3.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN THE NACELLE
CONTROL UNIT AND THE NACELLE MOUNTED WIND SENSOR.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ,
 J . . i i i j _ i J . . - i J . J r1 A conductor in cable is open-circuited. Wind data is lost from APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
one sensor. WTS shuts down E, F, 6, H, I
2 A conductor in cable is short circuited to another conductor.
Wind data is lost from one sensor. WTS shuts down. E. F. G. H. I
3 A conductor in cable is shorted to ground. Wind data is
lost from one sensor. WTS shuts down. E. F. G. H. I
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500
25 .15 >3000
25 .25 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i NCU detects wind sensor difference between two sensors.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Data from one wind sensor does not agree with data from the othpr wind
which causes the WTS to be shut down in the lockout mode.
|NAME G. TRUSK / H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
-B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER *
Rev. 9/28/7*
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CABLE TO THE TOWER
PAGE 90
FMEANO 6.6.3.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE Fl OH OF CONTROL SYSTEM COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA
BETWEFN THF NACFI I F P.hNTRni IINTT AND THF TQUER SLIP RING
LURE MOOES & EFFECTS . j . . r • i *.1 Wire in cable is open circuited. WTS may shut down, fail to APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
connect WTS to utility, or not shut down when required. ALL
2 Uire in cable is short circuited to ground. Same effect as No. 1
ALL
3 Wires in cable are shorted together. Same effect as No. 1
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 HOP X*
25 .15 '2800 X * "
25 .15 2800
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-3 Loss of manual control; UTS shutdown if critical systems involved.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION_(IF APPLICABLE)
* Manual command "auto/shutdown" or status signals originating at the base may
not be received by control equipment in the nacelle. Commands originating in
the nacelle may not be received at the base (i.e., "synchronizer enable" or
"utility bus tie disconnect"). If failure occurs while UTS is in the operate
mode and "utility bus tie disconnect" command cannot be sent via the control
system, the EPS "directional power" relay will trip the BTC when power reverses
due to low or no wind; generator in the nacelle is protected from damage by
protection devices located 'in,and controlled by.circuits within the nacelle.
[NAME
 G. JRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
c WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO
I FEATHER
Rev
Rev. 1/27/778
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CABLE TO THE GEAR BOX
PAGE g]
FMEANO 6.6.3.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF STATUS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FROM
THE GEARBOX TO THE NACELLE CONTROL UNIT
FAILURE MOOES 8. EFFECTSi wire in cable is open circuited: UTS may shut down. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F, G, H
2 Uire in cable is shorted to ground: WTS mav shut down.
F, G, H
3 Wires in cable are short circuited: HTS mav shut down.
F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 1400
25 .15 2800
25 15 2800
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS *
1-3 If WTS shuts down, power output indicated is zero.
21-3
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
U? UTS chni-g Hnwn HUP tn intprprptat-mn that Hata rnt.nr at 7Prn
excessive vibration or excessive low speed bearing temperature.
2 UTS shuts down due to interpretation that data indicates rotor speed is excessive
If fault is on vibration or bearing temperature circuits, re'dundant signals are
provided to maintain data integrity. ;
* See FMEA 7.7.7 through 7.7.12
G. TRUSK/H. ROTH PATE
 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/12/78
Rev 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE
THE
COMPONENT CONTROL CABLE TO
THE LUBRICATION SYSTEM'
PAGE 92
FMEA NO 6.6.3.7
FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN
NACELLE CONTROL UNIT AND THE LUBRICATION SYSTEM.
FAILURE MODES.& EFFECTS .1 Wire in cable is open circuited: WTS mav shut down. Oil oumo
may not be turned on or off, but redundant. path
2 Wire in cable is short
provided.
circuited to ground: same pffprt. a<;
No. 1. additionally, riata rannnt HP mnnitnrprl.
3 Wires in cable are short circuited: WTS may shut down
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
1
2
3
4
MODLEURE F'A. LURE 'RATE
FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
50 .15
25 .15
2b .15
<
*•"
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F,, G, H
F, 6 , -H
F, G, H
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL
(YEARS) 1
1400
2800
2800
MARGINAL CRI1
II
X*
X*
X*
riCAL CATASTROPHIC
II IV
X *
X *
X *
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS *
1
2
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Pump on/off commands may not be obeyed if command wires are faulted.
»
If status wires are faulted, WTS may shut down because data erroneously is
interpreted to mean one of the following: excessive particles in
oil overtemperature, oil filter restricted or oil level is low.
lub oil ,
Oil pump
may be erroneously commanded on or off.
* Depends upon which wire(s^ faulty for details. See FMEA 7.7.2.8. - 7.7.3.5.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
NAME Q.
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE
 8/1 7/78
Rev 10/12/78
G OPERATE • Rev 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT.CONTROL CABLE TO THE
YAW DRIVE SYSTEM
PAGE 92.1
FMEANO 6.6.3.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL DATA BETWEEN THE NACELLE
CONTROL UNIT AND THE YAW DRIVE SYSTEM CONTROLS.
FAILURE MODES.& EFFECTS . j. j , «•<• i_ i. j i. j i1 wire in cable is open circuited: WTS shuts down or hydraulic, APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
pump cannot be turned on or off. F, G, H
Wire in cable is short circuited to ground: same effect as #1
plus nacelle mav vaw left or right. .. F. G. H
Wires in cable are short circuited: no data monitored on
shorted wires or hydraulic motor cannot be turned on or off or
nacelle may yaw right or left.
F. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
50
25 400
25 1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 WTS shuts down. Manned substation receives alarm. On site data review will
identify problem circuit, inspection is required to pinpoint specific problem.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEAs 7.7.50 through 7.7.62.
NAME H. ROTH PATE 1Q/12/76
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP"
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
C O M P O N E N T ( D R I V E
SLIP RING BRUSH ASSEMBLY TRAIN)
PAGE
FMEANO
•53
6.6.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES THE STATIONARY PORTION OF THE PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND
SIGNALS BETWEEN THE NACELLE AND THE DRIVE TRAIN. ALSO PROVIDES A PROTECTED
ELECTRICAL JUNCTION FOR INCOMING NACELLE CABLES
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
iA hrush fails to make contact with slip ring: loss of data or
command function 1_^
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2High impedance contact between brush and slip ring: same effect,
at Nn. 1-
path hetwepn
ALL
4Conductive path between brush and structure or case
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
98 37.6 3.0 >
37.6 303
37.6 303
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 -4 Inspection and continuity tests
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEA sheets 7.7.13 through 7.7.26 and 6.6.3.3
Total for all signals
|NAME 6. TRUSK/H. .ROTH DATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/12/78
Rev 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A MEANS TO OPEN
COMPONENT
GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER (GCB)
PAGE 94
FMEANO 6.8.1
THE HIGH VOLTAGE POWER OUTPUT LINES FROM
THE GENERATOR.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Breaker contacts cannot be closed, WTScannot enter operate
mode.
2 Breaker contacts cannot
excessive fault currents
3 Breaker contacts have hi
causes heatina of breake
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
MODE NO FREQ %
1
 25
2 25
3 50
4
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
2.3
2.3
2.3
be opened, generator may carry|b>
gh resistance.
r
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
?nn
200
100
Excessive voltaae drop
-
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
E, F
F, G, H
F, G, H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
1
X
MARGINAL (
II
-
:RITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
X
-
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 Generator circuit breaker position indicator indicates open
2
 Generator circuit breaker position indicator indicates closed, zero power output.
3
 None-on-site: insoection
4
may reveal higher t.emos or 'lower voltaae
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Generator circuit breakers are in commercial use and should
dependable.
[2> Bus tie contactor unit has fuses
generator.
that backup
than normal .
be vpry
thp Gf.B and prot.Prt the
.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
DATES/ 18/78
Rev 10/12/78
G OPERATE Rev 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78-K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
VOLTAGE REGULATOR
"PAGE 95
FMEANO 6.8.2.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
^OVIDES AND CONTROLS DC POWER TO THE GENERATOR EXCITER
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Output voltage is zero: GCB & BTC trip. HTS shuts down. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F, G, H
Output voltage too low: GCB & BTC trip. UTS shuts down
F. G..H
Cutout voltage too high: GCB & BTC trip. UTS shuts down.
F. G. H
FAILURE FREQUENCY '
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
JYEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
' MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 11.4 20
25 11.4 40
25 11.4 40
"AILURE DETECTION METHODS
. 2, 3 Power output from UTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. Prior t.n BIT. i~in<;iirp; BTC will not outp t r
After BTC closure: Loss of excitation protection trips GCB.
2L _ Prior to RTr closure: _ Output voltage is high, synchronizer inhibits BTC closure.
After BTC closure: Power factor becomes more leading, either power factor
- or uvercurrent protection trips the GCB. ~"
; TRUSK/ H. Roth PATE 8/17/78
DERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE'
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV. 10/9/78
REV. 10/25/7
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELL EPS
COMPONENT
POWER FACTOR CONTROLER (PFC)
PAGE gg
FMEANO 6.8.2.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A FEEDBACK CONTROL SIGNAL TO THE VOLTAGE REGULATOR TO MAINTAIN A CONSTANT
OUTPUT POWER FACTOR FROM THE GENERATOR.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 THF PFP. HOPS NHT PROVTOF r.riNTRni SIGNALS Tn THE VOLTAGE
REGULATOR (VR^: POUER FACTOR IS NOT CONTROLLED, SEEJ>
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
2 THE PFC PROVIDES TOO HIGH A SIGNAL TO THE VR: PF IS LESS THAN
DFSTRFD. SFF&> :
3 THE PFC PROVIDES TOO SMALL A SIGNAL TO THE VR: PF IS GREATER
THAN DESIRED.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE-
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1,2,3, 100 22.8
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 -3 NO DETECTION OF FAILURE UNTIL CERTAIN ELECTRICAL PARAMETERS SUCH AS
DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT OR OVER-CURRENT ARE EXCEEDED.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 UNDER NORMAL WIND CONDITIONS NO PROBLEMS ARE ENCOUNTERED, THE VR PROVIDES
SUFFICIENT CONTROL; HOWEVER, IF HIGH WIND GUSTS ARE PRESENT THE GENERATOR
MAY SLIP A POLE AND EITHER DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT OR OVER-CURRENT PROTECTION
CIRCUITS WILL INITIATE WTS SHUT DOWN.
BE KNOWLEDGE THAT PF IS EXCESSIVE.
IF A POLE IS NOT SLIPPED THERE WILL
2&3 IF PF IS OUT-OF-TOLERANCE. IT. IS NOT DETECTED AND MAXIMUM REAL POWER IS
NOT AVAILABLE FROM THE WTS.
UNDER GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS THE GENERATOR PULL-OUT TORQUE MAY BE EXCEEDED
CAUSING THE GENERATOR TO SLIP A POLE WITH ATTENDANT VERY HIGH UNBALANCED PHASE
CURRENTS. WTS MAY SHUT DOWN. WTS SHUTS DOWN IF CURRENTS EXCEED
NAME
 G_ TRUSK/H. RQTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NAHFI IF - FPS
COMPONENT
FTFI n r.llRRFNT RFI AY
PAGE 97
FMEANO 6.8.2.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ROVIDES A DIRECT MEANS OF ENABLING AND DISABLING THE GENERATOR EXCITATION.
FAILUFiEMOQE§& EFFECTSi FCR fails closed; excitation current cannot be removed from the APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
generator field windings
2 FCR fails open, generator cannot be excited
F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
20 3.4 168
80 3.4 42
CAILURE DETECTION METHODS
Generator output power present, BTC* indicates open.
Generator power indicates zero power, BTC* indicates open.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
* Bus Tie Contractor
**Generator Circuit Breaker NAME H. ROTH/G- TRUSK DATES/17/78
jPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITl ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 9/2
Rev. 10/2-
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
'ONITQRS THE GENERATOR OUTPUT
COMPONENT
OVER VOLTAGE RELAY
PAGE98 /
F ME A NO 0-8.0^»
VOLTAGE AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO THE CONTROL SYSTEMyTMTIATI
fcHUTDOWN^lEN THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE EXCEEDS A PRESET LIMIT. /
\
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1
 Over vol taQ'a relay fails
""X
\
- 2 Over voltage relay fails
x
open. J^o *»ffprt. .
/
closed. WTS shutsdowif./
\ /
. \ /
\ /
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE E
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 10 6 p£R HOUR
1 80 3.4
2 20 -3.4
Al LURE DETECTION METHODS /
1
 None ' /
\ /
/
/ APPLICABLE
/ OPERATING MODES
/
 F, G, H
F, G, H
-
\. / FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME \/
iETWEEN FAILURE /NWINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) , \l II
42 / x\
}68/ - x^
/ \
\
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
x
'-.
GCB and 8TC position indicates open - \,
3 - / \
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) N.
Vol t?gp v/hilp nn ITIP fOntrolle^ ty Utility bUSS If Over excit^tinn nrrn^ while
onxfine. over temp sensors will initiate shutdown.
vS1^
cH^1i\\ ^
_ ^
^
-\
q$$V
^^^
-& ' V^X
<$&
[NAME
 H RQTH/G- TRUSK
-ERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE 8/1 7/78
Rev. 9/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE RgV • 10/25/78
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
iinppi | r CDC
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
1NITORS THF GENERATOR OUTPUT
COMPONENT
UNDER FREQUENCY RF' AY
PAGE 99
FMEAN06.8 .3 .2
VOLTAGE AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO" TRIP THE GENERATOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER WHEN THE GENERATOR POWER OUTPUT FREQUENCY FALLS BELOW A PRESET LIMIT.
"
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
i Under frequency relay fails open. No effect.
*t 2 Under frequency relay fails closed. GCB trips and WTS shuts do
-
3
•
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE COMPONENT
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % „
 1Q 6>£R ROUR
1 80 3.4
2 20 3.4
'
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 Nonp
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F, G. H
wn.
F. G. H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
"42 "
MINIMAL MARGINAL
1 II
X
168
•
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
•
X
2 GCB and BTC position indicates open.
3
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. I'ider frequency caused bv low rpm; if off-line rom sensor results in redundant.
system. If on-line, utility buss controls frequency, any fluctions would be due to
loss of utility power, initiating shutdown.
"
*
jPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
NAME H. ROTH6. TRUSK [DATE 8/1 7/78
r\cv . y/ f.-j/ 10
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
.SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPO
INTTDRS THE GEE
BREAKERJMEN THF
COMPONENT
OVERCURRENT RELAY
PAGE 100
FMEANO 6.8.3.3
ME NT
JFRATOR OUTPUT CURRENT AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO TRIP THE GENERATOR CIRCUIT
: GENERATOR QL
FAILURF,M<">r>p<:a ccccfrc
i Over-current relay fails
TPUT CURRENT EXCEEDS A PRESET LIMIT.
-
open: No effect
-
2 Overcurrent relay fails closed. GCB trips and "UTS, shuts down. .
* -•
* •. "* *" ""
3
t
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
MODE NO FREO %
1 80
2 20
-
"AILURE DETECTION
1 None '
2 GCB and BTC
3
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6FER HOUR
3. "4
3,4
METHODS
*•
position indi
•
APPLICABLE
OPE RATING' MODES
G
G
'
*
* „
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIM£
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
42
MINIMAL MARGINAL
1 II
• «B~
, X
168
rates open
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. No overcurrent protection available to the generator; however,
results from
sensing will
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III HV
' x
r
:-
-
if overcurrent.
a fault condition, ground current sensing or differential current
cause the GCB to open.
•
•
•
DERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
NAME H. ROTH/ G. FRUSK DATE 8/1 7/78
rev. 9/25/78
rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE-EPS
COMPONENT
REVERSE POWER RELAY
PAGE
 101
FMEANO 6.8.3.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
MONITORS THE GENERATOR OUTPUT POWER AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO TRIP THE GENERATOR
CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE GENERATOR OUTPUT POWER FALLS TO A LEVEL WHERE THE POWER
FLOW MAY REVERSE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i RELAY FAILS OPEN:
RFVFRSAI (IF POWFR OCCURS.
GENERATOR MAY ACT AS A MOTOR IF A REAL
APPLICABLE .
OPERATING MODES
2 RFIAY FATIS P.l nSFD: RCR TRTPS AND UTS SHUTS DOWN
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
X 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
80 3.4 42 X.
20 3 .4 - 168
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
GENERATOR POWER INDICATION INDICATES NEGATIVE POWER IS GENERATED.
GENERATOR POWER INDICATION TNDTP.ATFS 7FRO POhlFR TS GENERATED: GCB AND BTG POSITION
TMnTfflTF<;
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME R _ ROTH DATE B/17/7R
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP "
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E.STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/8/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure-Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
NACELLE - EPS GROUND CURRENT RELAY
PACE^
FMEANO 6.8.3.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
WITORS THE GENERATOR OUTPUT CURRENT FLOW IN THE NEUTRAL LINE TO GROUND AND PROVIDES A
SIGNAL TO TRIP THE GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE CURRENT FLOW RISES TO A PRESENT
LEVEL TO INDICATE AN ELECTRICAL FAULT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS -
1 GCR fails open. No effect
-
"i 2 GCR fails closed. WTS shuts down.
3
-
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY FAILU
FAILURE COMPONENT MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
MODE NO FREQ %
 x 10 6 PER HOUR (YEARS) 1 II
1 80 3.4 - 42 - X
? 20 3.4 168
"AILURE DETECTION METHODS
i None - Requires periodic check
2 GCB and BTC position indicates open
3
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
G
G
RE SEVERITY
L CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
-
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
2. OPR or OCR will probably initiate -shutdown, over temp, sensors would initiate shut-
down if fault continued.
,
"
|NAME G-. TRUSK / H ROTH DATE 8/17/78
™ • . . . R"evV^/"5'/78
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY l H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPE RATE 1- FEATHER
78 K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION RELAY
PAGE 103
FMEA NO 6.8.3.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
1NITORS THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT FLOW IN THE VARIOUS BRANCHS OF THE GENERATOR STATOR
WINDING AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO TRIP THE GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE DIFFERENTIAL
CURRENT EXCEEDS A PRESET LIMIT TO INDICATE A FAULT WITHIN THE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION ZONE
FAILURE MODES $ EFFECTSi DPR fails open, no effect APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 DPR fails closed, WT-S shuts down
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 RER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
80 3.4 -42
20 3.4 168
AILURE DETECTION METHODS
i None - Requires periodic checks
2
 Generator power^LDdjiction indir.flt.ps ?prn pnwpr; KCB and BTC position indicates "open"
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
jPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001
MOD 2 Pollute Mode and Ef fects Analysis
CS U B S Y S T E MNACELLE - EPS COMPONENT GENERATOR WINDINGOVER TEMPERATURE RELAY (QTR) PAGfF ME A NO fi.8.3.7CTlON OF COMPONENT
'__ j THE TEMPERATURE SIGNAL OF EACH GENERATOR FIELD WINDING AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL-TO THE
CONIROL SYSTEM INITIATING A SHUTDOWN WHEN ANY WINDING EXCEEDS A PRESET LIMIT.
FAILURE MODFS& EFFECTS
i_ Relay fails open: Generator may operate with overheated windings APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
resulting in eventual destruction of interwiding insulation and massiv
internal fault currents ,
2. Relay fails closed: WTS shuts down
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
Ml
CATASTROPHIC
IV
_8Q_
20
-3JL
JUA.
42
168
f. -.,. DETECTION METHODS
i & 2. GCB & BTBS open, power output from WTS indicates zero.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)I  
T. Excessive winding temperatures are caused by either internal or external faults that
should be sensed by over-current, differential current or ground current protective
curcuits that trip the GCB and cause WTS shut-down. Once the generator is shut-down
via the OTR the control system will prevent re-enabling the generator exitation until
the winding temperature is within acceptable limits.
1* only if backup protection devises fail (i.e., Over-current, differential current, or
Around fault)(Less than .1% chance per 30 NAME ROTH
years).
[DATE 9/27/78
DERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D- TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I - F E A T H E R
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SU8SYSTEM
 mm^R BEARING OVERTEMPERATURE "
NACELLE - EPS pELflY ™
lGE
 103.2
HEANO 6.8.3.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
Provides a signal to the control system to shutdown the WTS if a bearing over-
temperature signal is received from the temperature sensors.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS1 Relay fails open: Generator may operate with overheated bean rigs
resultina in eventual destruction of the bearing. 1*
2 Relay fails closed: WTS shuts down.
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY FAILURE SEVERITY
FAILURE p.,,', ,,BP RATE MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILUHti-mie BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITIC
MODE NO FREO % x 1{f° PER HOUR (YEARS) I II III
1 80 3.4 42
2 20 3.4 IfiR - X
3
4
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
G
G
AL CATASTROPHIC
IV
1*
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS -
1 None remotely, until WTS shutdown.
2
 BTC open, power output from WTS indicates zero.
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
The most probable cause for an overheated bearina is loss of lubricant. Control
system has redundant inputs to effect normal shutdown or failsafe shutdown in
the event of generator bearing nvprheat.
1* Bearing may seize and cause sianificant-damaqe to the structure. This would
require two relays to fail, due to redundant system. Probability of joint
failure is less than. .1% in 30 ypars.
-
{NAME H. ROTH | DATE 9/27/78
OPERATING MODES ' ' ReV 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
C- WARM UP F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
LOSS OF EXCITATION RELAY
PAGE 103.3
FMEANO 6.8.3.9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
Provides a means to trip the generator circuit breaker when excitation power
to the generator field is lost.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Open circuit: Relay does not operate APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F.G.
2 Relay does not issue GCB trip signal
F.G.
3 Relay issues GCB trip signal prematurely
F.G.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
_ao_ JLA.
10 3.4 333
10 3.4 333
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1- 3 UTS Shut Down
i.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 & 2 Damage may occur to the generator if excitation is lost and GCB is not
tripped in a timely manner.—Other protection devices will trip the BTC
to remove the generator from the system.
[NAME H- ROTH DATE 10-18-75
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G- OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
POWER FACTOR RELAY
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
Provides a means to siqnal the control system to shut down if
exceeds preset limits.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Relay does not operate: Power, factor may exceed tolerabl
causing generator heating.
2 Relay operates prematurely: Frequent unnecessary shut do
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
 FVn LIRE RATEFAILURE MODE FAILURfcHAIt
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR
1
 80 3.4
2 20 3.4
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-
FAILUF
MEANTIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) 1 II
42.
167
PAGE 103.4
FMEANO 6.8.3.10
the power factor
n , APPLICABLE
e level OPE RATING MODES
G
wns.
G
HE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
X
1 WTS Shut Down When Generator' Overtemperature Limits Are Exceeded.
2
 WTS Shut Down
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
(NAME . H. Roth
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
c - WARM UP
DATE 10-18-78
Rev 10-25-78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G - OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78-K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS BEARING UNDERTEMPERATURERELAY
PAGE 103.5
FMEANO 6.8.3.11
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A SIGNAL TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR INHIBITING START-UP OF THE UTS UHEN THE
GENERATOR BEARING TEMPERATURE IS TOO LOW.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Relay contacts stuck open: WT.S rotor will not rotate or UTS APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
will shut down. F, G, H
2 Relay contacts remain closed: Generator may be rotated without
lubrication. (Double failure)
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
ii CRITICALIII
CATASTROPHIC
IV
80 3.4 42
20 3.4 167
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 NTS will not start.
If damage is severe, eventual bearing over-temperature shutdown during
"operate" mode.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
2. Normally not detectable since relay contacts should be closed under conditions
where maintenance personnel are at station. If relay is suspect, conduct
operability test replace if required. This relay is a backup for the generator
heater. If the heater fails, the relay protects the generator.
NAME H. Roth DATE 10-19-78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10-25-78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E R ATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
MAfCI I C _ FPQ
COMPONENT
PniFNTTAI TRANSFORMER (PT)
PAGE
FMEANg.8.4.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-115 VOLT SIGNAL PROPORTIONAL TO THE 0-4160 VOLT OUTPUT OF THE GENERATOR-.
THIS SIGNAL IS USED BY THE GENERATOR PROTECTIVE RELAYS AND THE GENERATOR INSTRUMENTATION
TRANSDUCERS^ "
FAILUR open-circuited, no effect APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Transformer has short-circuited, windings
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 1.1 400
75 1.1 133 x-
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 WTS shutdown
2 WTS-shutdown 1*
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IE APPLICABLE).
Potential transformers are utilized for many .functions- 1) Controls, 2) Voltage
regulation, 3.) Indication devices. 4) Over-voltage protection. 5) Watt-hour
meters, 6) Watt-meter, and 7) Synchronizer circuits.
1* If PT is in a control circuit the WTS will shut down due to over-excitation
[NAME
 G. jRUSK / H ROTH DATES/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C - WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/25/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78-K 6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - FPS
COMPONENT
CURRENT TRANSFORMER (CT)
PAGE KJb
FMEAN&'8 -4 '2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-5 AMP ANALOG SIGNAL PROPORTIONAL TO THE 0-433 AMP GENERATOR OUTPUT LINE
CURRENT. THIS SIGNAL IS USED BY THE GENERATOR PROTECTIVE RELAYS AND THE GENERATOR .
INSTRUMENTATION TRANSDUCERS.
FAILURE MODES& EFFECTS
i Open circuit in the current transformer secondary winding- APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
no output from CT
2 Short circuit between individual turns of the current transformer
lower output from CT -
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 10 6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 1.1 400
75 1.1 133
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 WTS shutdown
WTS shutdown
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Current transformers are utilized for many functions- -1) Controls; 2) Voltage-
regulation, 3) Indication devices, 4) Over-current protection, 5) Uatt-hour
meters, 6) Watt-meter, 7) Ground fault protection, and 8) Differential protection
circuits.
[NAME G TRUSK/
 H. ROTH 1DATE 8/18/7E
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP ERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. '9/25/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.
SUBSYSTEM
NAf.FI I F - FPS
COMPONENT
VOLTAGE TRANSDUCER
PAGE
 1Q6
FMEANO 6.8.5.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-1 MA OUTPUT ANALOG SIGNAL FROM THE 0-115 VOLT OUTPUT OF A POTENTIAL
TRANSFORMER THIS SIGNAL IS PROVIDED TO THE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM AND TO A VOLTMETER DISPL/lY
*iUR6peri)Ecfrorf£TIn the voltage transducer. No output from transducer APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Short circuit between individual turns of the voltage transducer
Nn nr incorrect output from transducer. -G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x*10 6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 1.1 400
75 1.1 133 X-
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 & 2. None. Voltage signal is for data purposes only.
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
& 2. Independant over voltage protection in provided.
NAME G. TRUSK/ H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITI ON TO WARM-UP
C-WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
K6V. 3/CO/
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78-K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CURRENT TRANSDUCER
PAGE 107
FMEANO 6.8.5.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-1 MA OUTPUT ANALOG SIGNAL FROM THE 0-5 AMP OUTPUT OF A CURRENT
TRANSFORMER. THIS SIGNAL IS PROVIDED TO AN AMMETER DISPLAY.
FAILURE MOOES a EFFECTS1 Open circuit: control system or ammeter sense zero current. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Short circuited: same as #1.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
_Z5_ JL31.
25 JUL!
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 -2 Zero current displayed at WTS site. No remote detection avai lable .
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Approximate current can be derived from displayed or stored real power data.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES KLV 111/1J//B
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
REAL POWER TRANSDUCER
PAGE 108
FMEANO 6.8.5.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-1 MA OUTPUT ANALOG SIGNAL OF GENERATOR KW OUTPUT BASED ON INPUTS FROM
POTENTIAL AND CURRENT TRANSFORMERS. -THIS SIGNAL IS PROVIDED TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM
AND TO A KW METER DISPLAY.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Output high: WTS shuts down. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
Output low: WTS shuts down.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III'
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1&2 WTS shuts down, zero power output, BTC indicates open.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. Real power signal, is-h'igh. System'operates at' reduced power levels.- Detected
by comparison with other units In farm.
2. Real power is low. Control system uses real power data to set the rotor blade
pitch. WTS shutdown will be initiated when generator protection sensors approach
overstress limits.
G. TRUSK/H. ROTH 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES EV 10/13/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATU
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
REACTIVE POWER TRANSDUCER
PAGE 109
FMEANO 6.8.5.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-1 MA OUTPUT ANALOG SIGNAL OF GENERATOR KVAR OUTPUT BASED ON INPUTS FROM
POTENTIAL AND CURRENT TRANSFORMERS. THIS SIGNAL IS PROVIDED TO A KVAR METER DISPLAY.
LURE MODES & EFFECTS . . . . ,i Output high: incorrect on-site displays. APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
2 -Output low: incorrect on-site dlsplavs.-
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 200
50 1.1 200
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-2 No remote detection available. KVAR meter display is not compatible with
voltage, current, power factor and KW meter displays.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
KVAR's can be derived from other data displayed at site: voltage, current,
power factor and real power.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES REV 10/13/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E RATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Ef fec ts Analysis
S U B S Y S T E M
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
PAGE 109.1
F M L A N O 6.8.5.5
C1ION OF COMPONENT
ROVIDES A VARIABLE RESISTANCE PROPORTIONAL TO TEMPERATURE OF THE GENERATOR WINDINGS AND
SUPPLIES THIS DATA TO THE GENERATOR WINDING OVER TEMPERATURE RELAY.
FAILURE MODFS& EFFECTS
i Transducer is open-circuit: Over temperature relay is activated.
2 Transducer is short-circuited: Over temperature relay is activated.
3 Transducer is shorted to ground: Over temperature relay may or may
not be activated.
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
1
2
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
10
80
10
•COMPONENT
FAILURE RATE
x 106PER^HOUR
1.1 .
1.1
1.1
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MIN
(YEARS)
1000
125
1000
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
G
G
G
FAILURE SEVERITY
IMAL MARGINAL
1 II
'
-
CRITICAL, CATASTROPHIC
•I! _ IV
X
X
X
JRE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 GCB is open, BTC is open, power output from WTS is zero. (WTS shutdown initiated prior to
detaching generator output from the l i n e . ) =
DISCUSSION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME H. -ROTH DATEg/28/78
^PERATING MODES REV 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B - TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D - TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY - -
F -TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G- OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K-6162-001
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TRANSFORMS 480 VOLTS TO 1
COMPONENT
ACCESSORY POWER TRANSFORME
PAGE
 11Q
R FMEANO 6.8.6
15/230 VOLTS TO PROVIDE ELECTRICAL POWER TO
ACCESSORIES MOUNTED IN THE NACELLE.
FAILURE MODESA EFFECTS . . .
T Open circuit: WTS cannot start up or shut down v:a norma
control system procedure
1
 2 Short circuit: Same as No. 1
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODEURE FAILURE RATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"° PER HOUR
1 50 1.1
2 50 11
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILUF
MEANTIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAl
(YEARS) 1 II
?nn
?nn
.. APPLICABLE
1 OPERATING MODES
B, C, D, E, F.G.H
B, C, D, E, F.G.H
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
X
1
-2 Zero DOWer Output indiratpd at. manned t:nh<;tatinn
2
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-2 Loss of nacelle 115/230 Vac incapacitates the control system, fipnprat.inn
system protection will function from uninterruptible power supply. Shutdown via
this mode will not result in rotor overspeed beyond design limits.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/1 7/78
Rev 10/13/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE R^V 10/25/78
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS"
COMPONENT
480 VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
PAGE TTT
FMEANO 6.8.7.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION AND PROTECTION-OF 480 VOLT ACCESSORY
POWER UITHIN THE NACELLE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Open circuit: WTS cannot start up or will go to emergency APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
shutdown.
2 Short, rlrrinti: SfllTlP as No. 1
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 1.1 133- X -
25 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
-2 Zero power output indicated at manned substation.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (I F APPLICABLE)
Battery will discharge if maintenance is not effected.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/T37/0
Rev 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
115/230 VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKER PANE
PAGE 112
•FMEANO 6.8.7.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION AND PROTECTION OF 115/230 VOLT ACCESSORY
POWER WITHIN THE NACELLE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Individual circuit breakers open prematurely or fail to close. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
.ALL
2 Individual circuit breakers fail to trip when required
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 JL1
50 1.1 200
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 See FMEA sheets for individual items.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLEI
1* Critical if faulty breaker affprts r.Htiiral r.nntrnl , nt.hprun«;p
minimal
NAME B. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE7/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/13/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C - WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
Page 113
This page intensionally left blank
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
4.16 KV BUSES
PAGE 114
FMEANO 6.8.8.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF 4.16 KV POWER WITHIN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Buses are short circuited: WTS shuts down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 A bus is open circuited: WTS shuts down
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 2.3 66.7
75 2.3 200
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS is shut down.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APP LICABLE)
1 & 2 Differential protection or ground protection will trip the generator
circuit breaker.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES REV 10/13/78
,A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
£ STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
480 VOLT CIRCUITS
PAGE 115
FMEANO 6.8.8.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF 480 VOLT POWER WITHIN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.
FAILURE MOD£S & E.FFE.CTS1 A circuit is open circuited: APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 A circuit is shorted to ground: protective circuit breaker
trips All
3 Two circuits are shorted:
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL'
M
"CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 200
~2T i.r 400
25 1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEA sheets for individual items receiving 480 volt power,
NAME Q. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G. OPERATE
H' TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV 1U/1J//B
REV 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
115/230 VOLT CIRCUITS
PAGE
FMEANO 6.8.8.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF 115/230 VOLT WITHIN THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 A circuit is open circuit: APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 A circuit is shorted to ground: protective circuit
breaker trips ' All
Two circuits are shorted:
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 200
25 1.1 400
25 1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
* See FMEA sheets for individual items receiving 115/230 volt power
| NAME G. TRUSK/bi. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES REV 10/13/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C - WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I-FEATHER
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE
COMPONENT
D.C. CIRCUITS -
PAGE
FMEANO 6.8.8.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNINTERRUPTIBLE DC POWER WITHIN THE GENERATOR ACCESS
OXRY UNIT (GAUL_
FAILURE MODES &E.FFECJS . . . . . . . ,
 f ,
i Open circuit in individual circuit: loss of individual
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
function All
2 Short to ground on individual circuit: same as #1
All
3 Open circuit to the GAU: loss of generator protective
functions, aircraft warning lights and VITS shuts down. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I ,
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 1.1 133 X —
1.1 133
1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
& 2 Not remotely detectable.
WTS shut* down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEA sheets for individual,functions:
Generator protective devices (6.8.1, 6.8.3.1 through 6.8.3.8) ,
Aircraft warning lights (6.9.3)
Control system (memory and fail-safe shutdown circuits 7.7.4 and 7.7.6)
Failure severity critical'if WTS shuts down via fail-safe shutdown circuits.
NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH !DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS IT) ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
) FEATHER
REV 10/13/78
REV 10/25/78
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CIRCUITS
PAGE
FMEANO 6.8.8.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF COMMAND. CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SIGNALS WITHIN
THE GENERATOR ACCESSORY UNIT.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Individual path is open
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
F, G, H
2 Individual path is shorted to ground
F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
75 2.3 66.7
25 2.3 200
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
* See FMEA sheets for individual functions and 'failure severity
(6.8.1 through 6.8.5.5).
NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH IDATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E R ATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV 10/13/78
REV 10/25/78
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ILLUMINATION OF
COMPONENT
LIGHTING EQUIPMENT
PAGE H9
FMEANO 6-9.1
NACELLE INTERIOR AREAS USED FOR- MAINTENANCE AND
REPAIR WHEN THE NACELLE IS OCCUPIED.
-
FAILUR£ MQ.DE.S& EFFEQTS . . . .
 n . .. . . . .1 Individual circuit breakers supplying lighting circuits tr
respective lights extinguish.
2 Lamas burned out
3 115/230 V power failure:
-
all lights go out
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY'
FAILURE MODE0"' FA. LURE RATE ,
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"° PER HOUR
1 50 57
2 40 57
3 10 57
4
FAILUI
MEAN TIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) 1 " . 1 1
4 X -
5 X
20 X
_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
'IP' OPERATING MODES
A
A
A '
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
1
 Lights fail to illuminate or extinauish. No remote detection.
2 -
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
-
~
-
'
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C- WARM UP
(NAME G. TRUSK/H. F,OTH DATE s/l 7/78
Rev 10/13/78
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE IU/<ib//O
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
CONVENIENCE OUTLETS
PAGE 120
FMEANO6.9.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
MAKES ACCESSORY POUER AVAILABLE FOR TEMPORARY USE WITHIN THE NACELLE
FOR ASSEMBLY MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR TASKS.
FAILURE MQDE.S 8. EFFECTS . . . .
 n . ., ^ .1 Individual circuit breakers supplying convenient outlets trip: APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
No power available at outlet.
2 Open circuit to specific outlet: No power available at outlet.
3 115/230 V power failure: No power available
convenience outlet
at any nacelle
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 11.4 _20_
25 11.4
TT4"
40
40
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-3 Portable equipment fails to function
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME B. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/13/78
Rev 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
NACELLE - EPS
COMPONENT
AIRCRAFT WARNING LIGHTS
PAGE 121
FMEANO 6.9.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
COMPLIES WITH FAA REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE VISUAL WARNING OF OBSTRUCTION TO LOU -
FLYING AIRCRAFT. •
FAILURE M.ODES & EFFECTS . . . . . . . . , - , . , .i Circuit breaker is tripped: high-intensity flashing white APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
obstruction (HIFWO) lights are extinguished. All
Wire to individual (one oF three) high-intensity flashing white
obstruction lights is open circuit: one HIFWO is extinguished. All
3 Lamp malfunctions (burns out): individual HIFWO light is
extinguished. All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
PAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1140
1
~9T
1140
TT4T
10
.1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i -3 Alarm at manned substation. Visual observance at site.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
REV 10/13/78
REV.10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENT
TOWER STRUCTURE
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE TOWER STRUCTURE SUPPORTS AND PROVIDES MOUNTING PROVISIONS FOR
PAGE 1 22
FMEANO 7.1.1
THE YAW DRIVE
SYSTEM, ELECTRICAL CABLES AND NACELLE ACCESS DEVICE.
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
' Strurtiirfll •failure to tOWPr dllP tn nV6rlQ?rl
2
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE"" FAILURE RATE „
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"° PER HOUR
i negl gible
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 Inspect tower if overload
2
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All modes
'
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
condition occurs. •
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
The tower structure will be safe life designed, and no failures are anticipated
'unless loads greater than the design limit loads occur. Structural analysis
will be performed using the MOD-2 WTS structural design criteria.
•
[NAME j
 SHULTZ
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE
 8-14-78
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWFR SURASSFMRI Y
COMPONENT
NACELLE ACCESS DEVICE
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THF NAr.Fi i F arrFtt nFvrr.F PRnvrnps TRANSPORTATION FOR TWO
EQIITPMFNT PFTUFFN THF GROUND AND THF TOP OF THE TOWER.
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS .1 Power lifting device malfunctions
2 Power lifting device cable brakes
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE FA,mDFRATFFAILURE MODE r«.t.uncn«it
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR
i 99 1.1
2 1 1.1
3
4
F
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MAP
(YEARS) 1
101
 x
IU.OUO X
FAILURE DETECT! ON METHODS
[PAGE 123
| FMEANO 7.1 2
PERSONS/AND OR MAINTENANCE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
Maintenance
Maintenance
AILURE SEVERITY
GINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III IV
1
 Periodic maintenance and inspections
2
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Use ladder backup system if lift malfunctions and repair
Replace damaged cables and
lift.
fittings.- Plan to use lift with 2 cables.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
c WARM UP
JNAME j_ SHULTZ DATt8-14-78
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENT
LADDER
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
THE 1 ADDFR PROVIDES A MEANS OF ENTERING AND EGRESSING THE
LIFT PLATFORM AND PROVIDES
"
AGE 1247 1 ,FMEANO 7.1.3
NACELLE FROM THE POWER
AN ALTERNATE SYSTEM IF THE POWER LIFT MALFUNCTIONS.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Structural failure due to overload •
failure.
2
-
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FA. LURE MODEURE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
1
 Negligible
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
F
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MAR
(YEARS) 1 1
x
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
maintenance
,
ftlLURE SEVERITY
GINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
1 III IV
i Periodic visual inspections
2
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
No failure anticipated - ladder and attachments will be safe life designed - structural
analysis will be performed using the MOD-2 WTS structural design criteria.
-
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
|NAME J. SHULTZ lDATE8-14-78
Rev. 10/25/78
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENT
TOWER FOUNDATION
PAGE 125
FMEANO 7.1.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONE NT .
The TOWER FOUNDATION SUPPORTS AND PROVIDES MOUNTING PROVISIONS FOR THE TOWER STRUCTURE
FA
"jUStructural failure of concrete foundation due to overload. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
.All modes
2 structural failure of attachment bolts due to overload or
All modes
3 piffprpntial «tpt.t.1pmpnt. nf foundation due to overload resulting
excessive tyttpm tilt. . . .
in
All modes
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
Negligible
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
Negligible
Negligible
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
Perioduc visual inspections
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
No failures anticipated unless loads greater-than the design limit loads occur.
Structural analysis will be performed using the MOD-2 WTS structural design criteria,
Corrosion prevention finishes will be used and maintenance performed when required.
J. SHULTZ |DATE8-14-78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO SI ANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FAN URE MODES& EFFECTS
3__OPEN._CJRCULL;_.QdE, OR MORE PHASES GO TO ZERO VOLTAGE;_.GCBJDPENS.
BTC4BUSTIE CONTACTOR.) OPENS. WTS SHUTS__DOWN.
L..SKORL.C1RCUII: POSSI BLE_PHASE JQ.-P.HAS£ _F^ULTX GCB-OPENS. BTC
DP_ENS, WTS- SHUTS -DOWN
SL.. SYSTEM COMPONENT
TOWER-HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE
PAGE 126
F ME A NO 7 2 1 1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
_P.80V_ID.E.S_A. PATH. FQQHE ....RJJiUlF._HI.GH VOLTAGE GENERATOR OUTPUT CURRENT FROM THE _
_JCABL£ JEANS I J I ON JJECHAHI SM _JQ__IHE_H I GH _VOLIftGE JUNCTION, BOX AT THE FOOT OF THE TOWER.
3 GROUNDED CONDUCTOR MASSIVE FAULT ON ONE CONDUCTOR; GCB OPENS._
BTC OPENS, WTS SHUTS DOWN.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
50
'"25"
25
FAILURE RATE
x TO"6 PER HOUR
"78~
_
.8
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
286
578
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
' G
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
—X-
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 GENERATOR POWER INDICATION INDICATES ZERO POWER;- BTC POSITION INDICATES "OPEN".
2 -3 GENERATOR POWER INDICATION INDICATES ZERO POWER; GCB AND BTC POSITION INDICATES
BOTH ARE "OPEN".
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION RELAY WILL CAUSE THE GCB TO OPEN OR AS A BACKUP,
THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION CIRCUIT WILL CAUSE THE BTC TO OPEN.
2 GENERATOR OR BTCU DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT PROTECTION OR GENERATOR OVER-CURRENT
PROTECTION CIRCUITS WILL CAUSE THE GCB AND BTC TO OPEN
3 SAME AS 2 PLUS THE GROUND CURRENT RELAY WILL CAUSE THE GCB TO OPEN.
NAME G TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/8/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
TOWER TO BTBU HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE
PAGE 127
FMEANO 7.2.1.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF HIGH" VOLTAGE GENERATOR CURRENT FROM THE
JUNCTION BOX INSIDE THE FOOT OF THE TOWER TO THE BUS TIE BREAKER UNIT LOCATED
OUTSIDE AND AWAY FROM THE TOWER. '
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Open circuit: one or more high voltage power phases APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
go to zero volts: BTC opens, WTS shuts down
2 Short circuit: possible phase-to-phase or phase-to-neutrat
fault; BTC opens, WTS shuts Hnwn
3 Grounded conductor: massive fault on one'high voltage conductor
BTC opens. WTS shuts down
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME '
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .4 _57L
25 .4 1143
25 .4 1143
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 WTS shut down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Tower zone differential current protection relay will cause the BTC to open.
As a backup: generator over-current or ground protection relay may
trip the GCB; fused manual disconnect may fuse open. -
| NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH °ATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/13/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
 BTBU TO TRANSFORMER
HIGH VOLTAGE'CABLE
PAGE 128
FMEANO 7.2.1.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT '
PROVIDES AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THF FLOW OF HIGH VOI TARE GENERATOR OUTPUT CtlRRFNT
FROM THE BUS TIE BRFAKFR UNIT in THF INPUT STHF OF THF PDUFR OUTPUT
TRANSFORMER.
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
i Open circuit" one or more high voltage power'phases go to
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
volts: BTC opens, WTS shuts down, accessory power is distributed
at uLher Llian 3-phdse.
2 Short Circuit: _ pns<:ih1p nr
fault; BTC opens, WTS shuts down, accessory power is distributed
—at other than 3-phase.
3 Grounded conductor: Massive fault nn onp high vnltagp conductor
BTC opens. WTS shuts down, pnwpr is distributed at
than 3 phase.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 _5ZIL
25 .4 1140
25 .4 1140
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 WTS shut down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
1-3 For generator protection see FMEA 7.2.1.2
1-3 For accessory power utilization equipment protection (TBA)
see also FMEA 7.2.2.1
NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH IDATE R/?B/7R
OPERATING MODES
A-SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/13/7?
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
AERIAL HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE
PAGE ]29"
FMEANO 7.2.1.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH VIA CONDUCTORS FOR THE FLOW OF GENERATOR POWER
FROM THE OUTPUT STDF OF THF PfUJFR TRfllMSFORMFR TH THF Rl ADF STHF OF
THE FU7FD MANUAL DISCONNECT SWITCH.
FAILURE.
1
MODES& EFFECTS
Conductor open circuit: one or more high voltage power phases
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
go to zero volts: BTC^pens, WTS shuts down, accessory power
is distributed at othei—Lhaii 3-ulidbe.
Conductor short circuit: possihlp phase-to-phase or phase-
to-neutral fault: BTC opens, WTS shuts down, accessory power
is distributed dl other than 3-phase.
Grounded Conductor: fault "n one high voltage con^ucto
BTC opens, WTS shuts down; accessory power is distributed at
•Lhan S-phd^y.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
- CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 _5ZL
25 1143
25 1143
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 WTS shuts down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 For generator protprtmn^ coo FMFA 7 ? i ?
1-3 For accessory power utilization equipment protection (TBA) see FMEA 7.2.2.1,
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH PATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Revision:
10/16/78G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER R6V. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER FEEDER
TO THE TOWER JUNCTION BOX
PAGE
FMEANO 7.2.2.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF NECESSARY POWER FROM THE BUS TIE
BREAKER UNIT TO THE ACCESSORY POWER JUNCTION BOX AT THE BASE OF THE TOWER.
FAILUREMODESSi EFFECTSi Open circuit: accessory power is distributed at other than
3-phase.
2 Short circuit: fused manual disconnect may fuse and accessory
power distributed at other than 3-phase.
3 Grounded conductor- fused manual disconnect fuses and
accessory power distributed at other^than 3-phase.
- APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F. G. H
F, G, H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .13 1800
25 .13 3600
25 .13 3600
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3 WTS shut down.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If power phase faulted is supplying the control system, WTS will go into
emergency shutdown; if one of the other two phases, the WTS will probably
shut down.
6. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV 10/16/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER FEEDER TC
THE NACELLE
PAGE 1 31
FMEANO 7.2.2.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF NACELLE ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE JUNCTION BOX AT THE
BASE OF THE TOWER ;TO THE CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM AT THE YAW BEARING.
FAILURE MODE5& EFFECTSi Open Circuit APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Short Circuit
F.G.H
3 Grounded Conductor
F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
>1500
_25_ >3000 .- X
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3 WTS shutdown.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Same as FMEA 7.2.2.1
TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Kev. iu/ lb/ /o
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER CABLE T(
THE TOWER CONTROL UNIT
PAGE 132
FMEANO 7.2.2.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE BUS TIE CIRCUIT
BREAKER UNIT TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM'S TOWER CONTROL UNIT LOCATED INSIDE THE BASE OF
THE TOWER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Open circuit: loss of capability to communicate with nacelle APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
control system. Maintenance
2 Short circuit: Same as #1
Maintenance
3 Grounded Conductor. Same as #1
Maintenance
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"* PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .13 1800
-25- O3- 3600
25 .13 3600
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-3 None remotely
R 1-3 On Site: Inability to manually operate the WTS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE8/1 7/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/16/8
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV I
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER CABLE TO
THE LIFT SYSTEM
PAGE 133
F M E A N O 7 - 2 . 2 . 4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE BUS TIE BREAKER
UNIT TO THE LIFT SYSTEM LOCATED IN THE BASE OF THE TOWER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS "i Open Circuit: Elevator will not operate APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
.Maintenance.
2 Short Circuit: Elevator protective circuit breaker trips,
elevator will not operate Maintenance
3 Grounded Conductor: Elevator protective circuit breaker trips,
elevator will not operate Maintenance
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500
_25_ >3000
25 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 On-site elevator does not operate, associated circuit breaker is tripped
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) .'
Emergency egress from thp lift is via a ladder with safety rail
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITI ON "TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT! ON TO OP EH ATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. KJ/ID//8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER FEEDER T(
TOWER ELECTRICAL FACILITIES
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FMEANO 7.2.2.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE BUS TIE BREAKER UNIT TO THE
ELECTRICAL FACILITIES LOCATED AT THE FOOT OF THE TOWER
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Open Circuit- lights or utility outlets not functional APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
Maintenance
2 Short Circuit- protective circui't breaker trips and lights or
utility outlets not functional Maintenance
3 Grounded Conductor, Proctective circuit breaker trips and lights
or utility outlets not functional Maintenance
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50
25
•1L
.15
>1500
>3000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3 None remotely
1-3 On Site: Lights out or electrical outlets not functionin g
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATES/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
0 TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/16/78
G OPERATE ReV" 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOHER - EPS
COMPONENT ACCESSORY POWER CABLE 10
THE .POWER OUTPUT TRANSFORMER
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FMEANO 7.2.2.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PART FOR THE FLOW OF ACCESSORY POWER FROM THE BUS TIE BREAKER
TO THE HIGH VOLTAGE POWER OUTPUT TRANSFORMER
WTS shuts down, accessory power distributed at
less than 3-phase.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
2 Short Circuit: Same as #1, fused manual switch for accessory
power may be fused, open. - All
3 Grounded Conductor: Same as #2
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500"
25 .15 >3000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS Shut Down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Differential.protection will'trip the BTC if WTS in "Operate" mode.
G. TRUSK/H. ROTH PATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TOWABWl-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/16/78
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER
FEEDER TO THE TOWER JUNCTION BOX
PAGE T3T
FMEANO 7.2.2.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNINTERRUPTABLE (DC) POWER FROM THE BUS TIE
RRFAKFR TO THE JUNCTION BOX LOCATED INSIDE THE BASE OF THE TOWER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS . „-,„,.1 Open Circuit: No power to operate protection devices in BTCU. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F, G
2 Short Circuit: Same as #1
F, G
3 Conductor Grounded: Same As #1
F, G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500
25 .15 >3000
>300025 15
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 WTS shutdown.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Conservative and redundant design of cable run & careful fabrication should
minimize the probability of this failure mode. If the following faults occur WTS will
non shut down: Utility transformer low oil or overtpmnpratnrp. rpvpyc;p
differential protection.
Utility transformer is protected against explosion and fire. Fused manual disconnect
may fuse open under certain fault conditions.
|NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH |PATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/16/78
G OPERATE RfeVyjl°J2%78H TRANSIT)ON TO FEATHE'B c-'i'°
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER"
CABLE TO THE TOWER CONTROL UNIT
PAGE T37
FMEANO 7.2.2.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER FROM THE BUS TIE
BREAKER UNIT TO THE CONTROL SYSTEMS TOWER CONTROL UNIT MOUNTED INSIDE THE BASE OF THE
TOWER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Open circuit. Loss of stored data APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
Maintenance
Short circuit- Same as #1
Maintenance
Conductor Grounded Same as #1
Maintenance
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)"
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II ,
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .13 1800
25 .13 3600
25 13 3600
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 - 3 Remotely, None
1-3*
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION OF APPLICABLE)
Data stored in memory is lost, maintenance personnel are not able to use on-site
stored data for trouble identification. Trouble shooting procedures are adequate
to isolate and identify source of malfunctions. , -
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
-Rev 10/177/0
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT UNINFERRUPTABLE POWER
FEEDER TO THE NACELLE
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FMEANO 7.2.2.9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF NACELLE UNINTERRUPTABLE (DC) POWER FROM THE JUNCTION BOX
LOCATED INSIDE THE BASE OF THE TOWER TO THE CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM AT THE YAW BtAKlN
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Oppn Circuit
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
2 shnrt r.irpiiit: Same as #1
All
Conductor Grounded
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .15 >1500
25 .15
_L5_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i-3 WTS shutdown--
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Same as FMEA's 6.6.2.3 & 6.6.2.10
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/7f
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/16/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER EPS
COMPONENT CON'KUL LHBLt
TO THE NACELLE
PAGE i3»
FMEANO7.2.3.1
THE FLOW OF CONTROL SYSTEM COMMANDS AND DATA FROM THE TOWER CONTROL
UNIT INSIDE THE BASE OF THE TOWER TO THE CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM AT THE YAW BEARING
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
is npen rirruir
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
2 Wires short circuited
All
3 Wire shorted to ground
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x Id"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
_5Q_
_25_ >3000
25 .15 >3000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-3 WTS shutdown.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Same as FMEA 6.6.3.5
. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8717/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
c WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/16/78
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CABLE TO THE BTB UNIT
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FMEANO 7.2.3.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE AN UNDERGROUND PATH FOR THE FLOW OF CONTROL SYSTEM COMMANDS AND DATA FROM THE
TOWER CONTROL UNIT LOCATED INSIDE THE BASE OF THE TOHER TO THE BUS TIE BREAKER UNIT..
A
"jUREdpen circuit: BTB does not trip on UTS shutdown command, synch-
ronizer cannot be enabled, utility bus tie or power status is no
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
F.G.
available.
Short circuit:same as #1 F.G.
3 Grounded conductor: Same as #1
F.G.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 .6 400
25 .6 800
_8QO_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-3 None remotely
1-3 On-site1 Review of stored data
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLEI
Protective devices in the EPS will trip the ETC as a result of reverse power
if WTS is shut down.
Also see FMEA 7.7.41 through 7.7.44
NAME G. TRUSK/H.- ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/17/78
G OPERATE ReV' 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER "
78-K -6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM
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FMEANO 7.3.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A MEANS OF TRANSFERRING POWER AND SIGNAL -ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS FROM
THE NACELLE TO TOWER AROUND THE YAW BEARING THUS ALLOWING THE NACELLE TO
ROTATE IN RELATION TO THE TOWER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Qppn mrr.uits nr high-i
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 Conductive path between
3 Conduc.t.ivp path rn
. FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE-
x TO"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
37.6 3.1
37.6
37.6
_3Q3_
J1Q3_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
t> Total for all 'signals
See FMFA's fi.fi. 1.1, fi fi 1 9t fi K ? i ^.2.10 for failure
severity and fault dptection
NAMEG. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE
 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/16/78
Rev 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
ELECTRICAL PATH ACROSS YAW BEARING
PAGE
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FMEANO 7.4.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF LIGHTNING CURRENT THROUGH THE YAW BEARING.
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
1
 High
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 Inspection
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Yaw bearing is massive and offers a very Tow resistance path to high currents
resulting during lightning strokes.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES REV 10/17/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR LIGHTING ARRESTORS
PAGE H3
FMEANO 7.4.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A LOW IMPEDANCE PATH FOR THE FLOW OF LIGHTNING INDUCED CURRENT FROM THE
GENERATOR WINDINGS TO THE STRUCTURAL GROUND PATH OF THE SYSTEM. (THESE ARRESTORS ARE
IN THE GENERATOR TERMINAL BOX).
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Open circuit: No protection-against lightning surge currents. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
1
 (YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100"
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS shutdown
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If lightning surge currents reach the generator winding, because the arrestor is
open circuit, insulation damage can-occur leading to an internal -fault. Backup
protection is provided by differential protection and ground current protection.
Careful attention to'"lightning arrestor installation should be sufficient to
preclude this failure mode.
NAME G.- TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/17/8
A - SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
O TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
-F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER"
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
TRANSFORMER LIGHTNING ARRESTORS
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FMEANO 7.4.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROTECT THE TRANSFORMER WINDINGS BY PROVIDING A LOU IMPEDANCE PATH TO EARTH GROUND
FOR LIGHTNING INDUCED CURRENT. (THESE ARRESTORS ARE LOCATED IN THE TRANSFORMER
TERMINAL BOX).
FAILURE
1
ODES & EFFECTS
en circuit. No protection against lightning surge currents. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS Shut down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
If lightning surge currents reach the transformer windings, because the arrestor is
open circuit, insulation damage or flashover can occur leading to an internal fault.
Backup protection is provided by differential protection.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/17/8
G OPERATE ReV" 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOO-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
EARTH GRID
PAGE 145
FMEANO 7.4.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY ELECTRICAL CONNECTION WITH THE EARTH TO PROVIDE A CURRENT
PATH FOR LIGHTNING AND ELECTRICAL FAULT CURRENTS^
FAILURE MODES 8( EFFECTS -i Open circuit possible: erratic relay operation, possible
high potential between structures and earth.
APPLICABLE '
OPERATING MODES
All
2 High resistance circuit: same as #1.
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
_25_ _4QO_
75 1.1 133
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-2 None remotely.
J 1-2 On-site: erratic relay operation.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
During faults or lightning,lethal potential differences can occur between equipment
and earth when the earth connection is either open circuited or has a high resistance.
During normal operation protective relays may operate inadvertently to result in WTS
shutdown and possible shock hazards to personnel may exist due to unbalanced loads.
Special precautions will be taken to assure that grounds are properly installed and
that earth/ground resistance is at safe levels.
If site is occupied- O&M Manual will prohibit maintenance during storms.
Without periodic inspections. With periodic inspections, frequency is over
100,000 years between failure.
NAME Q. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
KLV 1U/1///8
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
CONNECTION TO EARTH GRID
PAGE
FMEANO 7.4.5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF LIGHTNING INDUCED CURRENTS AND ELECTRICAL FAULT
CURRENTS IN THE WTS STRUCTURE TO THE EARTH GRID TO ALLOW THEIR SAFE DISSIPATION.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Same as FM.EA 7.4.4
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x Iff6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEA'RS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
If
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1 1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Same as FMEA 7.4.4.
|NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATES/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
10/17/78
Rev. 10/25/78
G OPERATE '
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
BTBU ENCLOSURE
PAGE 147
FMEANO 7.6.1.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A WEATHERPROOF HOUSING, A MOUNTING BASE AND A MEANS OF CONVENIENT
ACCESS TO ALL THE 'EQUIPMENT AND WIRING PACKAGED UITHIN THE BUS TIE BREAKER UNIT.
LURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Enclosure leaks water or sand/dust into enclosure. APP LICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILUR.E
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
Inspection
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Proper positioning of parts to minimize water entering live circuits by
baffling, channeling and drip proofing as well as close detail to
weather-proofing or enclosure and drainage will preclude electrical
failures due to water- and participate damage.
NAME
 G- TRUSK/H. ROTH |DATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/17/7
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY '
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOUFR -EPS
COMPONENT
BUS TIE CONTACTOR (BTC)
PAGE
FMEANO 7.6.1.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE A REMOTELY OPERATED, HIGH VOLTAGE, HIGH CURRENT. ELECTRICAL SWITCH TO PERMIT.
THE FREQUENT CONNECTING AND DISCONNECTING OF THE UTS ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT TO THE
UTILITY TRANSMISSION LINE.
FAILURf
1 t UTS CANNOT BE, CONNECTED TO THE UTILITY
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
TRANSMISSION LINE. F.G.H
2 BTC FAILS CLOSED: GCB WILL' OPEN. UTS SHUTS DQUN.
F.G.H
3 BTC HAS INTFRNAI SHORT: PfKSTBI F PHASF-Tfl-PHASF FAINT; BHR
OPENS. RTC (WNS (TF Pf lSSTRIF) , UTS SHUTS F.G.H
BTC HAS TNTFRNAI Fqill T TO RRnilNn- MASSTVF Ffllll T PIF fl
CONDUCTOR: GCB OPENS. BTC OPENS ( IF POSSIBLE). NTS SHUTS DOWN. F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
2.28 100
_2Q_ 167
30 2.28 167
20 2.28 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
GENERATOR POWER INDICATION INDICATES ZERO POWER, BTC INDICATES OPFN,
NOT DEFECTABLE UNTIL A DISCONNECT SIGNAL IS SFNT AND NOT
4 GENERATOR PQJQ INDICATION INDICATES 7FPO PQVJEP., BTC AND GCB INDICATE OPEN.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-4 REPLACE THE BTC; THE BTC IS COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE AND IN EXTENSIVE USE BY THE
UTILITIES AND SHOULD BE VERY DEPENDABLE. .
2 PROTECTIVE CIRCUITS TRIP THE GCB IF THE BTC HAS NOT OPENED AFTER IT SHOULD.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev. 9/8/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP ERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
SYNCHRONIZER
PAGE 149
FMEANO 7.6.1.3.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
DETERMINE WHEN VOLTAGE AMPLITUDES AND PHASE RELATIONSHIPS OF. THE GENERATOR OUTPUT AND
THE UTILITY TRANSMISSION LINE ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE, PRESET LIMITS AND PROVIDE A
SIGNAL TO-CLOSE THE BUS TIE CONTACTOR.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
Tn nPPRATF. UTS TS NOT mNNFCTFO TO IITTI TTY TRANSMISSION
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F.G.H
OPERATES TO SYNC TOO EARLY: MECHANICAL DAMAGE POSSIBLE.
F.G.H
OPERATES TO SYNC TOO LATE: MECHANICAL DAMAGE POSSIBLE.
F.G.H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
F(AI LURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
]E
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1-3 TOO
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
GENERATOR POUER INDICATOR INDICATES ZERO POWER. ETC INDICATES OPEN.
2
 &3 IN EXTREME OUT-OF-SYNC BTC CLOSURE. MECHANICAL DAMAGE MAY OCCUR TO THE GENERATOR OR
DRIVE TRAIN.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Synchronizer is redundant, failure 'of one circuit results in disabling
synchronizer. Resultant failure rate is negligible.
FAT111RF SFVFRTTY MAY RE CATASTROPHIC IF MECHANICAL FAILURE RESULTS.
NAME TRIISK/H. ROTH IDATE8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP '
.D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER .
I FEATHER
Rev. 9/8/78
. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION RELAY
PAGE 150
FMEANO 7.6.1.3.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
MONITORS THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT FLOW IN THE WTS POWER OUTPUT CIRCUIT ZONE FROM THE
CABLE TRANSITION MECHANISM TO THE FUSED MANUAL DISCONNECT SWITCH AND PROVIDES A SIGNAL
TO OPEN THE BUS TIE CONTACTOR WHEN THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT EXCEEDS A PRESET LIMIT THUS
FAULT WITHIN THE PROTECTED ZONE.
Open cimi-it in unrp«:- — BTC trips or cannot be closed.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 Trip setting is too low: BTC will trip too often on unbalanced
loads or transients.
3 Trip setting too high: fault currents may continue to flow.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 21 JLLO.
25 21 22.2
"25" 21 22.2
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS shut down
2 WTS shut down
3
 WTS shut down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. Differential protection senses differential current in nppn phase. Trnuhlp-
shooting procedures will reveal source of trouble, repair as necessary.
2. Reset trip setting or replace differential protection relay in BTCLJ.
3. GCB will trip on overcurrent. Troubleshoot reset trip setting or replace
differential protection relay as necessary.
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE
 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/17/7*
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
0 TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
TOWER -.EPS GENERATOR VOLT!"
PAGE 151
ETER
 FMEANO 7.6.1.4.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OUTPUT VOLTAGE OF THE
GENERATOR FOR USE DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING, TROUBLE SHOOTING AND MAINTENANCE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Does not indicate: no effect
_
2 TnHir.ates hiah or low: no effect J
-
3 "
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE CAHURERATE MEANTIMEFAILURE MODE 1 ^ |LUMtMAIC BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL
MODE NO FREQ % x lO"*5 PER HOUR (YEARS) 1
1, 2 100 1.1 100 X
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i Visual inspection
2
 Visual inspection
APPLICABLE
OPERATING^MODES
Maintenance
Maintenance
-
.
FAILURE SEVERITY
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III _IV
~
_
_
f
„
3 ' -
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (^APPLICABLE)
-
- - -
See also FMEA 7.6.1.4.9 . - -
•*
NAME 6
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPfcRATE
. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
Rev 10/17/78
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER '
' 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
UTILITY VOLTMETER
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUAL VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE MAGNITUDE OF
INTERFACE WITH THE WTS FOR
PAGE 1 52
FMEANO 7.6.1.4.2
THE UTILITY VOLTAGE AT ITS
USE DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING, TROUBLE SHOOTING AND MAIN-
TENANCE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
- i Does not indicate: no effect
2 Indicates high or low: no effect
3
-
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE"6 FA. LURE RATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % * 10 PER HOUR
1, 2 100 1.1
2
3
4
~~-
F
MEAN TIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MAR
(YEARS) 1
100 X
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
-
AILURE SEVERITY
GINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
1 III IV
'
1- 2 Visual Inspection
2 Periodic Calibration Check
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
-
-
-
-
*-
.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH | DATES/ I?/ 8
Rev 10/17/8
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE 6V" '0/25/78
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPtRATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR AMMETER
PAGE 153
FMEANO 7.6.1 4.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE CURRENT FLOWING OUT OF THE GENERATOR
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS j ^ j r 4 . 4 . 4 .1 Meter does not indicate: no direct reading of generator output APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
current
indicates high or low _ incorrect generator output
riirrpnt. data.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
,2 100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 - 2 Visual and calculations
Periodic calibration check
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME "G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 8/18/8
G OPERATE ^v. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
LINE AMMETER
PAGE 154
FMEANO 7 6.1.4.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE CURRENT FLOWING IN THE LINE BETWEEN THE
WTS AND THE UTILITY
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .i Meter does not indicate: No direct reading of line current APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 Meter indicates high or low: incorrect line current data
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
JLOJL JLJ_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
- 2 Visual and calculations
Periodic Calibration Check
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/18/78
Rev. 10/25/78G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR KW METER
PAGE
 155
FMEANO 7.6.1 .4 .5
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS DISPLAY OF THE KW (POWER) BEING DELIVERED BY THE GENERATOR.
FAILU scfolsFEncot! indicate: No direct reading of power delivered
by generator.
APPLICABLE N
OPERATING MODES
2 Meter indicates high or low: iricorrect generator output power
- \ " '
reading 1: x
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
F Al LURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME '
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
'CATASTROPHIC
-_ IV.
V2 100 JLJ. JJXL
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 - 2 Visual and calculations
Periodic calibration check
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
(NAME G TRUSK / H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/18/8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR POWER FACTOR METER
PAGE 156
FMEANO 7.6.1.4.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS DISPLAY OF THE POWER FACTOR OF CURRENT BEING DELIVERED BY THE
GENERATOR.
FA
";uRlferEloelFFnatsind1cate- no direct reading of power factor
delivered by the generator.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 Meter indicates high or low: incorrect power factor data. 1
 G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 -2 Visual and calculations
Periodic Calibration Check
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH PATE 8/i 7/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/18/8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR KILOWATT- HOUR METER
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FMEANO 7.6.1 .4.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE ACCUMULATED KILOWATT-HOURS DELIVERED
BY THE GENERATOR
FAILURE MODES S EFFECTS ,
1 Meter does not operate: meter readings are incorrect. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Meter indicates high or low: meter readings are incorrect.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
F'AILURE RATE,
x 1Q"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECT]ON METHODS
-2 Periodic reasonableness check.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
|NAME H. ROTH/G. TRUSK DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHEB
I FEATHER
Rev. TO/
Rev. 10/25/78
78K'6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
LINE KILOWATT - HOUR METER
PAGE Ib8
FMEANO 7 6-1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE ACCUMULATED KILOWATT - HOURS DELIVERED BY
THE WTS TO THE UTILITY
LURE^ |^ .&(f0I|scnot operate: Meter readings are incorrect APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
Meter indicates high or low: incorrect power used/delivered
displayed on meter All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
X 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-2 Visual inspection, periodic calibration checks.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NMAE G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATES/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev. 10/18/8
G OPERATE Rev- 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS'
COMPONENT
POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER
PAGE
 15g
FMEANO 7.6.1.4.9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-115 VOLT SIGNAL PROPORTIONAL TO THE 0-4160 VOLT LEVEL EXISTING AT THE
POINT OF CONNECTION. THIS SIGNAL IS USED BY THE SYNCHRONIZER, VOLTMETER AND THE
VOLTAGE TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS . . . .i Secondary or primary winding is open circuited: No output
2 <>prnndarv or primary windinas or short circuited
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE^  FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"° PER HOUR
1 20 " 1 . 1
2 80 1.1
3
4
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F,G,H
F.G.H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL
(YEARS) 1
500
125
MARGINAL CRI1
II 1
X
X
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
PICAL CATASTROPHIC
II IV
_
i WTS Shutdown
2
 UTS shutdown.
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Failures of potential transformers associated with control or protective relaying
will result in WTS shutdown:
Voltage Transducer (voltage regulator) See
Underfrequency Protection See
Qv£rvol tan0. Protection ^pp
Synchronizer
Synchronization Check
See
See
Power Factor Protection See
Power Factor Control See
FMEA 6.8.2.1
FMEA 6.8.3.2
PMFA fi ft T 1
FMEA 7. 6.1. -3.1
FMEA 7.6.1.3.1
FMEA 6.8.3.10
FMEA 6.8.2.2
-
For Meterina Errors See FMEAS: 7.6.1.4.1. 7.6.1.4.2, 7.6.1.4.5 through 7.6.1.4.8,
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP -
C WARM UP
[NAME
 G T|
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP ER ATE
NISK/H. ROTH DATE8/17/78
Rev 10/18/78
G OPERATE Rev- 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78-K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
CURRENT TRANSFORMER
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A 0-5 AMP SIGNAL PROPORTIONAL TO
PAGE
 16Q
FMEA NO 7.6.1.4.10
THE 0-433 AMP CURRENT IN THE LINE TO WHICH
IT IS ATTACHED. THIS SIGNAL IS USED BY THE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION RELAY, AMMETER
AND THE CURRENT TRANSDUCER.
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
1 SFPniMnARY UlTNnTNfi FATI S nPFN CIRCUIT : NO OUTPUT SIGNAL.
2 SHORT BETWEEN SECONDARY WINDINGS: INCORRECT TURNS RATIO.
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
MODE NO FREQ %
1
 20
2 80
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION
FAILURE RATE MEANTIMEI- Al LUHt MA 1 1 BETWEEN FAILURE
x 10"° PER HOUR (YEARS)
1.1 500
1.1 125
METHODS
• APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
F.G.H
F.G.H
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
1
MARGINAL (
II
:RITICAL CATASTROPHIC
Ml IV
X
X
1
 WTS Shutdown
2
 WTS shutdown
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Failuresof current transformers associated with control or protective relaying
will result in WTS shutdown.
Reverse Power Protection
Differential Protection
Power Factor Controller
Loss of Excitation Protection
Time Over-Current Protection
Ground Fault Protection
For Metering Errors See FMEAS: 7.6.1.4.3
See FMEA
See FMEA
See FMEA
See FMEA
See FMEA
See FMEA
through 7.6
5.8.3.4
6.8.3.6 & 7.
6.8.2.2
6.8.3.9
6.8.3.3
6.8.3.5
1.4.8
-
6.1.3.2
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSITION
NAME
 G. TRUSK/H. ROTH
TO STANDBY
TO OPERATE
IDATE 8/1 7/78
Rev 10/18/78
- G OPERATE ^ 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K-t>162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
GENERATOR TOTAL RUNNING HOURS
PAGE 161
FMEANO 7.6.1.4.11
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE TOTAL ACCUMULATED HOURS OF OPERATION OF
THE GENERATOR
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS . .
i Does not run or quits running:- No direct display of correct
generator running time.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 Accumulate time too fast or slow: incorrect display of genera-
tor running time.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
F,AI LURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1-2 100 6.8 16.7
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-2 Visual and calculations.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Check wiring continuity torpotential transformer, repair if needed;
replace clock if required.
[NAME
 G. TRU$K / H- RQTH |DATE8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G ^OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev.10/18/8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
BTC OPERATING CYCLES
PAGE 162
FMEANO 7.6.1 .4.1!
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS VISUAL DISPLAY OF THE NUMBER OF OPERATING CYCLES ON THE BUS TIE
BREAKER. THIS IS MANDATORY DATA REQUIRED FOR BTC PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSi Does not register count: operating cycle data for the BTC is APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
incorrect
2 Misses cycle counts. Operating cycle data for the BTC Is
incorrect.
_L,H_
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FRCQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
&2 100 6.8 16.7
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
& 2 Visual
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Operating cycle data is used for maintenance purposes, maximum time interval to
BTC contact inspection and refurbishment will also be used.
NAME G TRUSK/H. ROTH DATES/ 17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/18/8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
Page intentionally left blank
Page intentionally left blank
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
TOWER - EPS 4.16 kV TO 480 VOLT TRANSFORMS
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALL OF THE ACCESSORY POWER USED IN THE WTS
PAGE 167
^ FMEANO 7.6.1 .5.1
-
-
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 Open circuit in primary nr sprnnH^ry windings' No output nr
nnn 3-pha<;p nutpnt
2 Internal short circuit: input fuzed manual switch fuses open,
No output.
3 Internal ground fault: input fuzed manual switch, fuses open.
no outout.
4
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
A l l
FAILURE FREQUENCY -- FAILURE SEVERITY
FAILURE c .MnPFRATE MEANTIME
FAILURE MODE FAILUHtHAie BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"* PER HOUR (YEARS) 1 II
1 50 1.1 200
2 25 1.1 400
3 25- 1.1 . 400
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 -3 WTS is shut down-
2
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
Ml IV
X
X
X
3
4 - ~
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
No accessory power available for housekeeping and maintenance functions
•
See also FMEAS 6.8.6, 6.8.7.1 and 6.8.7.2. 6.8.8.2-6.8.8.4. 6.9.1-6.9.3.
7.2.2.1-7.2.2.9, 7.6.1.6.2, 7.6.1.7.3-7.6.1.7.5
j
-
 NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE
 8/1 7/78
OPERATING MODES R6V 10/17/7J
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE ' "' '°
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT TRANSFORMER
480 VOLT TO 115/230 VOLT
PAGE
 168
FMEANO 7.6.1.5.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALL OF THE 115/230 VOLT ACCESSORY POWER USED IN THE TOWER BELOW THE CABLE
TRANSITION MECHANISM.
FAILURE.MODESa EFFECTS
1 No output clue to no input: no power for tower and base lights. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
convenience outlets, housekeeping and maintenance functions. Maintenance
2 No output due to internal fault: circuit breaker trips, thpn
same as #1. Maintenance
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
100 1.1
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1-2 None,remotely
?l-2 On-site: no lights, stored data or convenience outlet power for troublp-
~Zshooting/repair equipment.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Portable source of power required to effect troubleshooting/repair operations.
Reset circuit breaker or replace transformer as required.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV 10/17/78
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
BATTERY
TAG!F615
FMEANO 7.6.1.6.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER (DC) WHEN POWER FROM OTHER SOURCES IS NOT AVAILABLE.
SUPPLIES THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM PROTECTIVE RELAYS AND PORTIONS OF THE CONTROL
SYSTEM.
FAILURE JMQDE.S & EFFECTSi Discharged: WTS shuts down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
All
2 Overcharged/Overheated. DC output voltage too high
All
3 Under temperature: DC output voltage is too low would result
in WTS shut down. All
Battery Internal Fault: Same as FM. 1 if many cells are shorted
WTS shutdown if open'circuited. .
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1,4 70 11.4 14.3
29 11.4 34.5
11.4 1000
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i WTS shuts down. On-site trouble shooting
2 On-site inspection of data.\jn j  uc IIIOJJC^UIUM wi uu uu •
jJone until needed, then emergency shut down
4
 Same as FM 1
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Loss of battery supply 48V power results in WTS failsafe shutdown. Battery
monitoring circuit detects open battery, line.
See also FMEA's 6.6.2.10. 6.8.8.4. 7.6.1.6.2 and 7.6.1.76
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev. 10/17/8
Rev .--• Ky-257<-7e-
78-K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER -EPS
COMPONENT
BATTERY CHARGER
PAGE
FMEANO 7.6 1 -6.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
WHEN ENERGIZED. MAINTAINS THE BATTERY IN A STATE OF FULL CHARGE AND SUPPLIES UNINTERRU
ABLE POWER (DC).
(not regulating properly): Battery overcharge
DC voltage is high.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 Output low (not regulating properly)- DC voltage is low and
battery is undercharged. All
3 No output, battery will be dischargecUJdTS will shut down.
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(1EARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
25 2.3 200
25 2.3 200
_50_ 2.3 100
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 None - Requires on-site check
2 None - requires on-site check (if very ''low, UTS may shut down),
3 WTS shutdown (after battery discharges)
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Periodic inspection
See also FMEA 7.6.1.6.1
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/17/8
G OPERATE Rev. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
BATTERY HEATER
PAGE
'FMEANO
T7T
7.6.1.6,
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
MAINTAINS THE BATTERY TEMPERATURE AT OR ABOVE THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE LIMIT WHICH IN
TURN MAINTAINS THE BATTERY OUTPUT VC^GET~HEATER IS ENERGIZED BY THE ACCESSORY
POWER SYSTEM.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .
1 Heater is open circuit: Battery may be too cold. (See FMEA
7.e.i.e.n ;
--APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
2 Hpator thprmostat is short circuited or stuck shut: battery may
overheat and fail.* All
3 No accessory power available: Same as
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
X 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 2.3 100
-25- 2.3 200
25 _2QQ_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
& 3 None until battery power is needed.
None until battery is destroyed or maintenance personnel inspect.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1 & 3 Redundant heaters are provided.
Periodic inspection of battery electrolyte level and case temperature
is necessary.
See also FMEA 7.6.1.6.2
Pressure relief is provided to prevent dangerous pressure buildup.
NAME G. -TRUSK/H.' ROTH DATE 8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/17/8
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
HIGH VOLTAGE INPUT BUS
PAGE 172
FMEANO 7.6.1.7.1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A POINT OF CONNECTION FOR THE INCOMING HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLES AND A PATH
FOR POWER FLOW TO THE GENERATOR SIDE OF THE BUS TIE BREAKER.
L;UR^periEScnrcLn't: WTS will not enter operate mode or will shut down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
F, G
2 Short circuit. Same as
F, G
3 Grounded conductor: Same as #1
F. G
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV -
50 1.1
-20JL
25 1.1 _400_
25 1.1 _4QQ_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i -3 WTS is shut down.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Protective relays prevent BTC from closing or trip the BTC.
[NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE8/17/8
OPERATING MODES Rev. 10/17/8
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSIT! ON TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
HIGH VOLTAGE OUTPUT BUS.
PAGE
FMEANO 7.6.1.7.2
;UNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A POINT OF CONNECTION FOR THE OUTGOING HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLES AND A
PATH FOR POWER FLOW TO THE UTILITY SIDE OF THE BUS TIE BREAKER.
FAILUREMODES* EFFECTS , , . . . .
1 Open circuit: WTS will not enter operate mode or will shut
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
down. F,G
Short circuit: same as
3 Grounded conductor: same as #1
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 "200
1.1 400
1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 -3 WTS is shut down.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1-3 Control system will not permit "operate" mode if utility power is sensed as
not present or diff. prot. will trip BTC.
See also FMEA 7.2.1.1 through 7.2.2.9.
!NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A-SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
REV 10/17/78
G OPERATE ^V. 10/25/78
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT 480 VOLT ACCESSORY
POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
PAGE 174
FMEANO 7.6.1.7.:
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF 480 VOLT ACCESSORY POWER WITHIN THE BUS
TIE BREAKER.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Open Circuit: I n<;<: nf inHi viHnal Inari funrtinn.
2 Short circuit, circuit breaker trips then same as No. 1
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
3 Conductor grounded•• Same as No. 2
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x Iff6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARSI
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 _20Q_
25 1.1 400
25 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 -3 None,remotely
1-3 Onsite: loss of individual function
\
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FHEA 7.2.2.1 through 7.2.2.9. 6.8.7.1
NAME H. ROTH/G. TRUSK DATE8/17/78
kev IU/I///8
Rev. 10/25/78OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C - WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-OOI REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOMER - EPS
COMPONENT H5/230 VOLT ACCESSORY
POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
PAGE 175
FMEANO 7.6.1.7.4
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF 115/230 VOLT ACCESSORY POUER WITHIN THE BUS TIE
BREAKER
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS , - , „ „ , .
i Open circuit: loss of individual 115/230 V load function if
feeder to tower.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
2 Short circuit: circuit breaker trips, then same as #1.
All
3 Grounded conductor: same as #2.
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY *
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 1.1 zoa
40025 1.1
1.1 400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 - 3 None, remotely
1-3 On-sUe: loss of individual function
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
*See individual FMEA sheets.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTK DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
t FEATHER
TCEV iU/ l / /7O
Rev. 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER CIF
PAGE
 176
ICUIT FMEANO 7. 6.1. 7. E
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF UNINTERRUPTABI F POWER WITHIN
THE BUS TIE BREAKER. -
FAILURE MODESfc EFFECTS
i Open circuit: power not available for operating prntPrti
relays in BTCU or to tower/nacellp
2 Short circuit: same as Nn. 1
3 Grounded conductor same as No. 1
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAiLURE MODE0"' FA. LURE RATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~" PER HOUR
1 50 1.1
2 25 1.1
3 25 1.1
4
FAILU
MEANTIME
1ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) 1 II
200
400
400
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
VP OPERATING MODES
- Al-l
ALL
ALL
RE SEVERITY
L CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III ' IV
X
X
X
1 -3 WTS shuts down
2
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
See FMEA's 6.8.8.4, 7.2.2.8. 7.2.2.9.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
NAME G. TRUSK/H. F!OTH DATE 8/1 7/78
Rev 10/17/78
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSIT! ON TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78-K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
CONTROL CIRCUIT
PAGE 177
FMEANO 7.6.1.7.6
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A PATH FOR THE FLOW OF CONTROL SYSTEM COMMANDS AND DATA WITHIN
THE BUS TIE BREAKER.
:AILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i_ Open circuit: associated relay-will not, function, loss of
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
Circuit prnte&t-ion; In*;-; nf Hata F.G.
,Short circuit: Same as No. 1.-or relay functions inadvertently
causing WTS-shutdown. . JEJL
Grounded conductor: same as No. 1
F.G.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR'
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
'(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
50 JLQQ_
25 2.3 200
25 2.3 200
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
-3 WTS shutdown
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
Generator protective circuits will trip the GCB if failure in BTCU
jeopardizes the generator.
See also FMEA 7.2.3.2.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/17/7
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT
POWER OUTPUT TRANSFORMER
PAGE 178
FMEANO 7.6.2
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
MATCHES THE OUTPUT VOLTAGE OF THE WTS GENERATION SYSTEM WITH THE VOLTAGE OF THE
INTERFACING UTILITY POWER TRANSMISSION LINE.
windnng: WTS shuts down APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2 Short circuited windings: WTS shuts down, fused manual discon-
nect switch fuses open.
3 Winding shorted to ground, same as #2
4 Oil overheated- WTS shuts down
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
1 -3 90 1.1 m.i
_LQ_ JLJ_ icon
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 -4 WTS shuts down
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLEl
Also FMEA 7.2.1.4.
!NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH DATE8/17/8
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
Rev 10/17/8
Rev 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
TOWER - EPS
COMPONENT *
FUSED MANUAL DISCONNECT SWITCH
PAGE
FMEANO 7.6.3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES A MEANS OF TOTALLY ELECTRICALLY ISOLATING THE WTS FROM THE UTILITY AND
PROVIDES A FAIL-SAFE VISUAL INDICATION THAT THE CIRCUIT IS OPEN.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i Open circuit: WTS shuts dnwn- nrr r^nnnt <:tart up
APPLICABLE -
OPERATING MODES
2 Stuck shut: cannot disconnect WTS from utility.
All
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x Kf6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
90 Jfii.
10 .7 1666
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS shut down.
2 Requires manual check.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE) '
If switch cannot be closed or if it fuses open. WTS will either shut down or will
not transition -to operate.
If switch is stuck shut, WTS cannot be disconnected from utility but fused
protection is still available. Bus tie contactor and generator circuit
breakers continue to function.
NAME G. TRUSK/H. ROTH [DATE 8/17/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
REV 10/17/78
REV 10/25/78
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
Page 179.1-
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM - FAILURE FREQUENCY
Based on the analysis contained in sheets 180-257, there
are no catastrophic failure modes that can be caused by a
control system failure. Trade studies completed during
conceptual design concluded that a single thread system
was most cost effective; therefore, no effort has been
made to compute failure frequencies for individual signal
lines. The cumulative failure rate for the' entire control
system is three failures per year.
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM (NCV)
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ORDERLY SHUT DOWN & RESTART
COMPONENT
POWER FAIL RESTART CKT
OF COMPUTER DURING POWER INTERRUPTION.
PAGE jgQ
FMEANO . 7.7.1
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 INTERRUPT LINE SHORTS POWER FAIL INTERRUPT ACTIVATES-EMERGFNP.Y
SHUT DOWN APTTVATFrL
2 JNTFRBIIPT I IMF nPFNS-PnWFR FATI HOPS NOT DPFRATF ON PflWFR
INTERRUPT.
3 PF STATUS FAILS HIGH-CAUSES INITIALIZATION ON POWER FAIL INTERP
•
4 PF STATUS FAILS LOW-CAUSES POWER FAIL EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN ON
START UP.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE""' "A.LURERATE ,
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR
'.4
2
,3
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL_
UP"
ALL
B-C
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
iETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) I II
X
,
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
i SYSTEM WILL NOT RESTART: POWER INDICATION MANUAL CONTROL BOX BLINKS.
2
 ERATIC OPERATION
3
 ERATTf, OPERATION
4
 SYSTEM WILL NOT START
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
-
"
| NAME j. HUTTON
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE
 8/11/78
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
CPU. PROM ft DATA RIIS
PAGE
 181
FMEANO 7 7 9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
STORES AND OPERATES COMPUTER PROGRAM.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i CPU FAILURE-CONTROI OUTPUTS ARF NOT UP-DATFn PR fin in "0"
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
_ALL
2 PROM OR DATA RMS FATI IIPFS-FPATTr mMPIITFP PES'JLTS
SAME AS OTHER CQNTRQI SYSTFM FMFA-RFNFRAI I V <;AMF flS r.PII FATI MBF
3 _
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CRT AND SYSTEM DOES NOT RESPOND TO CHANGES & FAIL SAFE SYSTFM SHUTS HOWN Mrs UIHFN
UNSAFE CONDITIONS ARISE.
2. SEE 1 ABOVE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
.1- MUTTON I PATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SI1R SYSTEM
COMPONENT
INTERRUPT LOGIC
PAGE
FMEANO 7 7 3
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES CYCLING & SEQUENCING OF COMPUTER FUNCTIONS
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 I/If! SFP. TNT PIIISF FATIS-mMPIITFR STOPS IIPnflTfNR HATfl INPUTS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
CONTROL OUTPUTS ALL
2 1/10 SEC INT PULSE CDT PARTIAL FAILURE SHORTENING CONTROL CYCLE.
_ALL
3 IAB INTERRUPTS FAIL-ANALOG DATA INPUT STOPS
4 SIO INTERRUPTS FAIL-CRT SERVICING 'STOPS
Al 1
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURESEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
y
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CRT & SYSTEM DOES NnTRFSPONn TO CHANGFS
FAIIIT FIAG SHOWS TNCOMPI FTF CONTROI rYf.l F.
3 FAULT FLAG SHOWS INCOMPLETE CONTROL CYCLE.
4
 CRT DOES NOT RESPOND TO CHANGES.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
MUTTON DATE8/-ll/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITIONJTO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162O01 REV 1
Page intentionally left blank 
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
rnNTRni SIIR ^Y^TFM (wrv)
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES INTERFACE BETWEEN
COMPONENT
SERIAL I/O CKTS.
COMPUTER AND CRT TERMINALS.
PAGE TO/I
FMEANO 7.7.5
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1
 INTERMITTENT pfll" "^ ANn N
CONTROL WILL BE INCORRECT.
QISE-r.RT DISPIAY VITI I RF TNf.nRRFn
2 HARD FAILURE-CRT DISPLAY AND CONTROL INOPERATIVE.
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE PAI IURFRATEFAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 DISPLAY ERRATIC
2
 DISPLAY DOES NOT WORK
FAILUF
MEAN TIME
JETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) I II
X
X
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
-
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
"
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
'
-
' -
,
I NAME J . MUTTON
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE
 8/11/78
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM fNCVl
COMPONENT
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM
PAGE
FMEANO 7 7 fi
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES REDUNDANT SHUT DOWN TAPARTI TTY TN THF FVFNT HF PRIMARY mNTRni
FAILURES.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i RELAY COILS. ALL CONTACTS OPEN. All UITRFS OPFM FyfPPT MflMllfll
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
RESET-CAUSES SYSTEM SHUT DOWN B-H
2 CONTACTS SHORTED-REDUNDANT SHUT DOWN CAPABILITY IS LOST
B-H
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAIL SAFE TRIP DN
FAIL SAFE DOES NOT TRIP MHFN PRIMARY mNTRni SENSES FAILURE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
PRIMARY SYSTEM STILL RESPONDS TO FA1IITS.
[NAME J. HUTTON DATE8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
RPM SIGNAL
PAGE 18b
FMEANO 7.7.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
• PROVIDES RPH DATA FOR THE CONTROL SYSTEM FROM. THE LOW SPEED SHAFT.
•
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1<?HORT rTRHITT Tfl GROUND;
IN WTS SHUT DOWN
2SHORT CIRCUIT TO VOLTAGE
IN WTS SHUT DOWN.
APPLICABLE
rnNTRni, WTI i rumr/nT "n" RPM RFSIIITTNR OPE RATING MODES
ALL, EXCEPT STAN!
; CONTROL WILL INDICATE MAX RPM RESULTING
ALL
sOPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL INDICATES "0" RPM RESULTING IN WTS SHUT- DOWN ALL. FXCFPT
STANDBY
4 - "
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODLEURE FAILURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % x KT° PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE Mir
(YEARS!
_
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILURE SEVERITY
UIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
1 'II 'III IV "
X - ' ":<
X
X
V
-
1 CONTROL -WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
2 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
3
 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE ' - -
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE ALSO MONITORS-HIGH RPM.
„
*
_
.
_
t
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
NAflAE
 R.K. HILDAHL DATE 8/11/78
0 TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
 t
E STANDBY - H TRANSITION TO FEATHER •
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE ' 1 FEATHER
BY
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
#1 VIBRATION SIGNAL
PAGE
 187
FMEANO 7.7.8
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
pRnvrnF*; ai ARM STKNAI PDR pxrpssTVF VIBRATION MONITORED ON LOW SPEED SHAFT FRONT
RFARTNR.
FAILURE
1 S PRIMARY CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR. REDUNDANTLY
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
SENSORED BY FAIL SAFE SYSTEM. ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT. PRIMARY CONTROL MILL SHUT DOWN NTS
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
CONTROL- WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
[NAME
 R K HILDAHL DATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV I
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
iUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
*-> VIBRATION SIGNAL
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7'. 9
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR EXCESSIVE VIBRATION MONITORED ON LOW SPEED SHAFT REAR
(NEAR GEAR BOX) BEARING.
FAILURU E MODES & EFFECTS1 SHORT CIRCUIT; PRIMARY CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR REDUNDANT
SENSORED BY FAIL SAFE SYSTEM.
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: PRIMARY CONTROL MILL SHUT DOWN UTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SY-STEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY^
[NAME R.K. HILDAHL PATE 8/11/7
--725/7'Rev 10/ 8OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITI ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BEARING OVERTEMPERATURE #
PAGE J89
FMEANO 7.7 10
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW SPEED SHAFT FRONT BEARING OVER TEMPERATURE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT rTRr.llTT; PRIMARY CONTROI WTI I NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT, PRIMARY CONTROL Will SHUT MOWN HTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
|NAME R. K. HILDAHL DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Kev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL -SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BEARING OVERTEMPERATURE # 2
"AGE
 19-0
FMEANO 7 7 1 1
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES OVER TEMPERATURE ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW SPEED SHAFT REAR (NEAR GEAR BOX) -
BEARING.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT: PRIMARY CONTROI UTI 1 ' NOT MONITOR
y
2 QpFN riRniTT- PRIMARY rnNTRni WIN SHUT nnww I,IT<;
'
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE"6 ^AILURERATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10"° PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' REQUIRES INSPECTION
FAILUF
MEAN TIME '
iETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAI
(YEARS) 1 II
x
-
"
APPLICABLE
OPERATING'MODES
ALL
A 1 1ALL
IE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III . IV
X
2
 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODF
3
4 -
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
1. FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
„
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
JNAME R. K. HILDA HL DATE 8/H/78
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY " H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER l
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
Page intentionally left blank 
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
TEETER BRAKE UNLOCK COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE 192
FMEANO 7.7.13
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES COMMAND TO UNLOCK TEETER BRAKE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
rnNTRni urn i mr rnMMANn TFFTFR in APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL HILL NOT COMMAND TEETER BRAKE TO UNLOCK
.AL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE'
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10'6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
REQUIRES INSPECTION
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME HILDAHL IDATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES <evTO/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
rnNTRni SHR <;YC;TFM
COMPONENT
 EMERGENCY
flrriiMin ATOP rniwiANn STRNAI
PAGE 193
FMEANO 7.7.14
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
COMMANDS EMERGENCY ACCUMULATOR TO FEATHER ROTOR BLADES & SIGNALS FAIL SAFE CKT THAT
CONTROL SYSTEM HAS SHUT DOWN SYSTEM
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL ACTIVATE EMERGENCY ACCUMULATOR
2 OPFN CIRCUIT; CONTROI Wit I ACTTVATF FMFRGFNCY ACC1IMUI ATOR .
3 SHORT TO VOLTAGE: CONTROL WILL NOT ACTIVATE EMERGENCY ACC1
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE""6 FAILURE RATE „
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 CONTROI IN nr.Kniii Mnnp.
2
 CONTROI IN nr.KDIlT MfinF.
3 FAIL SAFE DETECTS INVALID
FAILUI
MEAN TIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) I II
SEQUENCE
'
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
All
ALL
JMULATOR
ALL
RE SEVERITY
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
Ml IV
X
X
X
'
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY.
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
rAME R. K. HILDAHL DAT£ 8/11/78
Rev 11/1/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
F TRANSIT! ON TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH HYD PUMP, ON COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
194
FMEANO 7 715
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES COMMAND TO START HYDRAULIC PUMP.
FA
'^
UlHM00RPTESC&IRClflCTTf CONTROL MILL NOT COMMAND PUMP ON AND CONTROL WILL APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
MAINTAIN UTS SHUT DOWN ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NOT COMMAND PUMP ON. AND CONTROL WILL
J^TNTATN UITS SHUT HOWN
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO,
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV'
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL Will BF TN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME HILDAHL DATE8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
,E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE -
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH HYP PUMP OFF SIGNAL
PAGE
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FMEANO 7.7.16
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES COMMAND TO TURN OFF HYDRAULIC PUMP.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NOT COMMAND PUMP OFF
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL MILL' NOT COMMAND PUMR OFF
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
if
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT. HYP. PUMP RUNNING
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT. HYP. PUMP RUNNING.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME
 R. K. HILDAHL DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITI ON TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78-K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT ft±
PITCH SERVO COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
 1%
FMEANO 7.7.17
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES rOMMANHS Tn TTP AVIATOR THAT rntMTPni <: Rl AHF TTD 41
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS1
 SHORT CIRC"™"; rnNTROi
WILL SHUT DnWN WTS
WTI I NOT rpMMAND ArilATOR CONTROL !
2 OPFN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NOT COMMAND ACTUATOR: mNTRni <
WTI i SHUTnnWN WTS
3
 INCORRECT ST&NAI roMMANnTNG FIII i POWPB
„
4 TNmRRprj <;Tr,NAl COMMAND wfi FFATHFR DIK IT-TON
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODLEURE •= A, LURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % * 10 PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILUF
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) 1 II
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
lYSTEM OPERATING MODES
Al 1
ALL
RE SEVERITY
CRITICAL 'CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
X
X
X
1 CONTROL WILL BF IN LOCKOUT MHDF
2
 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MOTIF
3
 WTS SHUTDOWN
4
 WTS SHUTDOWN
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
,
'
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
|NAME
 R- K> HILDAH L DAT1fi/11/7R
Rev 10/25/78 •
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G - OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT #2
PITCH SERVO COMMAND SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.18
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES COMMANDS TO TIP ACTUATOR THAT CONTROLS BLADE TIP #2
FAILURE MOOES & EFFECTS
1 SHDRT rTRriITT; r.ONTRni UTI I NftT mMMANH AP-TIIATOR: MNTRni SYSTEM
APPLICABLE
OPEF1ATING MODES
Mil I SHUT nOUN UTS ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NOT COMMAND ACTUATOR. CONTROL SYSTEM
UTI I SHUT nni*IN WTS
-ALL
STRNAI rnnMANniNR FULL ROWFR
4 TMrnPOFPT STRNfll mMMANnTNR PFflTHFP PfKTTTnN
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTLI BF TN I tir.MUlT MC1HF
WTI i BF TN i.ncKOUT
WTS SHUTDOWN
WTS SHUTDOWN
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME R. K. HTIDAHL DATE I/7R
OPERATING MODES Kev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
#1 BLADE PITCH POSITION SIGNAL
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.19
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES POSITION STATUS FOR ONE TIP BLADE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTSOR MORF SHORT CONTROL UII L NOT POSITION TIPS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
TnfiFTHFR: UTS WILL .SHUT DOWN ALL
2_nNF OR MORE OPEN CIRCUITS; CONTROI UITI
TOGETHER; WTS HILL SHUT DOWN
NOT POSITION TIPS
.AL
rL_rOMBINATION OF SHORT & OPEN CIRCUITS: CONTROI WILL NOT POSITION
TTPSJQGETHER. WTS WILL SHUT DQUN ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FHEQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS CONTROL TESTS POSITION IN STANDBY MODE.
1 BLADE TIPS NOT POSITIONED THE SAME, POSSIBLE.CONTROL IN tOCKOUT MODE.
2
 SAME AS 1.
3
 SAME AS 1.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
.SHUT nnuN win nrriiR UHFN THF POSITION EACH TIP HTFFFRS
NAME R HT | DATE am/7fl
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
J2 BLADE PITCH POSITION SIGNAL 199FMEANO 7 7 on
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES POSITION STATUS FOR ONE TIP BLADE.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i ONE OR MORE SHORT CIRCUITS; CONTROL WILL NOT POSITION TIPS APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
TOGETHER. NTS WILL SHUT DOWN ALL
2 ONE OR MORE OPEN CIRCUITS; CONTROL WILL NOT POSITION TIPS
TOGETHER. NTS WILL SHUT DOWN ALL
3 CnMRTNATTflN DF SHORT AND flPFN CTRri lTTS: CONTROI WILL NOT POSITION
TIPS TOGETHER: UTS HILL SHUT DOWN ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS CONTROL TESTS POSITION IN STANDBY MODE.
BLADE TIPS NOT POSITIONED THE SAME, POSSIBLE CONTROL IN LOCKOUT MODE.
SAME AS 1.
SAME AS 1.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME R. K. HTI DAHI |PATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E RATE
Kev
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BLADE LOCKED #1 SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.21
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES STATUS SIGNAL FOR BLADE #1 LOCK
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT; CQNTfll UTI I I\|QT NinNTTnR BLADE-LUCK. APPLICABLE.OPERATING MODES
.ILL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL HILL SHUT DOWN WTS
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
CONTROL MILL BE IN LOCKOUT WOHF.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
INAME R. K. HILDAHL DATE
 8/11/7?
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH HYP FILTER CLOGGED SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.22
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES STATUS SIGNAL FOR FILTER #1, 2 AND 3
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL MILL NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
.ALL
2 nPFN fTRr.lITT; P.nNTRni U I T I I SHUT JsHS_
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' RFQIITRFS TNSPFCTTnN
urn i RF TN i
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME HTinam |DATE 8/11/7
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2-Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BLADE LOCKED #2 SIGNAL
PAGE 202
'FMEANO 7.7.23
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES STATUS SIGNAL FOR BLADE #2 LOCK.
FAILUFIE MOQFS& EFFECTS
, .SHORTED CONTACT: CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR BLADE LOCK. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
2_QEHLfJRniTT: rnNTROi wil l SHULJDQWNJJIS. ALL
SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL SHUTDOWN WTS. ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO FREO- %
FAILURE RATE
* ICT" PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
. IV ' -
X -
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION.
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
rnNTgni WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
, | NAME o. Kenkman DATE T| iy 78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E RATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 - F EATH E R
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH HYD OIL TEMP HIGH SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.24
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES INDICATION OF PITCH HYD OIL TEMP. WHEN HIGH
FAILU WILL NOT. MONITOR APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN UTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES I'NSP-ECTIQN
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
- K HILDAHL DATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH HYD OIL PRESSURE LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 204
FMEANO 7.7.25
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDE STATUS SIGNAL FOR PITCH QIL .PRESSURE.
FAILURE CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
-ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WTLI SHUT DfMI UTS
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
SIGNAL TESTED IN STANDBY MODE & CDNTRni V IT11 FNH IIP TN I nrKnilT MHHF
CONTROL WTLI RF TN I nEKnilT MOHF
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME
 Rj K> HILDAHL DATE 778
OPERATING MODES Kev lU/15/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
f TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
PITCH ACCUMULATORS PRECHARGE LOW
PAGE 205
FMEANO 7.7.26
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PRfWTnFS STATUS SIGNAL FOR THE EMERGENCY AND OPERATIONAL ACCUMULATOR PRECHARGES.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROI UTI I SHUT DOHN UTS
ALL
3 ,.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 CONTROL WILL TEST DURING STANDBY AND WILL 60 INTO LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION UF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
INAME R. K. HILDAHL DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
SIIR
COMPONENT
PITCH HYD OIL LEVEL LOW SIGNAL
PAGE
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FMEANO 7.7.27
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
WARNS CONTROL SYSTEM ON LOU OIL LEVEL
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT; CONTROL HILL NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
-flL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WTLL .SHUT DOUN UTS
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
i HI
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODF
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
R. K. HILDAHL DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H-TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
r.
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL TEMP. HIGH SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.28
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR GEAR BOX OIL TEMPERATURE
FA
"^
UfST^^TE!;!lf60lT? CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN WTS
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FA.LURE MODE0"" FA. LURE RATE ,
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 RFQUTRF^ PFPinmr TNSPFP.T
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
_
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
JETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
X
TON
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
2
 r.nNTRni urn RF TN i nri^ niiT NinnF
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
-
_
'
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
(NAME D. KENKMAN (DATE 8/11/78
Rev 10/25/7&
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL PRESSURE LOW SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.29
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW OIL PRESSURE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
^ SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR THIS SIGNAL IF WTS IS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
nPFRATTNG-WTI I NOT START TF TN STARRY .ALL
2 nPFM rTRri iTT; rriNTRni urn i SHUT nnuiN UTS ALL'
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
PAILURE'RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
" (YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL MTU GO TNTfl I OHK OUT MMF
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCK OUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM PROVIDES REDUNDANCY
NAME
 D. KENKMAN [DATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL LEVEL LOW SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7 30
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PRfWTnFS A1ARM STfiNAI FHR I OU nil FVFI
iUR|fl8JJf Sft!f(fl!frl CONTROL MILL NOT MONITOR THIS SENSORFAILUR APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT, CONTROL UILL SHUT DOWN WTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQRUIRES PERIODIC INSPECTION
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE8/11/78
OPERATING MODES <ev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL TEMP. LOW
PAGE 210
FMEANO 7.7.31
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL IF OIL TEMP. IS TOO LOW TO OPERATE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT rTRfiiTT UITII MOT MriNTTno THTC cFMQnp
"APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
.AL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN WTS
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FA,LURE RATEF
 I H  H fc
x 10 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL .MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
RFQIITRFS PFRinniC INSPECTION
CnNTROI Wi l l RF .OCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
|NAME p. KENKMAN |DATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL FLOW
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.32
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW OIL FLOW ,
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT; CONTROI UITI I NOT MONITOR THIS SENSOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
-ILL.
2 OPEN riRniTT. rnNTRni UITI i SHUT nnuiN wrs ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
UITI i TFST niiRTMf; STflNnRV MnnF A RQ TMTn
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCK OUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME DON KENKMAN 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES <ev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY ,
F TRANSITIONTO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
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MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL PUMP ON COMMAND
PAGE 213
FMEANO 7 7 34
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES SIGNAL TO START RFAR ROX nil PUMP
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL NCVT TURN mi PUMP ON APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CQNTROI WIN MI TURN nil PUMP ON ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME D. KENKMAN IPATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H 'TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB.SYSTEM,
COMPONENT
GEAR BOX OIL-PUMP OFF ffiMMANn
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.35
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES SIGNAL TO TURN OFF GEAR BOX OIL PUMP
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT rrRHITT: MNTRni Mil I NOT TURN PUMP flFF
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 OPEN ripping-. CONTROI UITI i NOT TURN PUMP OFF
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE~ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN IDATE8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SI1R SYSTFM
COMPONENT
ROTOR BRAKE COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
 215
FME'ANO 7 7 Ifi
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES SIGNAL TO ACTIVATE NTS ROTOR
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT f.TRrilTT. RRAKFS UITI I RF APPI TFD
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT; BRAKES WILL BE APPLIED
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
ALSO MONITORED AND CONTROLLED BY FAIL SAFE SYSTEM
NAME 0. KFNKMAN DATE K/11/7R
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
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MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
ROTOR BRAKE UNLOCKED SIGNAL
PAGE 217
FMEANO 7.7.38
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
INDICATES POSITION OF ROTOR BRAKE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL ACT AS THOUGH BRAKE IS IN LOCKED APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
POSITION AND UTS WTI .L RQ-INTO LOCKOUT
2 OPEN CIRCUIT-CONTROL UTI
POSITION
ACT AS THOUGH BRAKE TS IN UNLOCKED ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL MILL GO TNTO LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
. KENKMAN 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SIGNAL
COMPONENT
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ENABLES THE GENERATOR TO PRODUCE POWER
GENERATOR FTFI D FMflRI F STENfll
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.29
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS -
1 SHORT r.TRrilTT-; fiFNFRflinR UITI I AlflT 011P1IT POUFR flNH THF UITS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; GENERATOR WILL NOT GENERATE OUTPUT POWER AND THE
WTA WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT -
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
- iv"
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
GENERATOR OUTPUT SIGNAL
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.40
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ANALOG SIGNAL TO CONTROL SYSTEM PROPORTIONAL TO GENERATOR OUTPUT
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SflORT CT'RCUIT: CONTROL WTI I RECFTVF NO nilTPIIT (IP LOW AND SHUTS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
WTS DOWN
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL RECEIVE NO OUTPUT AND SHUT WTS DOWN
3 HIGH RESISTANCE; OUTPUT SIGNAL WILL BE IN ERROR AND ACTUAL OUTPUT
WILL BE EITHER HIGHER OR-LOWER THAN EXPECTED
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
CONTROL WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
MAY REQUIRED PERIODIC INSPECTION
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN DATE 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
8 TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT!ON TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
UTTI TTY PnUIFR STATUS SIGNAL
PAGE 220
FMEANO 7.7.41
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES UTILITY POWER STATUS TO CONTROL SYSTEM
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CTRE1ITT; fONTM! Mill I OSF MnNTTnRTNR TAPARTI TTY
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 nPFN fTRriiTT; rfiNTPQi yfii UTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
' III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
INSPECTION REQUIRED
UTS MILL NOT START-IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME KFNKMflN DATE 8/10 Hi
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BUS TIE CONTACTOR OPEN SI(
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES STATUS OF THE UTILITY BUS TIE BREAKER
PAGE 221
JNAL FMEANO 7.7.42
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL LOSE MONITORING CAPABILITY IF
OPERATING
2 nPFN CIRCUIT: NTS WTI I BF SHUT DOWN
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE0"" FAILURE RATE
 B
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
FAILU
MEANTIME
ETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) I II
*
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
-ALL
"^ ni IALL
*
RE SEVERITY
L CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
A
1
 r.nNTRni WTI i GD INTO i nrKnirr wnnr AFTFR SHUT nnuiN
2 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE
 8/10/78
Rev 1 0/25/78
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHE R
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
COMPONENT
SYNC ENABLE SIGNAL
PAGE 222
FMEANO 7.7.43
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ENABLES THE AUTO SYNCHRONIZER TO .SYNCHRONIZE THE WTS TO THF UTILITY NETWORK
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRTUIT; WILL PREVENT'ENABLE
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
JJ-L
2 nPFN ETR01TT WTI L PRFVFNT FNARI F
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL"
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL Mil I RF TN I nrKflllT MflHF
CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME DONALD KENKMAN |DATE 8/10/7
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
0 TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-OOI REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
BUS TIE DISCONNECT COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE 223
FMEANO 7.7.44
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
COMMANDS THE GENERATOR SYSTEM TO DISCONNECT THE GENERATOR OUTPUT FROM THE UTILITY
PWR LINE
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT fTRf.llTT; mNTRDI SYSTEM -MILL NOT CONTROL DISCONNECT;
PWR SYSTEMGENERATOR) WILL CONTROL
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
THRU T
OPEN CIRCUIT; DISCONNECT WILL OCCUR AND WTS WILL SHUT DOWN
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x ICf6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
SYSTEM WILL NOT RECONNECT AND WILL REVERT TO LOCKOUT MODE
SYNCHRONIZATION WILL NOT OCCUR AND WTS WILL REVERT TO LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE 8/10/7!
OPERATING MODES Kev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD 2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
REMOTE RS 232 SIGNAL
PAGE 224
FMEANO -7.45
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL/MONITOR CAPABILITY FOR THE UTS
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT; MANUAL MODE;
APPLICABLE—"
OPERATING MODES
J1QR_ MANUAL-
OPEN CIRCUIT-SAME AS ABOVE
FAILURE FREQUENCY.
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
PAI lnRE RATEI- l LUHC n«ie
x 10"* PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL,
if - ~ I
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
INSPECTION
INSPECTION
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME DON KENKMAN DATE
 8/11/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSIT! ON TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM LOCAL RS 232 SIGNAL
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES MANUAL CONTROL/MONITOR CAPABILITY AT THE WTS
^VlH^^IRCuTTf TERMINAL WILL NOT OPERATE WTS IN MAN
NOR DISPLAY IWTA
2 OPFN CIRCUIT; SAME AS 1. ABOVE
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
 c a l l l iBFf ,ATF MEANTIMEFAILURE MODE hAILUMCHAic BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR (YEARS) I
1 X
2 ' X
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' INSPECTION
2
 INSPECTION
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D- KEf
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPE RATE
PAGE 225
FMEANO 7.7.46
SITE
MAI Mnnc APPLICABLE
UHL MUUt OPERATING MODES
FAILURE SEVERITY
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III IV
JKMAN DATE 8/14/78
Rev 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT "
GROUND INTRUSION SIGNAL
PAGE 226
FMEANO 7.7.47
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
_ppnVTDES AN ALARM SIGNAL FOR GROUND INTRUSION
WILL WT MONITOR APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT-CONTROL WILL SHUT DOHN UTS ALL
3 .SHORT TO GROUND-SAME AS 2
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
2/3 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION UF APPLICABLE!
|NAME DON KENKMAN DATE 8/10/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
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MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
NCU TEMP. LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 228
FMEANO 7.7.49
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL MEN UNDER TEMP. OCCURS IN THE NACELLE CONTROL UNIT. CONTROL
SYSTEM WILL WAIT FOR LOSS OF SIGNAL PRIOR TO SYSTEM RESET.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORTED CONTACTS-CONTROL WILL UOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
ALL
2 OPEN f.TRrilTT-CDNTRni UT1 I SHUT DnWN UITS ALL
3 SHORT TO GROUND-SAME AS 2
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
-II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 REQUIRES INSPECTION
2 /3 CONTROL WILL BE IN WAIT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME D. KENKMAN PATE 8/10/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
Rev 10/25/78
Rev 11/27/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-O01 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW ACCUM PRECHARGE LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 229
FMEANO 7.7.50
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW ACCUMULATOR PRECHARGE PRESSURE
FAILUR^
1 CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR WHILE WTS IS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
OPERATING-IF IN STANDBY-WTS WILL NOT START ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT; CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN WTS ALL
3 SHORT TO GROUND-SAME AS 2
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 CONTROL WILL MONITOR IN STANDBY MODE FOR "NO" PRESSURE AND GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
2 /3 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME lDATEa/in/7R
OPERATING MODES Kev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW OIL LEVEL LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 230
FMEANO 7./.51
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR LOW HYP OIL LEVEL
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORTED CONTACTS: CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
-flL
2 nPFN CIRCUIT: MNTRni MTI I SHUT DOUIN UITS
ALL
3 «:unpT rn
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i REQUIRES INSPECTION
2
 /3 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN IDATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM SIGNAL FOR
COMPONENT
YAW OIL PRESS LOW SIGNAL
LOW HID. OIL PRESSURE
PAGE
 231
FMEANO 7.7.52
FA
'^
URESH8RflSEf6^CTS; CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR WHILE WTS IS
OPERATING-IF IN STANDBY-WTS WILL NOT START
2 OPEN CIRCUIT. CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN WTS DUE TO THE ALAR!
3 SHORT TO GROUND-SAME AS 2
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE MODE""' •= A, LURE RATE
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR
1
1
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' CONTROL WILL MONITOR IN
FAILU
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINA
(YEARS) I II
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
^ fll 1MLL
RE SEVERITY
L CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
X
X
STANDBY MODE FOR "NO" PRESSURE & GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE
2
 /3 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE .
3 -
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
„
NAME
 D JUNKMAN
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
DATE
 8/9/7R
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G - OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
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MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW OIL TEMP,. HIGH SIGNAL
PAGE 234
FMEANO ^ 7.54
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES AN ALARM SIGNAL WHEN THE YAW OIL TEMP. BECOMES EXCESSIVE
FA
"jUR§fl8KT¥lf CFdW^T; CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR TEMP. SENSOR APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL WILL SHOT DOWN DUE TO AN ALARM
ALL
3 SHORT TO RRnilNn-SAMF
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS) -
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
• IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
2
 73 CONTROL WILL BE IN LOCKOUT HOPE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 D. KENKMAN |DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW OIL PUMP ON SIGNAL
PAGE 235
FMEANO 7.7.56
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES SIGNAL TO TURN ON THE YAW SYSTEMS OIL PUMP
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CIRCUIT WTI I PRFVENT PUMP TURN ON
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
_ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT WILL PREVENT 'PUMP TURN ON
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
X
T
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
NACELLE WILL NOT YAW AND CONTROL WILL END UP IN LOCKOUT MODE
SAME AS
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
KENKMAN [DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT!ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E R ATE
G OPERATE
H-TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-00) REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM YAW OIL PUMP OFF SIC
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES SIGNAL TO TURN OFF THE YAW SYSTEM OIL PUMP
PAGE 236
|NAL FMEANO 7.7.57
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 5HORT CIRCUIT WILL PREVENT PUMP TURN OFF
2 pPFN CIRCUIT WILL PREVENT PUMP TURN OFF
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAI LURE
 PA| . URE RATE MEAN TIME
FAILURE MODE KAILUHbHAIt BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL 1
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR (YEARS) 1
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' cnNTRni W T I I FNO IIP TN i ncxniiT MODE, PUMP RUNNING -
O • j* I1 12
 SAME AS ^1
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL -
FAILURE SEVERITY
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III LV.
- X
X'
f
_
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
'
.
.
,
(NAME
 n KE
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSIT! ON TO OPERATE
NKMAN DATE 8/9/78
Rev 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1- FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW LEFT COMMAND SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7 58
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
COMMANDS THE YAW SYSTEM TO MOVE THE NACELLE IN A LEFT DIRECTION
FA
"^
URSEHQRTESCIRCUITT$CAUSES NACELLE TO TRAVEL LEFT IF PRESSURE IS UP
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
2 (WN CIRCUIT; NACELLE WILL NOT MOVE LEFT AND MEN REQUIRED.
WTS WOULD BE SHUT DOWN
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL END UP ON LOCKOUT MODE
SAME AS #1
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
YAW RIGHT COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
FMEANO 7.7.59
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
COMMANDS THE YAW SYSTEM TO MOVE THE NACELLE IN A RIGHT DIRECTION
NACELLE TO TRAVEL RIGHT IF PRESSURE IS UP APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: NACELLE WILL NOT MOVE RIGHT ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III '
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL UILL END UP IN LOCKOUT MODE
SAME AS #1
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLEI
NAME
 D. KENKMAN I DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C - WARM UP
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F - TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
Page 239
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MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE YAW HYD. PUMP
OFF COMMAND SIGNAL
?AGE 240
FMEANO 7.7.61
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
TURNS OFF YAW HYD. POWER DURING A FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN.
FA
"^
URESH^RT$CIERCUITS PREVENTS F/S SYSTEM FROM TURNING HYD PUMP OFF. APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
2 OPEN CIRCUIT: CAUSING FAIL SAFE SYSTEM TO TURN HYD PUMP OFF.
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
' 3
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
INSPECTION REQUIRED
2 WTS IN SHUTDOWN MODE FROM PRESSURE FAILURE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
|NAME JD. Kenkman DATETI/1/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSIT I ON TO STANDBY
E, STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SYSTEM
COMPONENT
NCU TEMPERATURE LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 241
FMEANO 7.7.6.2.
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES INHIBIT TO CONTROL ELECTRONICS DURING LOW TEMP. CONDITIONS THROUGH INTERRUP
CONTROL.
'
URE
 SHOERT&CEIRCU?T: CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR. APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
OPEN CIRCUIT: INTERRUPT WILL OCCUR AND CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS!
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i REQUIRES INSPECTION.
2 CONTROL SYSTEM WILL BE INHIBITED.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
FAIL SAFE SYSTEM IS NOT TEMPERATURE DEPENDANT AND WILL CONTROL DANGEROUS CONDITIONS,
[NAME p. Kenkman 1/1/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FfcATHEH
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
#1 WIND SPEED SIGNAL
PAGE 242
FMEANO 7;7.63
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
UTND SPFFD PIATA FRHM n
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CIRCUIT
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
_A1L
2 nPFN ErREUIT
-flL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY ""
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i WIND SPEED WILL NOT AGREE WITH #2 SENSOR AND WTS WILL BE SHUT DOWN 'IN LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION INAPPLICABLE!
NAME KENKMAN I DATE8/9/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSIT!ON TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM #2 WIND SPEED SIGNAL
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES WIND SPEED DATA FROM #2 SENSOR
PAGE 243
FMEANO 7.7.64
FAinfl8Rf8AfTififfP
2 OPEN CIRCUIT
3 INCORRECT SIGNAL (RESI1I TTNR FRdM TTTNR, FTP. )
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE rAM ,,RF RATE MEANTIMEFAILURE MODE i- AI Lunt MA i e BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL n
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR (YEARSt 1
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
' WIND SPEED WILL NOT AGREE WITH #1 SENSOR AND WTS WI1
2
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
ALL
FAILURE SEVERITY
/1ARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III IV
X
X
L BE SHUT DOWN IN 1 (WONT MnDF
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME
 DON K
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
-NKMAN DATE R/Q/7fl
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SI1R SYSTEM
COMPONENT
#1 WIND DIRECTION SIGNAL
PAGE 244
FMEANO 7.7.65
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES WIND DIRECTION DATA FROM #1 SENSOR
FAILURE MODES* EFFECTS
PTRrilTT
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2
 OPEN CIRCUIT ALL -
3 INCORRECT SIGNAL (RESULTING FROM ICING. ETC.^
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE .
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x IQ^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 MIND DIRECTION WILL NOT AGREE WITH #2 SENSOR AND UTS WILL BE SHUT DOUN IN LOCKOUT
2 MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME
 DON KENKMAN [DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
#2 WIND DIRECTION SIGNAL
PAGE 245
FMEANO 7.7.66
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
HTNP. nTRFP.TTnN HATA FROM #2 SENSOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10~6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WIND DIRECTION WILL NOT AGREE WITH #1 SENSOR AND WTS WILL BE SHUT DOWN IN LOCKOUT
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME DON KENKMAN DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE GENERATOR
BEARING OVERTEMPERATURE
PAGE 246
FMEANO 7.7 67
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES ALARM FOR GENERATOR BEARING OVERTEMPERATURE.
iUREsT&RTS CIRCuW - CONTROL WILL SHUT DOWN .WTS.FAILURE APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT - UILL SHUT UTS DOWN- ALL
SHORTED CONTACT - WILL NOT MONITOR.
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
Ml
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
i WTS WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
2 WTS WILL BE IN LOCKOUT MODE.
REQUIRES INSPECTION.
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
. REDUNDANT TO CONTROL SIGNAL.
[NAME p. Kenkman DATE 11/1/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FAIL SAFE ENABLE SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7.7.68
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PRQVTDFS STKNAI TO CONTROI SYSTFH-THAT FAT I SAFF SYSTEM IS OPFRATTNB TN A RFADY
Tn
FAILU
CONTROL SYSTEM TO BELIEVE THAT FAIL SAFE APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
SYSTEM IS OPERATING AND CLEAR ALL
OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING CONTROL TO SHUT DOWN WTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
iINSPECTION REQUIRED
2 WTS WILL NOT START & GOES INTO LOCKOUT MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
[NAME
 D> KENKMAN DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAILSAFE EMERGENCY ACC.
PRESSURE LOW SIGNAL
PAGE 248
FMEANO 7.7.69
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
_pRfWTnF A STKNAI TO THF FATI SAFF SYSTFM INnirATTMR THE JJHUS-QE. THE PITCH EMERGENCY
ACCUMULATORS ARE WITHIN LIMITS.
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 SHORT CTRrilTT CAUSING FATI SAFF TO NOT MONITOR
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MODES
ALL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL SAFE TO SHUT DOWN UTS ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x lO^PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
REQUIRES INSPECTION
WTS WILL GO INTO FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APP LICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL SYSTEM I/JILI
OUTSIDE OF LIMITS.
STILL SHUT DOWN IF THE ACCUMULATORS AREL
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G - OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FAIL SAFE PITCH ACCUM SIGNAL
PAGE 249
FMEANO 7.7.70
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ACTIVATES THE EMERGENCY PITCH ACCUMULATOR TO FEATHER THE BLADES
LURE MODES & EFFECTS
1 OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING BLADES TO FEATHER APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
2 SHORT CIRCUIT CAUSING BLADES TO FEATHER ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x Kf6 PER HOUR
MEANTIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS HILL SHUT DOMN IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
WTS WILL SHUT DOWN IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDENDANT TO CPU CONTROL
NAME
 D. KENKMAN IDATE 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
 FAIL SAFE PITCH HYD.
PUMP OFF COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
 250
FMEANO 7.7.71
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
- TURNS HFF THF PITCH HYHRAIII TP PftUFR nilRTNR A FATI SflFF SHUT DOWN
F A
'
U
,
UfS» FAIL SAFE SYSTEM TO TURN OFF HYDRAULICS^
APP L IPABL E
OPERATING MODES
-fiL
2 OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING FATI SAFE TO TURN PITCH HYDRAIII TP.S.nFF ft
STAY OFF -.
-AL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE-
MODE NO
MODEURE
FREQ %
™l LURE RATE
x 10 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
Ij
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS WILL BE IN SHUTDOWN MODE
WTS WILL BE SHUT DOWN IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE
 8/9/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP '
D TRANSIT! ON TO STANDBY
E STANDBY -
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ALARMS THF FAR SAFF SYSTEM
THE LOW SPEED SHAFT.
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE BEARING TEMP.
#1 AND #2 SIGNAL
WHFN FXrFSSTVF REARING TEMPERATURE IS
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FMEANO 7.7.72
PRFSFNT IN
FA7%uWt~?lfcW!eAUSING FAIL SAFE TO NOT MONITOR SENSOR
2 OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL SAFE TO SHUT WTS DOWN OR STAY DISABLE
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE FAN URF RATEFAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE
 £
MODE NO FREQ % x 10~° PER HOUR
1
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
ALL
ID
ALL
FAILURE SEVERITY
MEANTIME
IETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL MARGINAL
(YEARS) 1 II
*
CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
III IV
X
i MANUAL INSPECTION REQUIRED
2
 WTS WILL BE SHUT DOWN IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
3
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL SO THAT EXCESSIVE BEARING TEMPERATURES WILL BE DFTFrTFn
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM-UP
C WARM UP
(NAME
 D< KENKMAN IDATE 8/R/7R
Rev 10/25/78
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY G OPERATE
E STANDBY H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE 1 FEATHER
78 K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE VIBRATION
#1 AND #2 SIGNAL
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FMEANO 7,7'. 73
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ALARMS FAIL SAFE SYSTEM ON EXCESSIVE SYSTEM VIBRATION FOR QUICK SHUT DOWN
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
i SHORT CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL SAFE TO NOT MONITOR SENSOR APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
2_ OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL SAFE TO SHUT WT.S DOWN OR STAY DISABLED
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
MANUAL INSPECTION IS REQUIRED
WTS HILL BE STOPPED IN FATI SAFE SHUT DOUN .
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL SO THAT SYSTEM WILL STILL DETECT VIBRATION
NAME D. KENKMAN DATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT FAIL SAFE C
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM OIL PRESSURE SIGNAL
5EAR BOX PAGE 253
FMEANO 7.7.74
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ALARMS FAIL SAFE SYSTEM ON LOW GEAR BOX PRESSURE
FAI
^
RSEHORTESC&IRCUEITTSCAUSING FAIL SAFE SYSTEM TO NOT MONIT
2 DPFN CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL SAFE SYSTEM TO SHUT WTS D
DTSARI FPI
3
4
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAI LURE , . . . ,RF RATE MEAN TIMEFAILURE MODE i-AILUHtH«ic BETWEEN FAILURE MINIMAL
MODE NO FREQ % x 10 PER HOUR (YEARS) 1
! X
2
3
4
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1
 INSPECTION REQUIRED
2
 WTS WTI 1 BE STOPPFO IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
3
nn cr-Mcnn APPLICABLE
UK bhNbUK OPERATING MODES
ALL
OWN OR STAY
ALL
.
FAILURE SEVERITY
MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
II III IV
X
4
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE!
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL. SO LOW PRESSURE WILL STILL BE DETECTED
'
NAME
 D. KEN
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP E STANDBY
C WARM UP F TRANSITION TO OPE RATE
KMAN DATE 8/8/78
Rev 10/25/78
G OPERATE
H - TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1 FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB-SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE GEAR BOX
TEMP.-HIGH .SIGNAL FMEANO' 7.7.75
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
ACTIVATES FAIL SAFE SYSTEM WHEN GEAR'BOX OIL TEMPERATURE IS .HIGH
FA
^
URSHQ>RfSCIRCUEICTSCAUSING FAIL SAF£ TO ACTIVATE AND SHUT DOWN WTS . APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES <
ALL
2 OPFN CIRCUIT CAUSING FAIL_SAFE TO ACTIVATE AND SHUTDOWN UTS
"ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS WILL BE STOPPED IN FAIL SAFE SHUT DOWN MODE
INSPECTION WILL BE REQUIRED
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL.
NAME
 D. KFNkMAN lDATE»/Q/7ft
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E, STANDBY
F 'TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT FAIL SAFE ROTOR
BRAKE COMMAND SIGNAL
PAGE
 256
F M E A N O 7 .7 .7.7
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
APPLIES BRAKE COMMAND SIGNAL TO ACTIVATE_ROTORJRAKL
FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS
<:nni?T<: ri nsrn x, RRAKP urn I RF FNFRRT7Fn APPLICABLEOPERATING MODES
ALL
SIGNAL OPEN-CIRCUIT & BRAKE WILL BE ENERGIZED ALL
3 INTERMITTENT-BRAKE WILL BE APPLIED AT RANDOM CAUSING EXCESSIVE
HEAT OR PREVFNT NTS FROM REACHING RPM
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREQ %
FAILURE RATE
x 10"6 PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
WTS WILL SHUT DOWN & ROTOR WILL NOT TURN
NTS WILL SHUT DOWN AND ROTOR MILL NOT TURN
BRAKES Wi l l BFMMF OVER TFMP. & SFNSflR WTI I 'SHUT DOWN UTS OR MNTRni kITLI MONITOR A
SHUT DOWN urrs TN i nrEmiT mnF
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL
NAME DON KENKMAN |PATE 8/8/78
OPERATING MODES Rev 10/25/78
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E R ATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 REV 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
FAIL SAFE OVER SPEED
PAGE 257
FMEANO 7.7.78
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES AN ALARM SIGNAL FOR ROTOR OVER SPEED
SAFE SHUTS DOUN SYSTEM
APPLICABLE
OPERATING MOOES
B THRU I
CIRCUIT-FAIL SAFE HILL NOT MONITOR
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MOPE
FREO %
FAILURE RATE
x TOPPER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
" IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
CONTROL WILL BE IN FAIL SAFE LOCKOUT
INSPECTION REQUIRED
FAILURE CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
REDUNDANT TO CPU CONTROL
|NAME R. E. HUTTON |DATE 8/14/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANSITION TO OPERATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
I FEATHER
78K-6162-001 R6V 1
MOD-2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SUBSYSTEM
CONTROL SUB SYSTEM
COMPONENT
TEST VAN READY SIGNAL
PAGE 258
FMEANO '7.7.79
FUNCTION OF COMPONENT
PROVIDES CAPABILITY FOR TEST VAN TO SHUT DOWN WTS DURING ALARMS OCCURING UNDER SPECIAL
TEST CONDITIONS MONITORED BY THE TEST VAN.
CIRCUIT? TO GROUND: CONTROL WILL SHUT DOUN UTS. APPLICABLEOPERATING MOOES
ALL
2 nPEN CIRCUIT: CONTROL MILL SHUT DOUN WTS.
ALL
SHORTED CONTACTS: CONTROL WILL NOT MONITOR TEST VAN READY.
ALL
FAILURE FREQUENCY
FAILURE
MODE NO
FAILURE
MODE
FREO %
FAILURE,RATE
x 10"6PER HOUR
MEAN TIME
BETWEEN FAILURE
(YEARS)
FAILURE SEVERITY
MINIMAL
I
MARGINAL
II
CRITICAL
III
CATASTROPHIC
IV
FAILURE DETECTION METHODS
1 WTS WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE.
2
 WTS WILL GO INTO LOCKOUT MODE.
3
 REQUIRES INSPECTION.
FAILURE CAUSE'AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF APPLICABLE)
NAME Kenkman DATE 11/1/78
OPERATING MODES
A SHUTDOWN
B TRANSITION TO WARM UP
C WARM-UP
D TRANSITION TO STANDBY
E STANDBY
F TRANS ITI ON TO OP E R ATE
G OPERATE
H TRANSITION TO FEATHER
1-FfcATHER
78 K 6162-001 REV 1
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COMPANY
APPENDIX B
Figure 1, MOD-2 Safety System
Figure 2, Control System Block Diagram
Figure 3, Electrical Power System Schematic
Figure 4, Hydraulic Schematic, Pitch Control
Figure 5, Hydraulic Schematic, Yaw System
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Power System « Electrical Power SystemElectncaElectrical Power System
ime overcurrent4-*
0<
'
Generator circuit breaker open
'
Generator
circuit
breaker
ado
'
'
Reverse current
Loss of excitation
Instantaneous overcurrent
Ground fault protection
Power factor error
Differential current
Generator winding overtemperature
tGenerator bearing overtemperature
Generator bearing undertemperature
Reverse power
Bus tie contactor open
Utility power withdrawn
Hydraulic Systems
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APPENDIX C
MEMO K-6265-SS-487, DATED 18 October, 1978, MOD-2 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
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October 18, 1978
K-6265-SS-487
To:
cc:
W. Wiesner
G. Davison
R. Douglas
J. Erickson
W. Engle
H. Davis
Subject:
Reference:
t
\MOD-2\Failure Mode and Effects Analysis ,
, i i , \ <
K-6266-RL-177, Same Subject, Sept. 14, 1978
The shutdown analysis requested'in the subject reference has been
(performed as/part/of/a more comprehensive study on emergency shutdown
conditions. The following shutdown analyses were performed:
Condition
#1
#3
Description
Normal shutdown
Emergency shutdown
Drop load, emer-
gency shutdown
Control system
malfunction
Emergency shutdown
One tip jams
Emergency shutdown
Lose one tip
Emergency shutdown
Shutdown Procedure
Feather at 1° per second,
drop load at 125 kw
Feather at 4° per second for 6
seconds and 1 per second
thereafter, drop load at 125 kw
Drop load, feather at -4° per
second for 6 second and 1 per
second thereafter
Power exceeds 2X rated, drop
load, feather at 4° per second
for 6 seconds and 1° per second
thereafter
One tip jams, feather other tip
at 6° per second for 8 seconds
and 1° per second thereafter, drop
load at 125 kw
Lose one tip, feather other tip at
6 per second for 8 seconds and 1
per second thereafter, drop load at
125 kw.
(2) K-6265-SS-487
The maximum rotor overspeeds resulting from the shutdown condition are
presented below.
SHUT DOUN CONDITION
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
MAX ROTOR SPEED (RPM)
45 MPH 28 MPH
17.530
17.516
18.536
20.016
17.519
17.526
17.529
17.515
19.771
1.5 gust required to drop load
Unable to drop load with 1.5 gust
Have not run these cases but rotor speed should not
be much different than condition 5 or 6 for 45 mph
since load is not disconnected.
Shutdown condition #4 and #5 correspond most closely to the conditions
requested in the reference memo. The worst overspeeds result when the
load is dropped before initiation of the shutdown procedure (Conditions
#3 and #4). The max overspeed, however, does not exceed 15 percent.
Under the other shutdown condition, the load is not dropped until the
aerodynamic torques are small resulting in negligible overspeeds.
COMPA»SIY
APPENDIX D
CABLE RUNS AND SLIP RING ANALYSES
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